FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JVLY

1962

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

the calm beauty of Japan at almost the speed of sound

Never has air travel seemed so serene as when you fly to the Orient aboard a magnificent DC-8 Jet Courier of Japan Air Lines. The world inside your cabin is one of complete relaxation as the traditional Japanese beauty quiets your senses. Your kimono-clad hostess moves with such grace, anticipating your every desire, it is restful just to watch her . . . the way she proffers an **o-shibori** hot towel or fills a a fragile cup with **sake.** In this atmosphere which she so graciously creates, Japan seems to come all too soon.

From San Francisco or Los Angeles, via Hawaii, it is little more than a half day's flight to Tokyo on Japan Air Lines. But it is a flight you will remember for the calm beauty of Japan that surrounds you as you fly to the Orient at almost the speed of sound. See your travel agent for reservations.

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

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Angelo Braccio

In America, you have the same opportunity

Angelo Braccio came to America from Southern Italy as a boy of nine.

The last 36 years, he has worked for the same private club in Los Angeles, raised and educated three children, and bought 53 shares of Union Oil stock out of his savings.

The latter entitles him (along with some 63,000 other share owners) to a report on our business in 1961—our 71st year.

Our customers paid us $546,342,000.

We spent 59% of this—or $320,231,000—with over 18,000 other companies and individuals with whom we do business.

More than 1,500 local, State and Federal tax collecting agencies took another 5% or $27,497,000. And we also handed over to governmental agencies 17%—or $94,252,000—in fuel taxes we collected from our customers.

Wages and other benefits for our employees and their families amounted to 12%—or $67,427,000—of our income.

This left 7%—or $36,936,000—as net profit. Slightly less than half of these earnings—or $17,463,000—the Braccios and our other share owners received in cash dividends. In addition, they received a 2% share dividend.

The balance of our net earnings—equal to 4% of our customers' dollars—we reinvested in the business to expand and modernize facilities.

We are proud that Angelo Braccio chose to become a part owner of the Union Oil Company.

Even more important is the fact that in America any man can become a part owner of a company by investing his savings.

This opportunity will continue to exist for all of us as long as our economy remains free and competitive.

YOUR COMMENTS INVITED. *Write: Chairman of the Board, Union Oil Company, Union Oil Center, Los Angeles 17, California.*

Union Oil Company OF CALIFORNIA

76 PIONEERING FROM 1890 ...FORWARD

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

VOICES OVER A BEAM OF LIGHT. Latest in a series of optical maser developments at Bell Telephone Laboratories, this new model is a solid state type using a ruby crystal and capable of continuous operation. The optical maser (or "laser") generates a kind of light beam that may some day transmit telephone calls, TV and data. Could conceivably carry far more communications than any radio system. Also a remarkably precise tool for study of atomic processes.

The Constant Search for a Better Way

Research and organization of the Bell System are vital factors in improving your communications services and holding down cost

The zest for discovery is a powerful factor in the vitality of the Bell System and its far-reaching progress in communications.

Today there are more than four thousand scientists and engineers at Bell Telephone Laboratories. They conduct research in behalf of the Bell Telephone Companies and Western Electric, the manufacturing and supply unit of the Bell System.

Without the close co-operation of research, manufacture and operations in one organization, your telephone service would surely cost you more and the quality would be less.

Behind the day-to-day research for communications is a program of basic scientific research into wholly new ideas, principles and materials. Out of it have come discoveries that have brought far-reaching benefits not only to telephone users but to many other businesses and the defense of the nation.

It was the basic scientific research of the Bell Laboratories that resulted in the invention of the transistor, one of the biggest technological advances of all time.

The electronic "brains" that are capable of guiding missiles first took form in bold adventuring along unknown paths by Bell Laboratories scientists.

Telephone research and development, which have brought so much to so many, have but touched the fringe of still greater progress to come.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

Owned by more than two million Americans

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

If you do business in Europe talk to the people at Chase Manhattan

And a key man to talk to is Vice President James W. Watts whose area includes such vital world business centers as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Bermuda, the Scandinavian countries, Italy and Greece.

A banker for over 30 years, James Watts has devoted his entire career to international trade and finance. With this background plus his close personal contacts and his first-hand knowledge of business in his area abroad, James Watts, together with his staff of International Department specialists, can be truly helpful to you.

So, too, can Chase Manhattan's branches, representatives and correspondents located throughout the area.

It will pay you to talk to the people in Chase Manhattan's International Department about your overseas business interests soon. Just write to International Department, The Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York 15, New York, or call LL 2-2222 any time.

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





Good Show! AIR-INDIA to LONDON (daily, you know).

Is it possible there's still someone who *doesn't* know? If so, we are happy to reiterate that AIR-INDIA has now stepped up its transatlantic schedule to *daily* flights between New York and London.

Which brings up a fascinating question: why travel like an ordinary tourist when, aboard AIR-INDIA's Boeing 707 Rolls-Royce Jets, you can be pampered like a potentate?

Lavish Indian atmosphere and hospitality . . . sumptuous food and drink . . . exquisite service by attentive sari-clad hostesses . . . these are just a few of the pleasures that await your grateful senses.

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Why Some People Don't Buy Harper's

By John Fischer
Editor

Harper's is a singular kind of magazine, with a special flavor. Some people like it—so much, in fact, that they become lifelong addicts. Yet when taken regularly and in moderation it appears to do them little harm.

In honesty, however, it must be admitted that other readers find it hard to stomach. They complain that it is unsettling—even dangerous—and that its contents are too sharp and pungent for general taste.

Harper's has never been produced for the mass market. Its founders designed it 111 years ago for a small, specific clientele. They had no other choice.

A century ago, before the days of universal public education, the so-called educated class was the only group that had the ability, the leisure, and the money to read much of anything. It was, in effect, the governing class of the country—those people in the professions, industry, and public service who largely decided the issues and set the standards of taste for the rest of the population.

Within six months of its founding, the magazine had reached a circulation of 50,000 copies, a remarkable figure for the time. (The editor—a young man named Henry J. Raymond—was encouraged by this success to branch out on his own; he founded The New York Times.)

Harper's was treasured by its subscribers; hundreds of them bound their old copies into leather-covered volumes, and carried them across the plains in covered wagons or around the Horn to the gold camps of California. By the light of whale-oil lamps they were read aloud in innumerable family circles from Maine to Oregon. By the time the Civil War broke, Harper's was firmly established as the leading national monthly—"a mirror," as a later editor put it, "of American life and ideas."

During the succeeding generations, Harper's has, of course, undergone many changes in format, content, and editorial techniques. Yet its chosen audience remains much the same; those people who assay considerably higher than average in discrimination, intellectual curiosity, and concern for the national well-being. As a result, it has developed certain characteristics:

1. It deals primarily with ideas. Especially the ideas which will make important news a year—or five or ten years—later. In fields ranging from oceanography to economics, from the theater to religion, Harper's tries to find the fresh, seminal thinkers whose ideas may have a real impact on the future shape of the world.

2. It provides a highly selective kind of news coverage. Harper's makes no attempt to cover the ephemeral happenings which fill about 90 per cent of the space in news magazines and the daily press. What it does attempt to report are those events and personalities that may have a lasting historical significance—and it tries to cover them in a more authoritative, carefully considered, and analytic fashion than the daily or weekly publications can ordinarily achieve. Harper's articles have shaken up state governments, labor unions, political parties, and state and federal laws.

3. It seeks an independent assessment of public issues. Harper's keeps apart from any party, pressure group, or commercial interest. It peddles no ideology, grinds no private axes. It tries to reflect the widest possible spectrum of responsible opinion—including many opinions with which the editors personally disagree. It is skeptical of the public relations counselor and the official pronouncement. It has a special respect for the sharp-eyed individual observer who, as Frederick Lewis Allen, former editor of Harper's, once said: "...sits all by himself, unorganized, unrecognized, unorthodox, and unterrified."

4. It welcomes controversy. The mass media usually have to shun controversial subjects, because they dare not risk offending any substantial number of their readers. Harper's does not try to woo everybody—and it assumes that its kind of reader is tough-minded enough to enjoy a lively argument, even when it rubs him on a raw spot. Consequently, Harper's is able to examine the behavior of Sacred Cows—for example, U. S. Savings Bonds, the veterans' and farmers' lobbies, the giant charity fund-raising outfits, and the F.B.I.—with a candor not often found elsewhere.

5. It provides a vehicle for the artist in literature. The short story writer, the poet, the essayist, the critic, and the humorist find here a welcome for their best work—uncramped by popular formulas or conventional forms. And the work of an entirely unknown writer is considered just as eagerly as that of a William Faulkner or Arthur Miller.

All too often these five standards measure the aspirations rather than the accomplishments of the editors. Yet now and then they feel that they have come somewhere near the mark, and that a proportion of the things they publish may have a permanent value.

We hope that at least some of those who try Harper's will find the flavor robust, well matured, and a pleasure. In the meantime, we have tried to explain why some people *don't* buy Harper's. *And* why *many do.*

What better time to start your Harper's subscription? You may have up to 14 monthly issues for only $4.20, at the special new reader's rate.

Harper's



Harper's magazine FA-7
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WHO'LL FILL BROWN'S JOB?

After sympathy, speculation. Natural, human speculation. Who'll fill Brown's job? Someone from the outside or someone on the way up? That empty chair has to be filled.

Management knows the bitter truth, however: that no one can fill Brown's job. Take over his responsibilities, yes. But Brown was at the peak of his powers, the peak of his efficiency when he was struck down by cancer. You can't buy the years the company put into Brown in the open market place.

You can buy one thing, however, as a business man and as a person. You can buy research to help control and perhaps one day eliminate the disease that struck Brown. According to statistics, one out of four employees will be afflicted with cancer. Send a check now to CANCER, c/o your local post office.

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY

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Our publisher writes about Japan in the July issue of SHOW Magazine

LOOK CAREFULLY at the Hokusai-like illustration above; there is more to it than meets the eye. And the *movies* currently emerging from Japan are more than they might appear to be, too. Strikingly, and significantly, they mirror the post-war emergence of a wealthy, cultured and influential middle class in Japan, which is both an important world producer and an important world market.

Frank Gibney, publisher of SHOW and author of "Five Gentlemen of Japan," joins Anthony West and Norman Sklarewitz in a three-article panoramic view of Japanese movies and life today, in the new issue of SHOW. It's on the newsstands now, and costs only seventy-five cents.

SHOW is also available by subscription. Charter rate is only $5.75, or $3.25 less than the newsstand rate. No matter what in the world you're interested in, there's important and exciting reading in every single issue of SHOW—The Magazine of All the Arts. Mail the coupon NOW.

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Statement of Condition, March 31, 1962

ASSETS

Cash and Due from Banks	$1,440,186,808
U. S. Government Obligations	1,089,267,239
State, Municipal and Public Securities	424,801,490
Other Securities	37,096,396
Loans	2,299,768,987
U. S. Government Insured F.H.A Mortgages	86,524,757
Other Mortgages	72,653,593
Banking Premises and Equipment	41,342,669
Customers' Liability on Acceptances	208,104,811
Accrued Interest and Other Assets	32,257,049
	$5,732,003,799

LIABILITIES

Deposits		$4,896,326,181
Acceptances		215,542,530
Reserve for Taxes, Accrued Expenses, etc.		48,386,009
Dividend Payable April 2, 1962		5,859,333
Other Liabilities		14,789,042
Reserve for Possible Loan Losses		93,474,726
Capital Funds:		
Capital Stock ($15 Par)	$175,780,005	
Surplus	200,000,000	
Undivided Profits	81,845,973	457,625,978
		$5,732,003,799

U. S. Government obligations and other securities carried at $252,161,242 were pledged for various purposes as required or permitted by law.

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
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JAPANESE SCRIPT INDICATES THAT MAP SHOWN IS WEATHER CHART AUTOMATICALLY PRINTED BY AN IBM COMPUTER AT JAPAN METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY IN TOKYO. THE COMPUTER CONSULTS LATEST ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS ON MAGNETIC TAPE REELS, COMPILES WEATHER PREDICTIONS DAYS IN ADVANCE.

Drawing the fangs of the Tai-Fu dragon

This is Tomo, a fishing village that sleeps more soundly these days because of an IBM computer.

Since time began, Tomo and a thousand other Japanese towns have trembled under the attack of the dread Tai-Fu, the Great Wind. Typhoons rip across the islands a dozen times a year, moving so fast they often strike before their courses can be plotted by hand. But now Japan's weather experts have found something faster—an IBM computer.

Twice each day hundreds of ships and weather stations from India to the Arctic radio their local winds, temperature, barometric pressure to the Japan Meteorological Agency in Tokyo. There, the IBM computer needs little more than an hour to run this data through complex numerical weather forecasting equations and predict the weather for the next two to three days—a task that would take 180 years working 40 hours a week with a desk calculator.

The computer even prints out its own weather maps, like the one shown, predicting conditions over thousands of square miles. Numerical Weather Forecasting is improving all the time; already meteorologists talk of weather predictions a month ahead. When that day comes, some of the chief forecasters will probably be weather-wise IBM computers, just as

IBM

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

In South America . . . there are 35 Citibank branches to help you do business better in this dynamic market for international trade. These branches are fully-staffed with experienced Citibankers, assuring you of the same complete services in Montevideo as in Manhattan. This advantage is yours not only in South America but throughout the free world for Citibank's branches are located in 30 different countries including the United States. Just about anywhere you do business, First National City is the right bank—in the right place.

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

Bringing the promise of the stars down to earth While deeply involved in helping put satellites into the skies, General Electric has not lost sight of its traditional objective: providing products of outstanding value to serve the varying needs of customers in every corner of the earth. Around the globe, General Electric is working to translate the benefits of scientific advances into increased value for customers. This value is built right into General Electric products which, on a world-wide basis, are providing the power for developing industries and the innovations for better electrical living in the home. International General Electric Company, Dept. IGED-1-62, 159 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y., U.S.A.

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2026.
REMEMBER THIS DATE...IT'S DOOMSDAY

This Doomsday is nothing to scoff at. It is not the work of crackpots. It is a carefully considered estimate published in *Science* magazine by three serious scientists.

These men have been studying the rate at which people have been giving birth to people since 5000 B.C. Then they calculated ahead and concluded that on November 13, 2026 the planet earth will contain 50 billion people (current total: less than three billion). And that, unless our world's production of food is stepped up immeasurably, these people will almost certainly starve.

If our heaping dinner tables make Doomsday seem absurd; if our highly publicized crop surpluses make the Starvation Age seem remote, ponder this:

If those 50 billion future citizens were invited to share our plenty, they could eat their way through America's gigantic stored surpluses *in less than one day.*

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

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE

By Henry A. Kissinger

THE recent meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers at Athens ended with the usual proclamations of Allied unity. A great deal was made of the United States commitment of five—and later more—Polaris submarines to NATO. Yet the significance of the meeting went far beyond this largely symbolic gesture. The Athens conference marked the point at which a reassessment of NATO strategy could no longer be avoided. It underlined the urgent need to resolve the debate of the past years about the relative role of nuclear and conventional forces, the relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of nuclear weapons.

This debate was first given impetus when, shortly after the advent of the new Administration, the United States proposed that the conventional forces of NATO be strengthened—specifically, that they be brought up to the level of 30 divisions agreed upon in 1957. Our allies, in turn, inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, and whether our nuclear guarantee was being deprived of its credibility. We replied that the build-up of conventional forces did not imply a reduced reliance on what has been called the Deterrent. On the contrary, the strategic striking force was being expanded and made more invulnerable.[1] The non-nuclear build-up, far from diminishing the credibility of our nuclear power, would actually enhance it.[2] In short, the NATO policy being promulgated was

[1] Speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, November 13, 1961, cited in *The New York Times*, November 14, 1961.

[2] Secretary of Defense McNamara, February 17, 1962. Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, cited in *The New York Times*, February 18, 1962.

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not new, according to our official statements; we were simply asking our allies to live up to their previous commitment. Our goal was flexibility of response.

This curious dialogue, in which a change of emphasis in United States policy was defended in terms of traditional doctrines of NATO, in many ways only increased the uneasiness of our allies. There were a number of reasons why the NATO goals for conventional forces had never been met. An important one was the fact that in terms of the prevailing NATO strategy these forces did not make much sense.

That strategy had been developed during the period when the United States had strategic preponderance. For the greater part of the nuclear age we could win a general war whether we struck first or second. We could destroy the Soviet means of retaliation at minimum cost. This superiority enabled us not only to prevent an attack on the United States, but to protect our allies by what amounted to a unilateral American guarantee. The Soviet Union did possess superior conventional strength. But it could not set these forces in motion because such an action might have triggered our Strategic Air Command (SAC). It could not attack the United States at the same time as Europe—even after it became technically feasible—because, while this would have increased our losses, a Soviet defeat would nevertheless have been inevitable. Throughout its history, the security of NATO has depended essentially on the ability of the United States to destroy the Soviet retaliatory power—technically speaking, on our capacity to conduct a counterforce strategy.[8]

Any prudent planning for NATO in the 1960s must start from the assumption that the utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe is bound to decline. It is possible to accept the statements of our defense leaders that the United States is superior in strategic striking power and intends to remain so. But the strategic and political significance of this superiority is certain to diminish. For the immediate future—as long as the Soviet missile

[8] The term "counterforce strategy" can be used in two senses: (*a*) as a strategy for general war, specifically for dealing with a Soviet attack on our strategic striking forces; (*b*) as a strategy for dealing with *all* challenges, including the defense of NATO. The author is of the view that in case of an attack on our retaliatory force a counterforce capability gives us the greatest degree of flexibility and may be an extremely important bargaining device. For almost every other challenge, including the defense of NATO, its utility will, however, decline constantly for the reasons outlined in this article. Whenever the term counterforce strategy is used in this article, it will be in the second sense: as a strategy for responding to challenges other than an attack on our strategic striking forces. The article does not argue against possessing such capability, where possible, but against relying on it too much.

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force remains relatively small—a counterforce strategy may remain technically feasible. This situation should be treated, however, as a temporary respite permitting an adjustment to inevitable realities, not as an excuse for continuing to depend on traditional policies.

For one thing, if a counterforce strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true in the case of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives. Given the nature of Soviet society and the vastness of Soviet territory, our knowledge of Soviet launching sites is likely to be fragmentary. Moreover, as missile systems become more sophisticated, missiles will be dispersed—at least assuming reasonable prudence on the part of the opponent—thus preventing one attacking missile from destroying more than one on the ground. Also, many missiles will be protected in hardened underground sites. These two factors will greatly magnify the force required for a successful counterforce strike. Other missiles will be mobile or based at sea, creating the need for coördinating many different forms of attack.

The constantly growing complexity of staging a missile attack is bound to reduce the political utility of a counterforce strategy —perhaps even faster than is warranted by purely military considerations. It will grow ever more difficult to convince political leaders that they should rely on a strategy based on intelligence which is fragmentary, using large numbers of weapons for which there is no operational experience in wartime, and in the face of risks which are certain to mount dramatically. Even if the percentage of the opposing strategic force which we are able to destroy remains constant throughout the 1960s—an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption—the absolute number which is left will rise. Thus the Soviet capability to devastate NATO countries in a counterblow will inevitably increase.

To pretend that these factors will not reduce any President's readiness to initiate general war would be sheer irresponsibility on our part and a convenient delusion for some of our allies. Even our best efforts will not prevent the credibility of a counterforce strategy from declining in the years ahead. It will grow ever more difficult to convince the Soviets that such a capability exists or that we are prepared to run the risks it involves. If NATO does not change its strategy as the missile age develops, increasingly direct Soviet challenges will be likely.

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There are, of course, those who argue that as long as the nuclear threat is sufficiently grave our hand will never be called. But when the stake is the lives of tens of millions, statesmen cannot gamble on such psychological assessments. It is simply irresponsible to base the future of freedom on the gamble that a threat one is not—or should not be—prepared to implement will never be challenged. And if the threat is implemented except as a last resort, NATO strategy would have brought on a needless catastrophe. Wherever possible, NATO should possess the capability to thwart Communist pressures by means appropriate to the provocation, shifting to the other side the responsibility for escalation.

This is not a peculiarly American problem. The reduced utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe is not the result of a desire by the United States to become a sanctuary while turning the territory of its allies into a battleground—as is sometimes alleged in Europe. Soviet strategic weapons deployed against Europe far exceed in number those aimed at the United States. A SAC counterforce strike that destroyed the same percentage of both categories of weapons would leave a far greater number directed against our allies than against us. And the European national strategic forces would not alter this situation significantly.

A general war is certain to be more destructive to our European allies than to the United States. Their inhibitions, as they confront a strategy of pure devastation, cannot be less than ours. If they understand their own interests, they should demand, rather than resist, alternatives to the present strategy for the defense of Europe.

II. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE

Throughout its history NATO has suffered from the difficulty that its strategic doctrine has followed, rather than guided, the creation of its forces. Decisions have been made to meet specific crises, or on the basis of fiscal considerations, or with an eye toward what the traffic would bear politically. Too frequently, more thought has been given to expedients for getting through another NATO conference than to the shape of NATO over a decade.

But whatever the origin of particular force levels, once established they have developed a life of their own. The 30-division goal of 1957 did not make much sense when first advanced—

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except as an estimate of what our allies might reasonably be expected to contribute. However, that goal furnished a convenient target for the Kennedy Administration when it decided that conventional forces should be increased. As a result, goals which originally were not met because, in terms of traditional NATO doctrine, they were too high may now not be met because they are too low for sustained local defense.

Actually, and fortunately, the size of the military establishment on the Continent—some 22 divisions when the Administration took office—has always been largely inconsistent with NATO strategic theory. Had NATO carried out the implications of the prevalent strategic doctrine, the sole function of the shield forces —the forces deployed on the Continent—would have been to determine that a general Soviet advance had in fact begun. At that point, SAC would have launched its counterforce strike.

It was no accident that the 30 divisions called for in 1957 were never provided. For it did not require 30 divisions to establish that something more than a border incursion was taking place. To be sure, in order to rationalize NATO force goals various other functions were conceived—expressed in such terms as "forward strategy" and "broken-back warfare"—but they were equally inconsistent with basic NATO strategy. In case of war, the crucial factor would not be the units on the ground in Europe, but the effectiveness of SAC. Only if SAC were successful could the Soviet advance be stopped, and then the precise number of divisions would not make much difference.

The size of the military establishment in Europe reflected psychological and not strategic considerations. Our allies have always been uneasy about placing the major responsibility for their defense on an ally 3,000 miles away and with a recent tradition of isolationism. No moral commitment could entirely remove their fear that we might not implement our guarantee. They therefore sought to eliminate or at least to restrict our freedom of decision by committing us to maintain substantial ground forces on the Continent. We could not be expected to do this, however, unless our allies were prepared to make an effort of their own.

Thus there grew up a substantial military establishment on the Continent, even though prevailing NATO doctrine could assign no particular function to it. Current disputes within NATO are largely incomprehensible unless we realize that in the eyes of our allies the shield forces have always been considered a price that

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had to be paid for the United States nuclear guarantee, a form of mechanical trigger for our strategic forces. Our allies have kept their contribution at a level high enough to induce us to maintain our military establishment on the Continent, but not so large as to provide a real alternative to reliance on a counterforce strategy.

Another consequence of NATO doctrine has been that it has provided a maximum incentive for the creation of national nuclear retaliatory forces. Our doctrine had defined these as the ultimately decisive weapons. In order to reduce dependence on the United States, to gain influence over our actions and for reason of prestige, first Great Britain and then France embarked on the immensely costly and difficult course of building up nuclear strategic striking power.

This was the situation when the present Administration took office. Our strategic doctrine had defined *any* war in which United States troops engaged Soviet or Chinese Communist forces as general war. This accounted not only for the halfhearted build-up of the shield forces on the Continent, but also for the paucity of strategic reserves in the United States. In any direct confrontation with the major Communist powers, the United States had little choice between acquiescing or launching a counterforce strike.

Since taking office, the Administration has attempted to remedy this situation. However, it has complicated its task by not facing squarely what kind of flexibility it is aiming for. A true capability for "flexible response" would enable us to meet a Soviet challenge at whatever level of violence it might be presented. However, we have justified the build-up of conventional forces in a more technical sense, as providing a capability for a last warning before *implementing* a counterforce strategy. This argument has tended to defeat its objectives as far as Europe is concerned. An increase in our strategic reserve in the United States by three or four divisions does enhance the credibility of the nuclear deterrent for the defense of, say, Southeast Asia, by giving us the physical means to intervene.

In Europe, however, where we already are physically committed, a few additional divisions take on a different significance. There, our frequent assertions that an increase in the shield forces was designed to make a counterforce strike more likely have been bound to appear as a subterfuge for our reluctance to face nuclear war. The need for flexibility of response in Europe cannot be used to justify a counterforce strategy but to reduce our reliance on it.

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Until this is openly avowed, the difference between 22 divisions and 30 will seem unimportant. And if the implications of the impending invulnerability of retaliatory forces are squarely faced, the goals of the build-up will have to be redefined.

These considerations are well illustrated by the concepts which we have used to justify the strengthening of the shield forces and by the concerns these have aroused. As propounded by General Norstad and reaffirmed by President Kennedy, the shield forces —presumably the conventional ones, though this has not been made explicit—should be strong enough to enforce a "pause" in military operations in order to permit the Soviets to "appreciate the wider risks involved." The shield forces, that is, are supposed to define a "threshold" below which nuclear weapons would not have to be used.

But is it really true that at the end of a short period of conventional operations the Soviets would confront more clearly the wider risks of nuclear war? If a full-scale conventional attack were to occur, the Soviets presumably would have discounted the threat of our nuclear retaliation. Why should this threat grow more credible during conventional operations, each day of which would shift the local balance against us? Why should our bargaining position be better at the end of the period of 30 days—when our forces would have presumably been decimated—than at the beginning? What if at that point the Soviets offered to negotiate after having gained possession of their prize? If nuclear war was too risky at the start of the conflict, why should it not be even more risky when the local issue has in effect already been decided against us and when the devastation caused by a nuclear exchange may make the local situation seem irrelevant?

If, on the other hand, it is argued that the Soviets will never dare to defeat our shield forces lest this trigger a nuclear exchange, what have we gained by increasing the number of our divisions from 22 to 30? In other words, as long as a nuclear strike remains the chief weapon in our arsenal, the increase in conventional forces in Europe now projected may turn out to be too little or too much: too little for a real local defense, and too much for a counterforce strategy to remain credible.

The same difficulty applies to the concept of a "threshold." This has been defined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, as follows: "The current doctrine is that if NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by non-nuclear attacks

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from the bloc countries, NATO would make use of nuclear arms."[4] This raises two questions: (1) Who determines whether the NATO conventional forces are being overwhelmed? (2) Assuming this determination is made, how are nuclear weapons then to be used?

With respect to the first question, one can foresee situations in which NATO forces are simply pushed back without being overwhelmed. Will this then be the threshold for nuclear war? What if the Soviets mass clearly overwhelming power in Eastern Europe, but have not yet launched an attack? Or it could be that in an otherwise successful defense individual units of, say, division size would suffer setbacks. Given the dispersal of nuclear weapons in Europe to divisional level and below, it may be that the location of our nuclear stockpiles and delivery vehicles will decide the question of using nuclear weapons for us. This situation may well contribute to deterrence. It is not, however, consistent with an attempt to conduct sustained conventional operations.

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, the question arises how and what nuclear forces are to be used. If we assume that both sides have tactical nuclear weapons in adequate numbers and sizes, it is far from clear that the employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that stage of a battle. With the conventional defense overwhelmed, there would presumably be few shield forces left to stem the tide, even if the attacking units were reduced by nuclear power. *After* a breakthrough has been achieved, battlefield employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose units can by then be dispersed, while the defense has to move its units into predictable areas. In short, if nuclear weapons are to be used tactically at all, it is likely that the optimum, perhaps the only, appropriate moment is early in military operations, or at least while the shield forces are reasonably intact and Soviet reserve forces have not yet appeared on the battlefield.

The ability to reverse a defeat—or an imminent defeat—of the conventional forces would thus depend on the efficacy of a counterforce first strike, and then we are back where we started. If we have a reliable counterforce capability, it will prove as useful when 22 divisions are defeated as when 30 are. If we do not have such a capability, 30 divisions will be insufficient.

[4] *The New York Times*, June 7, 1961.

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Similar considerations bear on the troublesome question of "forward strategy," by which is meant the ability to put up a defense along the Iron Curtain and in particular to protect cities close to that dividing line. It has often been argued that this could be accomplished by a build-up to 30 divisions. If the notion is to prevent a limited *coup de main,* the argument is valid. If, however, the expectation is to hold the central front along the Iron Curtain in case of a major assault, it is extremely dangerous. For the most perilous deployment of conventional forces is close to the main centers of enemy strength, all the more so as the defense is necessarily spread out, while the aggressor can concentrate. Most conventional battles have been decided not by over-all, but by local superiority—by the ability to concentrate forces at a critical point and then to defeat the enemy in detail. An attempt to hold a line along the Iron Curtain with 30 divisions would repeat the mistake of the Allies in 1940 when they were surrounded in the Low Countries.

Of course, 30 divisions are a more powerful force than 22. However, their major utility is in terms of tasks which we have not defined. Shield forces of this size will greatly increase the capability of NATO to defend such allies as Greece and Turkey against satellite attacks. They will make it easier to respond to pressures against European countries which are not part of NATO, such as Austria or Jugoslavia. They may be especially necessary if a tactical nuclear defense of the central front is envisaged—though this goal seems to have been explicitly excluded.[5]

As for the central front, 30 divisions will improve NATO's capability to resist minor incursions. And they will enable NATO to offer a somewhat more prolonged resistance to full-scale attack. However, the definition of a minor incursion is crucial. A Soviet *coup de main* along the central front with, say, five divisions can be resisted by 22 divisions, if not quite as flexibly. A larger Soviet attack would be tantamount to full-scale war on the central front. It is against all reason to suppose that the difference between a Soviet decision to launch a major attack or a minor incursion depends on whether they face 22 divisions or 30. Since the risks of an attack on some 20 divisions would not be much lower than those of a major assault, the Soviet Union would be likely to use whatever force was required to overwhelm the cen-

[5] See reports in *The New York Times* of Secretary of Defense McNamara's presentation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Athens, May 6, 1962.

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tral front as long as that front is inadequately held. In other words, if the NATO conventional build-up is to be anything other than a slight variation of traditional strategy, a basic reassessment of NATO doctrine and force levels is necessary.

III. THE CHOICES FOR LOCAL DEFENSE

NATO will have to face much more explicitly than heretofore the necessity of developing forces for a local defense of Europe. Those Europeans who believe that an emphasis on local defense reduces the credibility of the deterrent are confusing cause and effect. The absence of alternatives to a counterforce strategic strike is certain to create a weakness that invites attack. The creation of these alternatives will demand a greater effort than the relatively minor modifications in doctrine and force levels envisaged thus far.

Two general options are available. The first would seek to strengthen the shield forces and ready reserves so that they could hold, not for 30 days, but long enough for the West's superior potential to make itself felt. The objective of the conventional forces would be to achieve a local stalemate equivalent to the stalemate in strategic forces which made the build-up necessary. These forces would have to be trained in nuclear warfare and they would have to be backed up by a nuclear arsenal to guard against the introduction of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union. However, while the tactical use of nuclear weapons would not be ruled out, NATO, if it adopted this course, would in effect attempt to match Soviet power at whatever level it is presented, thus completing the spectrum of deterrence. If this option is chosen, the goal of 30 divisions will have to be substantially increased and a reserve structure will have to be created almost from scratch.

This course is not beyond the capabilities of NATO. Western Europe alone is superior to the U.S.S.R. in industrial capacity and even in manpower, and the North Atlantic Community as a whole should find it much easier than the Soviet bloc to maintain a full spectrum of deterrent power. The frequently heard argument that NATO must retain its present strategy because its people are not prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for an effective local defense is surely inconsistent with the hope of maintaining the credibility of a counterforce first strike. Why should an aggressor believe that people and leaders who are not prepared to make the comparatively small sacrifices needed to

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assure a conventional local defense would be willing to face the enormous devastation implied by general nuclear war?

At the same time, a decision to rely on a largely conventional defense is not without its risks. Unless we act with great delicacy and subtlety, it could give rise to the notion that the West considers *any* kind of nuclear war unthinkable regardless of provocation. In such conditions, the Soviets could make NATO's conventional build-up irrelevant by threatening to use nuclear weapons against it. Moreover, despite the considerations outlined above, it may be that no Western government, including that of the United States, is willing to make the effort which a heavy emphasis on conventional defense would entail. Failure to meet these force levels would then create a sense of impotence and invite Soviet pressure. Nothing could be more dangerous than to change the doctrine without acquiring the necessary forces to sustain it.

If NATO is not willing to make the effort required for a conventional defense, its other option would be to rely more heavily on tactical nuclear weapons. A tactical nuclear war does not require less manpower at the beginning than a conventional war, and it may even require more. But it is more likely to be fought by ready forces and the use of tactical nuclear weapons should make it possible to prevent massive reinforcement of the battle area.

In this strategy, the conventional forces should be at least strong enough to stop the Soviet forces deployed in Germany and Eastern Europe. This would prevent a sudden *coup de main*. A decisive Soviet attack would require an advance build-up of troops. If the West's conventional forces were powerful enough so that very considerable Soviet reinforcements were required, many targets for tactical weapons would be presented. The purpose of the conventional forces would be to create optimum conditions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Deterrence would be achieved not by protecting against every contingency, but by confronting the Soviets with the prospect of a conflict with incalculable consequences.

The difference between this option and current strategy is threefold: (*a*) Major reliance would be placed on stopping a Soviet attack without resorting to a counterforce strike. (*b*) Nuclear weapons would be used not after a pause and when NATO's conventional forces were on the verge of being overwhelmed. Rather, they would be employed early in the operation, as soon

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as it was clear that a massive Soviet attack was under way. (*c*) The primary use of nuclear weapons would be in the battle area.[6] The most convincing argument on behalf of the 30-division goal is in terms of a tactical nuclear, not a conventional, defense.

At the same time, reliance on tactical nuclear defense is plainly the more uncertain and risky course, even if it is the more attainable. It would require the West to initiate the use of nuclear weapons early in the operations. If NATO hesitated, the Soviets might wear down the defending forces to a point where even the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons could no longer restore the situation.

This strategy would thus enable the Soviets to pose challenges ambiguously and force NATO into an unfavorable war of attrition. The difficulty is compounded by the failure of the West to devise a clear doctrine for tactical nuclear war or to develop forces clearly designed for it. For a variety of reasons, the possibility of limiting a nuclear conflict has been rejected and all nuclear weapons have been stigmatized without distinction as to kind. If these trends continue, it is likely that a strategy relying on the use of even tactical nuclear weapons may involve inhibitions similar to those in a counterforce strategy, bringing about almost equivalent opportunities for Soviet blackmail.

Whatever the course selected, a number of considerations must be kept in mind. First, the choice between conventional and nuclear war is no longer entirely up to the West. Whatever its preferences, NATO has to prepare for the introduction of nuclear weapons by the opponent. *Any* war will be nuclear, whether or not nuclear weapons are used, in the sense that deployment—even of conventional forces—will have to take place against the backdrop of tactical nuclear weapons, and the risk of escalation, even under conditions of mutual invulnerability, can never be wholly removed.

Second, in deciding on the strength of forces required, there is the danger of too mechanical an approach. Too often, the impression has been created that a sustained conventional defense is within reach simply by assuming that the offense requires a superiority of about 3:1. This assumption, which is strangely reminiscent of certain French theories prior to World War II, cannot, even if valid, be applied so literally. The attacker does not require a three-to-one superiority all along the front. He can win by mass-

[6] See below p. 530–1.

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ing troops suddenly at the decisive point and overwhelming it. In conventional war, victories have very often been won when forces were roughly equal. (Germany, after all, achieved its victories in World War II with inferior forces.)[7]

A shift of emphasis to local defense will require NATO to address itself with determination to three other problems: the standardization of weapons, the creation of special forces for conventional war and a reconsideration of nuclear deployment. At present, NATO is equipped with several different types of tanks, artillery and small arms. Though the NATO command is integrated, each national force has its own weapons. In case of conflict, the logistics problem may prove insuperable. It is likely that each national force in the integrated command represents a separate capability in terms of both "pause" and "threshold."

Also, with present weapons a conventional battle of any duration may cause insupportable attrition of the nuclear forces. This is a particular difficulty for the Air Force. The equipment required to overcome modern air defense and to make deep penetrations of hostile territory has put a premium on complex, fast aircraft. The cost of these planes almost impels the use of nuclear weapons for economical operation. Moreover, the number of combat aircraft available today is dramatically lower than it was in World War II. In a prolonged conventional war, a substantial part of the aircraft needed for a nuclear back-up might be lost. If the conventional build-up is to be effective, NATO requires the augmentation of its tactical air forces and the development of cheap, simple planes for ground support.

This raises directly the issue of nuclear deployment and control. Nuclear weapons in Europe are now deployed so far forward that any local reverse will create enormous pressures to use them. At the same time, they are so dispersed that while the President undoubtedly controls the decision to fire, discriminating control *after* the decision to release them will be extremely difficult. This uneasy situation is aggravated by the fact that the term "tactical" in current usage includes any weapons not assigned to the Strategic Air Command. While some of the weapons in Europe are designed for battlefield use, others have essentially retaliatory functions indistinguishable from those of SAC. Thus, NATO's current deployment creates a built-in pressure toward escala-

[7] To reduce the danger of a sudden breakthrough, we should reëxamine the utility of building fortifications to protect strategic points on the central front.

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tion, not only toward nuclear war but, once that threshold is crossed, toward its most destructive form. Whatever the level of the conventional build-up, a reassessment of the deployment and concept underlying the use of nuclear weapons is essential.

Thus NATO has taken only the first tentative steps toward the reappraisal of its strategy. It has somewhat increased the number of its divisions and improved their equipment. But a serious commitment to local defense requires much more drastic efforts.Unless the ambiguities described here are resolved, our actions may be misunderstood by the Soviet Union. Within NATO, it will prove difficult to assert effective political control of military planning. Half-measures may cause NATO to combine the disadvantages of every available option.

IV. NATO AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The present deployment of NATO's nuclear capability represents an anomaly in terms of current NATO doctrine. Nuclear weapons and delivery systems for tactical use have been placed in Europe in considerable numbers. Yet Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric has rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war: "I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of a nuclear bang."[8] And this view seems to have been reinforced by Secretary McNamara at the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens.[9]

At the same time, Secretary McNamara has insisted that in case of general war our strategic forces are alone sufficient to perform any nuclear mission: "There is no question but today our strategic retaliatory forces of bombers, missiles and Polaris are fully capable of destroying Soviet targets, even after absorbing an initial nuclear surprise attack. Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack we calculate that our forces would destroy virtually all Soviet targets without any help from deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course, have the capability of attacking these targets with nuclear weapons."[10]

In these terms, the nuclear establishment on the Continent is both dangerous and useless. It is dangerous because it may make inevitable the limited nuclear war both Mr. McNamara and Mr.

[8] News Conference, June 6, 1961, cited in *The New York Times*, June 7, 1961.
[9] *The New York Times*, May 6, 1962.
[10] Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, *loc. cit.*

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Gilpatric have declared is certain to escalate. And it is useless because it will merely duplicate attacks on targets already covered by our strategic forces.

The validity of the statements of our highest defense officials depends, of course, on the assumptions one makes about the central problem before NATO, the efficacy of a counterforce strategy. If the opposing strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, *any* use of nuclear weapons is likely to escalate. On that hypothesis, however, a substantial conventional build-up would be unnecessary just as the nuclear establishment on the Continent would be superfluous. If, as is much more likely, the invulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces increases, the controlled use of nuclear weapons takes on a different significance.

The President has spoken of the need for alternatives between surrender and general nuclear war. To provide these, a capability for tactical nuclear operations would seem to be essential. Indeed, it is the most useful—perhaps the only meaningful—role for the nuclear weapons based on the Continent.

There are those who argue that the limited employment of nuclear weapons, if judged useful, can be left to the strategic forces. According to this line of reasoning, nuclear war, even if limited, would bring about conditions so confused and fraught with peril that the local situation would be relatively unimportant. This school of thought, therefore, advocates that when the conventional battle seems to be getting out of hand, nuclear weapons be used "demonstratively," as a "shot across the bow."

But what does one hope to demonstrate? Two methods of employing the strategic forces are available: a limited attack on the opposing strategic force or a "punitive" attack on the aggressor's non-military targets. The usefulness of either method is open to serious doubt.

If the opposing strategic force is vulnerable, and if our limited attack is effective, the Soviet response may be a counterblow directed against our cities while the U.S.S.R. still has some strategic weapons remaining. If the opposing retaliatory force is relatively invulnerable, the result may be a tit-for-tat. In that case, the issue may well depend on the outcome of the battle on the central front. In almost any foreseeable situation, an all-out counterforce blow may be less risky than a limited one.

If nuclear weapons are used "punitively," the outcome is again likely to depend on the local situation. After Soviet forces have

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reached the Rhine, for example, the destruction of Kiev followed by a similar destruction in the West may submerge all other considerations in the desire to end the spiral toward ever greater devastation. The ensuing confusion and panic may well enable the Soviets to consolidate their gains.

The most effective method for employing nuclear weapons in a limited manner appears to be their tactical use to stop a battle and prevent a breakthrough. In the best of circumstances, the confusion attendant on *any* use of nuclear weapons will be considerable. It will be compounded by every country's lack of experience with them. The use of nuclear weapons to prevent a significant territorial advance by the attacker would have the virtue of observing well-defined geographic limitations. Of all conceivable limitations, this is the easiest to understand and to concert. If a standstill in military operations can be forced, the major objective of the defense will be achieved.

Heretofore, consideration of this mission has been frustrated by a variety of groups: by disciples of traditional air theory who are convinced that any limited employment of nuclear weapons is certain to produce an inconclusive outcome; by pacifists eager to polarize our options between the most extreme alternatives; by advocates of more limited disarmament schemes who want to leave the door open for such measures as a nuclear-free zone in Europe. The lack of a concept and capability for tactical nuclear war—conceived as control of the battlefield—is one of the greatest gaps in the present military posture of the United States as well as of NATO. It should be remedied as part of any reassessment of NATO strategy. Strategic weapons cannot perform this role. They lack the accuracy; they are too powerful; and their attrition in tactical operations would be too great.

A new approach to the nuclear establishment on the Continent should address itself systematically to the role of nuclear weapons in stabilizing a battle front. This is especially required if NATO cannot raise sufficient conventional forces to resist a massive attack, but it is needed, in any case, so that we may know how to deal with nuclear weapons if they are introduced by the Soviets against NATO forces. NATO should not simply seek to replace existing weapons with more modern versions designed for similar missions—such as replacing aircraft with missiles. Rather an effort should be made to reassess the missions first and develop weapons appropriate to the new concept afterwards. The term

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"tactical use" should be much more rigorously defined than it has been in the past. In current thinking, a tactical nuclear war is distinguishable from a general nuclear war primarily by its geographic limitation—a consideration which can be of no interest to the potential victim. All targets and the weapons appropriate for them will have to be rigorously restudied.

Any tactical employment of nuclear weapons requires discriminating control and careful advance planning. Neither objective is likely to be attained as long as nuclear weapons are such an integral part of every major military unit. In order both to make the conventional build-up effective and to permit a flexible use of nuclear weapons, the atomic arsenal on the Continent should be grouped into a separate command. If a NATO nuclear force is thought necessary, the control of tactical operations would appear to be the most sensible focus for it.[11]

It is easy to jibe at the "Marquis of Queensbury" rules which limited nuclear war is often said to require. Many argue that a limited nuclear war will automatically escalate because the losing side will always invest more resources to restore the situation. Thus victory is said to be impossible. However, those who ridicule the concept of tactical nuclear war should explain what alternative they propose if, at whatever level of conventional build-up, the Soviets introduce nuclear weapons against our shield forces. If we wish to avoid surrender or a general nuclear war, the tactical use of nuclear weapons may be our only possibility for avoiding defeat. The *worst* that could happen if nuclear weapons are used tactically is what is *certain* to happen in case a counterforce strategy is carried out.

At the same time, if it is true that in tactical nuclear war victory is impossible, then deterrence would be enhanced, for aggression could have no purpose. The statement is, however, only partially correct. If the shield forces disintegrate, it may come about that no amount of additional violence can restore the situation. Effective employment of tactical nuclear weapons depends, therefore, on the strength of the shield forces.

V. NATO AND THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Whatever strategy is adopted, NATO will confront the issue of the control of nuclear weapons. For nearly two years, this difficult issue has been the subject of consultation and dispute. France

[11] See below, p. 540.

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has attempted to build up its own retaliatory force, following a path long since trodden by Great Britain. The Federal Republic of Germany, in the latest formulation of its Defense Minister, has asked for information about the nuclear weapon stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these will not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO, and for a degree of unspecified joint control over weapons fired from German soil.[12] The French effort is designed to reduce reliance on the United States' retaliatory force; but the German proposal bears primarily on the issue of tactical nuclear war, for the nuclear weapons on German territory are neither designed nor intended for a retaliatory strategy. Other NATO allies have speculated about some form of joint control designed less to contribute to an affirmative decision to employ nuclear weapons than to provide a veto over their use.

Our own thinking has suffered from the attempt to combine several incompatible courses of action: we would like to head off the multiplication of national nuclear establishments and we are stressing the increased importance of conventional forces; but we would also like to retain the determining voice in the nuclear policy of the alliance. It is, however, against all reason to expect our European allies to integrate their conventional forces in a joint command and to place increased reliance on a conventional defense, while one partner reserves for itself a monopoly on the means of responding to the Soviet nuclear threat and freedom of action in employing nuclear weapons.

From this point of view, the French national effort is not as senseless as is often made out. It is easy enough to demonstrate that national nuclear forces in Europe are ineffective because they cannot withstand a determined surprise attack and to use them independently against the Soviet Union would be to commit suicide. However, the key question is whether these forces are intended to be used separately. Could the Soviet Union ever conduct a surprise attack against the strategic forces of Great Britain or France without running an unacceptable risk of a counterblow from the United States or from the other European ally, temporarily spared? Alternatively, if the strategic forces of one of our European allies were to attack the U.S.S.R. without our consent or perhaps against our wishes, it is of course possible to say petulantly that we would then leave our ally to his fate. However, in the real world, such a course would be ex-

[12] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21, 1962.

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tremely unlikely. It is not only that the Soviets might retaliate against us in any case. More important, to "punish" a recalcitrant ally by leaving him at the mercy of a Soviet counterblow would be scarcely less serious for us than for the offender.

If we are honest with ourselves, we will have to admit that one of our objections to the spread of national nuclear forces within NATO is that we do not wish an ally to be in a position to force us into nuclear war. For this very reason, independent national nuclear forces, whatever their military effectiveness, will have the practical consequence of impelling the coördination of policies which President de Gaulle first proposed in his scheme for a Directorate. To be sure, President de Gaulle undoubtedly has other goals in mind as well. The question before NATO, nevertheless, is whether coördination can be achieved without an expensive and wasteful duplication of effort.

Several schemes have been advanced. In May 1961, President Kennedy formally offered to "commit to NATO . . . five—and subsequently still more—Polaris atomic submarines . . . subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use."[13] This pledge was fulfilled by Secretary McNamara at the Athens ministerial meeting when he announced that five Polaris submarines had already been committed to NATO, with more to come.[14] Also the President has expressed a willingness to consider "a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control. . . ."[15] And Secretary Rusk has reaffirmed our willingness to participate in consultations to this end.[16]

When we assess these proposals and undertakings, however, it is important that their nature be clearly understood. Assigning Polaris submarines to NATO is an important symbol of America's commitment. It is *not* a device for effective joint control of nuclear weapons. To present it as such only invites confusion.

For what precisely does this commitment to NATO entail? As announced, the submarines remain under exclusive United States control. Does this then mean that there is a stronger obligation to employ the NATO-assigned nuclear forces in the defense of Europe than to employ SAC? The danger of creating

[13] Speech by President Kennedy at Ottawa, May 17, 1961, text in *The New York Times*, May 18, 1961.

[14] *The New York Times*, May 6, 1962.

[15] Speech by President Kennedy at Ottawa, *op. cit.*

[16] See Press Conference of March 1, reproduced in the *Department of State Bulletin*, March 19, 1962, p. 456.

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an impression that there are degrees of our nuclear commitment to NATO must be weighed against whatever reassurance our allies derive from the act of assigning these submarines to NATO. Then, what is one to make of the phrase in the NATO communiqué at Athens that the United States and Great Britain had given "firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to provide defense against threats to the alliance beyond the capability of NATO-committed forces to deal with"?[17] Does this imply that there are two thresholds in NATO strategy: one between conventional and nuclear war and another between the use of the strategic forces assigned to NATO and the rest of SAC in combination with the British Bomber Command? If so, this alone would spell the end of a counterforce strategy, for such a strategy is beyond the capability of a Polaris force assigned to NATO—present or prospective. If, however, *all* strategic forces are to act in concert, the wisdom of splitting them into two parts becomes doubtful.

It may be argued that the commitment of Polaris submarines to NATO subjects them to joint guidelines—as indicated in the President's Ottawa speech. But what is the significance of guidelines for a limited number of submarines? The only joint plans that would seem to make strategic sense would involve the total nuclear strength of the alliance, including SAC and the British Bomber Command.

But a more serious question is this: Are these guidelines to be understood as a contingency plan for the employment of nuclear weapons *provided* the governments concerned agree on using them? Or are they intended to commit NATO to use nuclear weapons in certain specified situations, giving the NATO Commander authority in advance, without further recourse to political directives? If the former is intended, a discussion of guidelines may create as many problems as it solves. A contingency plan of this nature not only includes; it also excludes. It determines not only when nuclear weapons will be used; it also defines when they will *not* be employed. To attempt to be too specific may thus magnify concerns; failure to be specific may defeat the objectives of some of our allies.

If, on the other hand, the guidelines are to be construed as a directive to the NATO Commander, they would involve an unparalleled abdication of what has been traditionally considered

[17] Text of communiqué, *The New York Times*, May 7, 1962.

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a key element of political control. In any event, the concern of some of our allies does not focus on the deficiency of our planning but—to put it bluntly—on the deficiency of our will. Some of our allies profess to doubt, not our capacity to use nuclear weapons, but our readiness to do so.

Can this concern be met by creating a NATO nuclear force, either through common ownership of a NATO Polaris force, or by devising a multilateral central mechanism for the Polaris submarines which we may assign to NATO? Making NATO into a "fourth nuclear power" is supposed to provide a mechanism for joint planning and a substitute for national nuclear establishments. In practice, it is unlikely to provide either.

A multilateral NATO nuclear force superimposed on the existing framework would bring about three, or perhaps even four, kinds of strategic forces within the alliance: a very large one under exclusive United States control (depending on how the NATO force comes into being, this may be split into two parts, one assigned to SAC, the other "committed" to NATO); two smaller national forces; and, finally, a medium-sized NATO force in which all the countries already possessing national forces would also participate. This plethora of forces will present formidable problems of command and control. As we have seen, it is also likely to signify to the Soviets that there are degrees of intensity of the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Why else would we devise such gradations of retaliatory power?

Moreover, what is to be the purpose of such a multilateral NATO force? Presumably, if our strategic forces already cover every Soviet target without help from forces deployed overseas, as Secretary McNamara has said, it will be superfluous militarily. A multilateral NATO force can no more conduct a counterforce strategy than a small NATO force controlled by the United States. And, whatever its mission, it must be coördinated with the much larger forces under our exclusive control.

If we create a multilateral NATO nuclear force that is militarily senseless, we will not be at the end, but at the beginning, of a process. Once the joint force has been established, it will be next to impossible to head off pressures to turn it into a militarily useful instrument both by increasing its size and by giving our allies a more determining voice than is now envisaged. This may be desirable, but we should at least embark on such a course with our eyes open.

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If a NATO force as now conceived is militarily unnecessary, is it a political answer to Europe's concern about our nuclear predominance? This raises squarely the issue of the American veto in the nuclear policy of the alliance.

If we retain a veto, then two types of strategic forces will exist for the defense of NATO: a relatively small one, which would require our consent, together with that of whatever control mechanism NATO devised; and another large force—SAC—which would remain under our exclusive control, though perhaps split into two parts. Our European allies could prevent the use of the smaller force, but they could not compel it. With respect to the larger United States force—from the military point of view, the crucial one—our allies could neither prevent nor compel its use.

In case of disagreement with our European allies, one of two things would happen. If we wished to use nuclear weapons and the Europeans did not, we could still employ SAC (and probably even the Polaris submarines assigned to NATO). If they desired to use nuclear weapons and we did not, both the NATO nuclear force and SAC would be inactive. In other words, a NATO nuclear force with an American veto would multiply safety catches but not triggering devices. It can easily be demonstrated to be a shift of nuclear weapons from one American headquarters to another —as the French have already maintained.

If, on the other hand, we agreed to give up our veto, a major and perhaps insoluble constitutional issue would be raised in the United States. Can a group of foreign powers commit us to nuclear war without our consent? While the present situation is not very different, a great deal may depend on maintaining this nuance. The attempt to eliminate it may evoke a debate casting in doubt the extent of our nuclear commitment to NATO.

If we did give up our veto, would we be committing ourselves to the use of the NATO nuclear force only or to the use of our *entire* strategic force? In the former case, we would have again raised doubts whether the NATO force represented the limit of our commitment. In the latter case, a separate NATO force would be unnecessary, for we would then be obliged to use all our nuclear forces at the behest of whatever majority had the power of decision in the control body.

The discussion about the veto illustrates that the European concern about nuclear control is not as baseless as is often alleged.

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If disagreements with our European allies were inconceivable, we could agree to use our nuclear arsenal whenever a certain number of our allies requested it, according to plans mutually agreed upon in advance. Since we are unwilling to do this, it must be that we wish to reserve for ourselves the right to differ with the interpretation of our allies about the nature of vital interests or the means to defend them. Jealous as we are of our prerogatives, we should have understanding, even when we do not agree, of the attempts of some of our allies to achieve a greater voice in determining their fate.

In short, the only kind of NATO force that could meet some of the concerns that gave rise to the quest for multilateral control in the first place is one that involves a modification of the United States' veto. Apart from the domestic problems this would raise, a separate NATO force may not represent the most creative use of such a dramatic American commitment. A NATO force without our veto is a European Atomic Force. If we are prepared to give up our veto, it would be better either to create a control body for all strategic forces within NATO or to support an independent European Atomic Force which would allow us to avoid our constitutional dilemma.

Indeed, the only separate multilateral strategic force within NATO that makes sense would be a European Atomic Force merging the British and French nuclear forces. This would avoid our constitutional dilemma with respect to the veto. It would not create the same doubt about the extent of our nuclear commitment as would a NATO force. The fact that a European Atomic Force could not deal with the whole gamut of nuclear threats would make, not for the dissolution of NATO as is often alleged, but for a partnership in planning between Europe and the United States. The purpose of a European Atomic Force should be to deal with problems of special concern to Europeans. In particular, it could allay the fear that emphasis on local defense would enable the Soviet Union to devastate Europe while it spared the United States. Our support for a European Force would remove the impression that we are striving to keep Europe in a state of dependence with respect to nuclear matters. Such a force is likely to be the result of European integration and could become a device for fostering it.

However, it is important to recognize that at this time neither the United States not Great Britain nor France seems ready to

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adopt such a course, and it must not be allowed to serve as an excuse for avoiding the issues which rend the alliance. Also, we must take care not to confuse palliatives with remedies and symbolism with reality. Assignment of nuclear submarines to NATO is a token of our commitment; it does not of itself change the existing situation. To be sure, it is highly desirable that our allies have more information about the targeting and planned employment of our nuclear forces. The exchange of information agreed to at the Athens NATO meeting is an important step. It deals, however, with only one horn of the dilemma. The other concerns the issue of the United States veto and the French effort to achieve a nuclear capability of its own.

Indeed, the greatest single obstacle to a reassessment of NATO strategy is the Franco-American difference in nuclear matters. Of course, our skittishness about the veto and our refusal even to reply to President de Gaulle's suggestion for a political Directorate at least partly explains, even if it does not justify, France's lone hand in the nuclear field. In any case, irritation at de Gaulle's tactics should not obscure the fact that, as Bismarck once said, policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. Our assessment of the military significance of an independent French nuclear striking force is undoubtedly correct. The question remains whether giving such high priority to thwarting it may not have the ironical consequence of forcing NATO to remain committed to an obsolete strategy.

We will have to choose between seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within NATO and placing greater emphasis on local defense. A local defense of Europe is unthinkable without a French contribution or French coöperation. The refusal to help France even with projects not directly related to nuclear development (such as guidance systems for airplanes) threatens to turn an erroneous French doctrine into an obsession. By absorbing ever more of France's resources, it also reduces her potential contribution in other respects. As long as France cherishes this doctrine, then even in the unlikely event that her nuclear effort should eventually atrophy, the result in all probability would be not a greater contribution by France to the shield forces, but a sense of impotence leading to neutralism.

The chief drawback to our present policy is that, whatever its theoretical merit, it will not work. It will not prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—not even to France. It *will* prevent the

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build-up of local defense forces. If we are to make progress on the primary objective of improving NATO's capacity for local defense, we will have to be prepared—painful as it may be—to reassess our attitude towards France's nuclear ambitions.

However, if we decide to be more forthcoming with respect to the French atomic program—if only by aiding the development of delivery vehicles—we would have a right to insist that the resources thus saved be used to strengthen the conventional shield of NATO. We should make our assistance dependent on the willingness of France, and Great Britain for that matter, to maintain the forces they have promised to the NATO shield. If France accepts, the basis for a much greater and more systematic emphasis on local defense exists. Support for a modest French nuclear force at this stage may also be the best means of bringing about the European Force described earlier. If France refuses these conditions, it will be clear that she places notions of grandeur above the common interests of the alliance and ultimately above her own best interests.

VI. THE TASKS AHEAD

The above analysis indicates that the West confronts the following tasks:

(1) NATO must face the fact that during the 1960s the opposing strategic forces are likely to grow increasingly invulnerable. This impels a substantial shift from a counterforce strategy to some concept of local defense. Unless this issue is explicitly met, NATO is condemned to evasions and a maximum incentive will be created for the multiplication of national retaliatory forces.

(2) NATO must choose between the two available options for local defense: a primary reliance on conventional defense with nuclear forces in support or, alternatively, an emphasis on a tactical nuclear concept. To attempt to combine both—or to act as if NATO has one capability while it really has another—may invite disaster.

(3) Whichever option is selected, NATO must draw the indicated consequences. The corollary to a reliance on conventional defense is a detailed and integrated NATO mobilization plan. The corollary to a tactical nuclear defense is firm political control to ensure compliance with the strategy. In either case the shield forces will have to be increased beyond the 1957 goals.

(4) The choice between conventional and nuclear defense is

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not entirely the West's to make. Thus it is extremely dangerous to reject the notion of tactical nuclear defense as rigorously as we appear to have done.[18]

(5) Greater emphasis on local defense highlights the need not only for a conventional build-up but for the ability to conduct discriminating tactical nuclear operations. The nuclear weapons now on the Continent should therefore be given a clear tactical mission—primarily that of controlling the battle situation. A tactical nuclear command should be formed under SACEUR, charged with planning and conducting tactical nuclear operations. Nuclear weapons should be removed from the control of front-line units and placed under this command. The tactical nuclear arsenal would be a much more useful focus for a multilateral NATO command than a small strategic force, since all the weapons relevant to the tactical mission could be assigned to it. To take account of the European wish for a greater role in nuclear planning, the commander of this force could be a European, presumably French.

(6) If it makes sense for NATO to rely on local defense, the implications of this for other areas must be squarely faced. It will simply be untenable to rely on a local defense of the most vital area while depending on a strategy of nuclear retaliation everywhere else. Thus the mobile strategic reserve in this country will have to be augmented.

(7) With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, NATO should distinguish sharply between expedients to ward off immediate pressures and steps to achieve our long-term purposes. To have meaning, NATO guidelines for strategic forces should extend to all strategic forces of the alliance and not only to a small, somewhat artificial NATO force. A multilateral control system, if it is to be effective, would make most sense for a European and not a NATO force. As for the French, our best opportunity for constructive policy at this stage lies in seeking to divert them from exclusive preoccupation with their nuclear program, rather than in trying to obstruct it. However, assistance to France and Great Britain in the nuclear and related fields should be made dependent on their fulfilling their commitments to the shield forces, and undertaking not to spread nuclear weapons to other countries without our consent.

[18] See the reports of Secretary of Defense McNamara's presentation to the NATO Ministerial Conference in *The New York Times* and New York *Herald Tribune*, May 6, 1962.

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(8) The ultimate problem in NATO is not military. It is all very well to proclaim the indivisible interests of the North Atlantic Community of nations in the abstract. But on a whole series of disputes from the Congo to Berlin, the United States and our European allies have seen the matter differently. NATO cannot be welded into a unit militarily until it becomes one politically.

Some of the structural changes recommended by Alastair Buchan may help.[19] But the real problem goes deeper. Nothing less is required than a fundamental reassessment of attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. When NATO was formed, the United States was preponderant politically and strategically. The only security for our European allies was the American guarantee. They were therefore willing to accept most of our proposals without too many quibbles, whatever their real views, for their very act of submission increased our commitment. We have since then fallen into the habit of dealing with our European allies, except Great Britain, almost psycho-therapeutically; we have tended to confuse our periodic expressions of reassurance with the creation of a true partnership, and the muffling of European expressions of concern with meeting the cause of concern. Our Continental allies in turn have shown their disquiet more frequently in the hesitancy with which they have carried out agreed measures than in frankly asserting their disagreement.

In the decade ahead, we must face the fact that our mere enunciation of a policy no longer guarantees that it will be accepted. Henceforth, the Europeans are bound to examine not only the fact of our commitment, but also its nature. At the same time, our allies must accept the responsibility that goes with their new equality. If they merely show petulance, while refraining from suggesting constructive alternatives, they will drain the alliance of dynamism.

In many ways Europe's new self-assertiveness should be a source of pride for the United States. It marks the success of the policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan. Many of the difficulties described in this article arise from the very vitality and strength within the North Atlantic area. Resolving them is a worthy task, for it will liberate energies that could transform the nations of the North Atlantic into a true community.

[19] *Foreign Affairs,* January 1962.

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ATLANTIC PACT OR EUROPEAN UNITY

By Altiero Spinelli

NATO gave proof that the United States was determined to save and consolidate the democracies of Western Europe after World War II. Following the economic underpinning provided by the Marshall Plan it constituted a fairly satisfactory solution to the problems which both they and the United States then had to face. Having subjugated Eastern Europe, Stalin was turning to the West; his prime aim was to undermine democracy there before it could get firmly on its feet. By assuming the leadership in organizing Western defense, the United States provided an effective answer to this challenge.

Since that time, however, there has been a series of transformations in the world scene. The development of atomic arms and missiles has forced the two major powers to review their policies and to seek a way toward peaceful competition. At the same time, they have extended their rivalry and hence their commitments in an ever-increasing number of critical areas all over the globe, which as a result absorb an increasingly large portion of their resources and energies. Meanwhile, Western Europe has enjoyed tremendous economic growth; she has changed from a weak, frail American dependency to an "affluent society," not much inferior to the United States itself. And the rest of the world has passed from a period of political inertia to one of intense change.

In these new circumstances, the solidarity of the advanced Western democracies is as essential as ever. The question is whether the particular form this solidarity has assumed in NATO is still useful and efficient. Indeed, it will be argued here that NATO involuntarily has become the cause of excessive responsibility for the United States and of excessive irresponsibility for its European partners.

The Atlantic Pact is a defensive alliance among sovereign states, but it is fundamentally different from the traditional alliance common in European history. The latter remained dormant, as it were, until the common enemy had committed an act of aggression. In the meantime, each ally carried out its own foreign and military policies, free from any specific commitment toward its partners. In letter, the Atlantic Pact conforms to this conception, but in reality it has rapidly gone beyond it.

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Although no actual aggression had taken place in Europe, NATO came into being because the danger was so grave that a permanent and relatively united military defense was essential. Each member of the Alliance keeps its own national armed forces, but not all are given the same role. As the predominant military power, the United States has the decisive arms and the right to use them. The European states provide the larger part of the troops slated to stand an initial blow, and to this end each puts part—or in the case of Germany, all—of its national army at the disposal of a unified High Command, headed by an American general. The strategic concept of such a permanent coalition is inevitably a reflection of the military position and policies of the country which has the major responsibility. The European forces are hardly more than auxiliaries, as the Romans used that word.

Institutionalized in this manner, NATO is not a classical alliance but rather a true military confederation—an association of states that have decided on a common defense of particular territories, for which purpose they have created representative bodies, as well as various common military services and a common strategy. As with all other confederations which have meant something in history, this one is viable only because it contains one member "more equal than the others"—indeed, a super-power.

In assuming and maintaining heavy obligations toward Europe, the United States has undoubtedly felt that it was acting in its own interests. Yet NATO did not come into being and did not become a confederation owing to an imperial wish of the United States, but rather by force of circumstances. The most remarkable —one is tempted to say noble—aspect of the American hegemony in Europe lies precisely in the fact that the United States has refused to consider it the beginning of empire. Yet in a sense this is its weakness.

Without the Soviet threat the United States would hardly have been induced to recommit itself in Europe so soon after liberating it. But that this new commitment should have taken the specific form of a confederation under American hegemony was essentially due to the political structure of Europe. Economic reconstruction required a central European authority which would distribute aid in a way to promote a balanced recovery of the various countries. Political reconstruction of Germany had to take place in such a way as not to generate mistrust and disagreement between victors and vanquished. Military defense and related for-

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eign policies had to be harmonized. But Europe, founded on the principle of national sovereignties, was organically incapable of undertaking such tasks alone. The American hegemony, willingly accepted by the European states in the dramatic period after the war, supplied the supranational power which Western Europe needed but did not possess.

If we compare the political condition of Western Europe in 1935, 16 years after the First World War, with that in 1962, 16 years after the Second, we may appreciate the positive impact of what could be called, without much overstatement, the establishment of a *pax americana* throughout this area.

II

The aim of the Atlantic Alliance has been to safeguard the liberty and democracy of its peoples. Various unpleasant contradictions to that aim could be explained, if not justified, by more urgent reasons of a military or diplomatic order. An eye had to be closed to the fact that Portugal is certainly not a democratic country, that Turkey has often fallen short of the mark, that Franco's Spain has been accepted (even though indirectly) into the Atlantic system, that no effective objection could be made to the degeneration of the French Republic into authoritarianism. What is much more serious is that though the Atlantic Alliance has helped safeguard democratic forms within most of the countries of Western Europe, it has at the same time emptied their democratic processes of no small part of their substance. In the area of foreign and military policy, each European government has come to exercise a good share of its responsibilities through the Atlantic Alliance and to that degree has escaped the control of national legislative bodies. Yet no serious attempt has ever been made to create supranational democratic institutions.

From an American point of view, this is understandable. Unlike the European countries, the United States has had such a predominant position within the Alliance that it has been able to preserve a substantial measure of its sovereignty. The American people have seen no reason to merge their own political life into that of a wider community.

But Europeans have felt a need for some form of integration going beyond military defense. Since an Atlantic union seemed a practical impossibility, the idea of European federalism has spread both among peoples and statesmen, and all sorts of plans

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and projects have been widely debated. A proof that the American hegemony had nothing imperialistic about it is that the United States has shown unconditional sympathy for the concept of European union, although its success was bound to end American supremacy in Europe.

At first, this American attitude was helpful, but in the longer run the effect proved to be negative. This was because neither American nor European statesmen seemed to realize that, however much they emphasized the idea that NATO was complementary to European unity, the fact was that it was impossible to strengthen the former and simultaneously organize the latter. It has become necessary to choose between two forms of supranational political power—one constituted by American hegemony, the other by an over-all European government. And in fact, the only instances where the idea of European unity has yielded results—modest but real—is where it was not in competition with the idea of American hegemony; whereas it has failed to prosper wherever the ground was covered with Atlantic vegetation.

Thus American and European statesmen have long assumed that the very substantial part of Western European foreign policy concerned with the attitude to be adopted toward the Soviets had to be planned jointly by the various Atlantic councils and commissions. Consequently no serious attempt has ever been made to establish any European institution which could determine a European foreign policy—harmonized with, but independent of, American foreign policy. Neither the Council of Europe nor the more recent project of *l'Europe des patries* can be considered a truly serious undertaking.

Similarly, since American participation in NATO appeared to assure the defense of Europe, Europe has failed to provide for a European defense in conventional war, and each member has been allowed the luxury of maintaining its own separate national army. In fact, it was NATO which permitted the French to keep the greater part of their forces outside Europe in an effort to preserve their obsolescent overseas empire for a few more years.

On the other hand, while the United States encouraged European union, it has not—so far—committed its own economy to help build a united European-American market. As a result, it is only in the field of economic policy that the idea of European unity has been fulfilled.

Europeanists are very proud indeed of this achievement and

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usually maintain that the three economic Communities form a living nucleus of European supranational power, only awaiting further development. But this is wishful thinking. The successes of the Common Market have shown that the economic integration of Europe is much less difficult than was generally supposed; if political unity is one day achieved, the Communities will have accomplished an excellent preparatory job. But European unity is something more than a mere cut in customs duties; it will exist when real supranational political power has been created, capable of deciding and carrying out economic, military and foreign policy. By themselves, the Communities are simple treaties of very advanced economic liberalization; but the power to rule, to make laws and to enforce them still rests exclusively and absolutely in the hands of the several national governments.

III

It might be deduced from these considerations that however wonderful the idea of European unity may be it has missed its historical chance and that to keep on thinking about it today is like beating a dead horse, since the only unity possible is Atlantic unity under the leadership of the United States. There are many Americans who contend that the Atlantic Alliance should go beyond its present military scope and become a real and true "Community," with the United States assuming much more vigorous leadership.

This doctrine cannot be refuted in the abstract. If an Atlantic Community under American hegemony were able to face the more serious political problems of our time with a good probability of success, we should enter a positive judgment in its favor and develop it coherently. This is how empires have historically been born, not because a great nation decided to establish one, but because it became that nation's role to assume and maintain supreme political power over a group of nations. In the case of Europe, however, things have not turned out in that way.

The American hegemony over the states of Western Europe was due to their extreme economic weakness after the war. Unable to defend themselves against the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Army, they required the protection of atomic weapons, then an American monopoly. Today these conditions do not apply. If nuclear war comes, the defense of Western Europe will not be really important, for the outcome will essentially be de-

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cided by the nuclear first-strike and retaliatory capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States. In such circumstances Europe can do nothing. The defense of Western Europe makes sense only if it is conceived and prepared as a conventional defense against a possible conventional attack. If conceived in this way, Europe can contribute largely to world stability and therefore to peace.

Leaving aside the political difficulties, we must conclude that Europe is today quite able, without undue effort, to form an army capable of defending itself against attack with conventional weapons. Its population is larger than the population of either the Soviet Union or the United States and its economy is superior to the Soviet economy and only little inferior to that of the United States. Since an attacking force should be up to three times as large as the defending army, the Soviet Union could not achieve victory with its conventional forces alone—once, that is, Western Europe had made a reasonable effort to equip itself. A "reasonable" effort would be one that provided Western Europe with a conventional defense in proportion to the strength of the Soviet conventional forces which might be used against it. (In time, the forces on both sides might be reduced by bilateral negotiations.) Western Europe should give up nuclear weapons, on the basis of an arrangement by which the United States would intervene only if the aggressor employed nuclear weapons. Such a concept of European defense would go far to ease international tensions; it would make the presence of American troops and atomic warheads in Europe superfluous, and this in turn would facilitate the search for a basis for atomic disarmament.

Quite possibly the withdrawal of American military forces from Western Europe could be traded for a parallel withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe. But even if such an agreement could not be reached, the defense of Western Europe still would no longer require the presence of American troops.

To return to the political difficulties of arranging this system of defense, they arise from the fact that for Western Europe to be able to assume its military responsibilities it must be able to act as a political unit through a real federal government. Under the present Atlantic system, although the European states are the most directly interested in the question of their own defense, they have only marginal responsibilities. The major responsibility is borne by a power whose main strength is on the other side of the

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ocean, whose military presence in Europe has become a permanent commitment, and whose strategy relies on nuclear weapons over which Europe has little or no control. Such a conception of European defense is becoming obsolete; it contributes to keeping tensions high between the United States and the Soviet Union, increases the danger of war and hinders progressive disarmament. But so long as Europe remains divided into fully sovereign states, this permanent and preëminent American commitment is necessary to hold them together.

IV

Necessary does not mean sufficient. The authority of the United States is no longer as strong as it once was, partly because its forces are now committed over a much larger area of the world, partly because the European states no longer feel as helpless as they did in the past. Indeed, now that they are rearmed to a considerable extent and enjoying renewed prosperity, they are eager to play a more autonomous role in international affairs. Since as things stand they cannot develop a realistic picture of the role Western Europe must play in the world today, they tend to look backward for sources of inspiration and guidance. Old files in the foreign ministries are dusted off and re-studied. Once again we hear the former great themes of foreign policy—the *grandeur nationale* for France, the *Wiedervereinigung* (reunification) for Germany, the temptation of double-dealing for Italy, the role of a wise mediator for Britain. For the most part these are themes that in the present world have lost all meaning.

To keep its European protégés united, the United States finds itself forced more and more to tolerate, and even to take over as its own, many of their irresponsible claims. When it rendered its independent judgment on the Suez adventure, and took the liberty of opposing it, it was called a bully. It must accept the decision of Britain and France to make atomic bombs purely for reasons of national prestige. It must condone the fact that none of its allies ever completely fulfills the military commitments which are made each year in the councils of NATO. It could not dissuade France from engaging the greater part of her armed forces not for the defense of Europe but in a lost cause in Algeria. It must allow the German myth of reunification to complicate, if not prevent, a reasonable compromise with the Soviet Union. It cannot prevent Portugal from sending large bodies of troops to

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Angola nor can it influence Belgian and British interests to stop intriguing in Katanga. It must accept the fact that Europe as a whole is extremely reluctant to make sufficient sacrifices to help the emerging countries, or, as in the case of France, makes them largely to maintain old imperial ties. Summing it all up, Western Europe, thanks to American protection, has become a paradise of political, military and social irresponsibility.

For the advanced democracies, the temptation is strong to become simply satisfied societies. Ready to do business with the rest of the world, but indifferent to the main currents of what is happening there, they appear mainly anxious to defend their position among the privileged of this earth. Switzerland and Sweden furnish examples of this attitude. It is of little use to moralize from outside; each of the advanced democracies must learn of itself to become aware that its own future is linked with that of the entire world and that to a considerable extent the future of all depends on what each will or will not do with its own power. To cease dreaming of restoring situations as they were in the past; to help provide for one's own defense to the full measure of what is possible; to study how to contribute to atomic and possibly to general disarmament; to accept the sacrifices necessary to help the emerging countries progress toward social and economic as well as political democracy; to adopt policies toward the Communist world which foster the liberalizing currents existing there rather than the totalitarian forces which now predominate—these are the new tasks of the advanced democracies. This is their "New Frontier."

The United States cannot be said to have risen to this challenge with all its strength and intelligence, but at least it feels the gravity of the challenge and endeavors to face it. It is unlikely to succeed, however, unless Western Europe, the second great center of advanced democracy in the world, commits its own forces fully. This it is incapable of doing because its political structure of national sovereignties does not allow it to perceive its responsibilities; and American hegemony exempts it from the effort to perceive them and, the problem understood, to proceed to the creation of the necessary common institutions and policies.

V

Though many recognize that the situation of NATO is most unsatisfactory, no very imaginative effort has been made to

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remedy it. Yet it seems likely that a critical point is approaching at which even the most reluctant will have to reconsider the whole matter afresh.

First, the fragile political balance in Western Germany seems to have begun to deteriorate dangerously. Either the Federal Republic must become engrossed in a task more important than national unification—and one that can be undertaken in concert with the other European democracies—or after having obtained all that it can from the West, it will progressively lose interest in the Atlantic Alliance. It will more and more be tempted to wonder whether neutrality, or even an Eastern orientation, will not bring some kind of *Wiedervereinigung* closer.

After the loss of Algeria, France finds herself face to face with her own hour of truth. Either she will continue with a strongly authoritarian régime more dedicated than ever to issues of national prestige and resentful of those who do not acknowledge in every respect her great-power status; or there will be a return to democracy, in which case the French people must be given a new sense of mission which will allow them to forget the Empire and Algeria. It is difficult to conceive of a purely national mission which would be sufficiently challenging for this purpose.

Most of the other West European countries are not in as explosive situations as are France and Germany. However, since any relaxation of world tension will weaken the American hegemony and strengthen the centrifugal forces in Western Europe, the alternatives for these other countries, too, will be to withdraw toward nationalism or to participate in a great common enterprise of democratic integration. The present effort to keep the Atlantic Alliance on its feet may stave off the crisis for a while; but it also may make it more serious and perhaps irretrievable when it comes.

As the friendship between the United States and Western Europe is more important than the particular form which it has assumed in the Atlantic Alliance, the latter should be dropped in order to maintain the former. This does not mean that it will be sufficient merely for the United States to give back effective sovereignty to the European states—to put an end to American hegemony and leave nothing in its place. That would immediately strengthen the nationalistic forces which are already so evident, with the result that Europe would be "Balkanized." The course to choose, instead, is to go back to the plan for European federal

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unification, conceiving it, however, for what it really is, and not as an appendage of the Atlantic Alliance. Popular feeling in Western Europe is definitely favorable to this course; and what has been accomplished in the three economic Communities has helped to undermine the resistance of economic interests.

Clearly, a move in this direction must come first and foremost from Europeans, and particularly the democratic Left, which is not so dedicated to the status quo as are the conservatives. However, though Americans are generally very reluctant to admit it, United States policy can do much to hinder or help create the conditions for European unity. Remembering that in the recent past the too-open support of the United States for the European Defense Community was strongly resented in Europe, Americans incline to think that they would not serve the cause of European unity by playing too active a part. This notion is fundamentally wrong. It is an inescapable fact that European unity means the disappearance of American hegemony in Europe. Consequently, the possibilities and means of achieving federation are necessarily conditioned by the manner in which the United States conceives and exercises its responsibilities with regard to Europe.

If the United States conceives its hegemony as a permanent feature of the European system, Europe will not be able to find the necessary political will to move of its own accord. Europeanism will continue to be a relatively superfluous appendage of Atlanticism and will hardly go beyond the economic liberalization promoted by the three Communities. But it must be remembered that in any case American hegemony is likely to become progressively weaker as restiveness in Europe increases. In order to counteract such a trend, the United States might then be tempted to adopt policies designed to maintain rather than lower world tensions and to uphold the conservative forces in Europe more and more openly. However, leftist opposition parties are likely, out of the very logic of democratic life, to come into power eventually, and in that case would probably push individual countries toward neutralism. In such conditions, the popular feelings which at present exist in favor of real European integration will fail to become a political force and in the end will completely dissolve.

On the other hand, the United States can decide to conceive its hegemony as temporary and NATO as a provisional structure fulfilling responsibilities which are intrinsically European and which should be returned to the Europeans. Such a change in outlook

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would imply notable changes in policy. The general American sympathy toward European unification should be translated into conscious and farseeing actions which would tie a gradual American withdrawal from Europe to the creation of a constructive political will in Europe and the beginnings of federal institutions. This will not be easy. Unlike a simple maintenance of the Atlantic system, however, it will have the advantage of being in harmony with the present requirements of world political developments and the needs of European democratic life.

The United States must be prepared to disengage itself militarily and to accept the denuclearization of Europe. It should do this on condition, however, that the defense of Western Europe against attack with conventional weapons is entrusted to a European army and not to a coalition of national armies. It will be necessary to recognize the present frontier between West and East, and thereby to accept the division of Germany; but instead of Western Germany being abandoned to the unavoidable nationalistic resentments natural to a sovereign state, it would become a vital part of the new European federal democracy.

Two different but equally great challenges have been hurled by the Communist world and by the emerging countries at the great advanced democracies of the West. They can be met only if there is a very strong political and moral commitment from the peoples living on both sides of the North Atlantic. For Western Europe to assume its share of such a commitment is impossible, however, as long as it remains an irresponsible military and political dependency of the United States.

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IS COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY BECOMING IRRELEVANT?

By Chester Bowles

IS Communism gaining strength as a world ideology? Is it really destined to sweep new nations and old peoples before it with the force and inevitability that it still claims? Or has it unhinged itself from historical truth and modern reality, thus losing both relevance and momentum?

In my travels in the last few months in 40 or 50 countries on four continents, I have become convinced that Communism as an ideological force is ebbing. The mounting contradictions between Communist doctrine and the hard economic and political realities of today are beginning to be understood more widely. Even in the Soviet Union itself, changes in practice are being reflected in publicly avowed changes in dogma. The simple fact is that the world is refusing to act as Communist ideology said it should and would.

Before exploring the evidence of this and noting the results, let us define our terms. By Communist ideology I mean these three things:

First, Karl Marx's theory of history which assumes that certain "laws" impel a society to move through a series of economic stages to Communism. Communism is here presented as an economic system which in theory satisfies all of a society's needs without exploiting any of its members.

Second, Lenin's assumption that the pace of history can be accelerated by "political" means, principally by revolution.

Third, Lenin's belief in the Communist Party as the all-wise, all-powerful—indeed, the only—vehicle of this economic and political change.

Marx's thinking was powerful largely because it was based on shrewd observation of life around him; it was limited because he saw only those facts which time, place and inclination permitted him to see. What Marx saw were the grim realities of everyday life in the crudest years of the industrial revolution. He saw the London slum dwellers, crowded into hovels, working themselves to exhaustion under the insensitive impact of an ever-expanding economy. He saw their helplessness as individuals before the power of the men who owned the factories in which they worked

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and who controlled the governments under which they lived. Similar conditions could be found in the urban areas of Tsarist Russia which Lenin saw a half century later.

Time has wrought a profound change in the "objective reality" which both Marx and Lenin observed. For two generations the power of indigenous forces, the pressure of events and the increasingly pragmatic response of Soviet leaders have been steadily eroding the ideological foundations of Communism.

What will finally emerge from this conflict between ideology and reality is unpredictable. The long-range result may be greater moderation among the Soviet leaders and a gradual easing of the roadblocks to communication between East and West; but the immediate result may be that Soviet leaders will return to highly risky political and military policies as an outgrowth of internal confusion and frustration. At the least the growing irrelevance of the Communist ideology may be expected to create major internal strains not only within the Soviet hierarchy but also within the Communist bloc and within Communist Parties everywhere. If these strains are ignored, our ability to shape events in a constructive manner will be severely diminished. On the other hand, through recognizing their nature and significance we will be in a favorable position, not only to protect our immediate national interests, but even to move the world gradually toward a peaceful and more rational future.

With these preliminary words let me proceed to test my argument that Communist ideology is gradually losing its relevance in three crucial respects: as a guide for the assumption and consolidation of power, as a program for economic development, and as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

II

Privately the Soviet leadership surely must harbor some serious doubts today about traditional Marxism-Leninism as a source of political ideas appropriate to current conditions and as a guide to the seizure and holding of power in the modern world.

Marx counted on the inevitable processes of "history" as such to bring the world to Communism. The industrialized nations would lead the parade toward the promised land of a classless society. In fact, Communism achieved power first in the backward society of Tsarist Russia and 32 years later in China, the least developed of all the major countries in the world. Not since

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the Italian elections of 1948 has any industrialized state seriously considered opting for Communism.

This miscalculation grew from Marx's dogmatic assumption that capitalistic states were inherently incapable of adjusting to new situations. He reasoned that any capitalist government must be under the control of the privileged minority, that it could never modify that control or escape from it, and that this control would be used forever to exploit the masses. Competition among the capitalist nations—largely over markets and colonies—would lead to a series of wars and eventually to their collapse.

These assumptions have been disproved by events. Through the process of evolutionary development most capitalistic states have produced governments that are instruments not of a single class but, with varying degrees of perfection or imperfection, of the people as a whole. The development of the welfare state has blunted the edge of the class conflict that Marx assumed would ultimately move the world toward Communism.

Moreover, the capitalistic powers have not only failed to destroy each other in quest of greater profits, but on the contrary have increasingly engaged in political and economic coöperation. Instead of extending their colonial realms, they have been rapidly relinquishing them; indeed, only the poorest nation in Western Europe now clings to its "right" to an overseas empire.

Nor have the workers in modern capitalistic states coöperated with Marx by pressing either for Communist solutions to domestic economic problems or for "proletarian internationalism" as a vehicle with which to expand their influence in world affairs. Through the development of trade unions they have been able in most of the great industrialized states to secure an expanding share of the benefits of increasing production within the established order. Leftist energies have been continually channeled back toward development and reform.

This suggests that Marxist ideas are outdated as theoretical political guidelines, and a similar conclusion can be drawn about the efforts made to apply them in Soviet Russia and in the nations of Eastern Europe which have been under her control since 1945.

Lenin himself did not adhere to the teachings of Marx and wait for "history" to bless Russia with the inevitable revolution; instead he gave history a shove. Even so, without the First World War there would probably have been no Russian revolution. It was the war, with its hideous casualties, its frustrations and its

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feeding of discontents, that gave Lenin his opportunity. He assumed that similar forces would create similar upheavals in those other nations which had been devastated by war. But after abortive outbursts in Hungary, Germany and Italy, the "proletariat" refused to rise, and in 1920 Trotsky's "liberating" Red Armies were stopped east of Warsaw.

Within Soviet Russia itself Lenin's most important source of strength was the vision of peace and plenty, land and bread, freedom and opportunity, which he held out to the exploited, embittered and war-weary people—and, perhaps most poignantly of all, to their children. The solutions which he advocated under the name of Communism were at that time unblemished by experience or failure.

Marx had left his picture of the future conveniently vague. He had been more concerned with the process of the struggle than with the structure of the Communist society that was to emerge. He was clear, however, on the need for a "proletarian dictatorship" in which the means of production would be owned by the state in the name of the workers. As the capitalistic élite and the bourgeoisie were destroyed there would emerge a single class, within which each individual would give according to his ability and receive according to his need. Since the state was itself an instrument of class rule which was no longer needed, it would, as Lenin later said, "wither away."

No Soviet citizen needs to be told, 45 years later, that the withering process has not taken place. On the contrary, conflicts within Communist society itself, and the planning failures resulting from impracticable or contradictory objectives, have forced the state to maintain its all-powerful role. Hundreds of examples could be cited. For instance, the Soviet need for well-educated men and women, capable of coping with the sophisticated demands of a modern industrial society, has collided with the need to control what people think. Crimes against state property, crimes that in theory should be nonexistent in a Communist society, have become so widespread that capital punishment has been introduced as a deterrent. Nor has Marxist ideology itself provided the Soviets with techniques necessary to increase the productivity of their industrial workers. The methods used to deal with this problem have been strikingly similar to those of capitalism; indeed, individual incentives to encourage high productivity have in many cases actually exceeded those in Western industrial nations.

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Especially revealing has been the built-in conflict in Soviet agriculture. City-oriented Karl Marx had dismissed the peasants as "lost in the idiocy of rural life." The Communist Manifesto of 1848 alluded only casually to agriculture. But Lenin was a pragmatist and he was dealing with a country in which 85 percent of the people lived off the land. One of his first acts after seizing power, therefore, was to ratify a decree distributing all land to the peasants who tilled it. "This is the most important achievement of our revolution," Lenin said. "Today the Bolshevik revolution will occur and become irrevocable."

Here again, however, the revolution became entangled in a conflict between Communist ideology and economic and social realities. A disciplined Communist state requires a disciplined peasantry. But how can political discipline alone be used to persuade individualistic farmers to put in the extra hours of effort to boost food production for the state beyond their own needs? By 1938, less than a generation after the Bolshevik revolution, this question found its answer in the adoption of another capitalistic incentive: the official establishment of privately owned plots and a limited free market in farm produce to encourage the peasants to help fill the national food gap.

In 1962, the basic conflict between political control and adequate incentive for increased agricultural production remains unresolved, not only in the U.S.S.R. but in Communist China and in every East European country. As a result, inefficient agriculture continues to be a drag on Communism in Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe and a threat to the future existence of the state in Communist China.

Finally, we see evidence of the failures of Marxist doctrine in the Soviet Union itself in the developing pattern of Soviet society. A presumably classless society is producing a series of new classes, the dominant one of which shows strikingly hereditary features.

These illustrations are not cited here as novel, but because taken together, and with many many more, they suggest why the ideological claims of Communism have begun to awaken questionings and doubts among the underdeveloped nations.

In most of the new and in many cases unaligned states, the situation has changed since the success of the anti-colonial independence movements in Asia and Africa. As European imperialism and colonialism disappear, the cries of "imperialism" and "colonial-

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ism" become less persuasive. Indeed, where the Leninist slogan of "national liberation" now has its most legitimate appeal is in the East European countries still occupied by Soviet troops.

As colonialism loses its relevance as an issue, the most vulnerable targets for Communist activity, particularly in Asia and in Latin America, are the peasant majorities which have been the victims of feudal-minded landlords for generations. The squalor of the rural slums that has resulted from long injustice rivals that of the city slums which shocked Karl Marx more than a century ago. Yet even in this apparently promising area the Communist persuaders have been handicapped by what is gradually becoming known about the harsh experience of the Russian and Chinese peasants under Communism. Vigorous pressures and help by the United States and by United Nations agencies for the distribution of land on a more equitable basis are helping, too, to undermine the appeal of the Communist promise which, in Lenin's words 45 years ago, made the Russian revolution "irrevocable." Furthermore, when the distribution of land to individual peasant families turns 94 percent of them into landowners, as happened in Japan, we see what a formidable dilemma is posed for Soviet propagandists. If they support such reforms, the result will be to extinguish the sparks of discontent; if they obstruct them, they go against the interests of the people they have promised to help.

Nor is the "bourgeoisie" a hopeful revolutionary vehicle in underdeveloped nations. The middle class is often a strong nationalist element, and the Communists cannot afford to oppose nationalism. Usually, too, the local bourgeoisie in these countries is too small to be either an agent or a target of revolution. The search for a "proletariat" on which to base a revolution has been no more rewarding. Most of the developing nations in Asia and Africa do not have enough proletarians worth summoning to unite. Here again a Communist slogan is empty of content.

In Eastern Europe the Communist task has been to replace the Soviet military presence with an effective Communist political and economic structure based on an acceptable ideology. To do this, the local Communist Parties, maintained in power by Moscow, have been striving for 17 years to capture the loyalty of the new postwar generation. Yet with all the punishments and rewards that are at their disposal, they have been unable thus far to enlist the necessary competence or to arouse the necessary enthusiasm. Today the Communist leadership in Eastern Europe

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consists largely of elderly or middle-aged opportunists cut off from a resentful or apathetic people. (In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the average age of the Party membership is about 45.)

The Hungarian uprising in 1956 was created by students educated in Communist schools under Communist teachers, and vigorously supported by the workers whom Marx had proclaimed to be the shock troops of the Communist revolution. The same elements led the anti-Communist protests in Poznan and in East Berlin. The Berlin Wall is a transparent effort to stem a mass exodus of the younger, more vigorous Communist-educated elements to Western Germany, which for years has been officially described as a cesspool of capitalistic exploitation. In Poland, in order to increase stability, Gomulka has had to strike a wary peace with the church and allow peasants to retain their land. It is a fair generalization to say that wherever in Eastern Europe Communist ideology has not become a strait jacket on the talents of the people it is today a body of doctrine honored primarily in the breach.

My conclusion is that neither Marxist theory nor the Soviet attempt to put it into practice, whether in simon-pure or adulterated form, has proved to be a reliable guide to power on Communist terms. This is true both in states now under Communist rule and in nations toward which the Soviet Union apparently harbors designs.

III

When we turn to a second aspect of Communist ideology, as prescribing unvarying rules for economic development, we again find substantial evidence that the ideology is irrelevant to the practical problems faced by nations in the modern world. This is particularly true where the Communists had assumed they would find their most promising targets—in the developing new countries recently emerged from European colonial rule. One difficulty has been that their ideological guidelines are not really clear, for neither Marx nor Lenin gave much thought to whether Asia and Africa would develop in the European pattern.

In two generations the Soviet Union has developed a modern nation, highly industrialized, with a powerful military machine, able leaders, brilliant scientists and an educated people. Communist spokesmen have, of course, credited these achievements to the techniques of Karl Marx and announced that these were now

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available to any aspiring new nations that wanted to join the Communist club. In so doing they overlooked some crucial differences. The most important of these is that the Soviet Union is almost unbelievably rich in natural resources. In less well-endowed nations, it simply is not possible to squeeze the capital for rapid industrial development out of the "savings" of the impoverished peasant majority. Red China, acting ruthlessly on Stalinist principles and helped substantially by Moscow, made a bold attempt to do so. Since the average Chinese rural family has less than two acres of arable land, it is not surprising that the attempt has failed.

When such realities could no longer be hidden, the Soviet Union began to offer the developing nations economic aid, in competition with the West. But in terms of the political influence it has been able to buy, or the Marxian dogma it has been able to impose, the price must seem appallingly high. It is not surprising that the new nations have been unable or unwilling to apply the totalitarian discipline which Stalin found necessary even under the much more favorable physical conditions in the Soviet Union.

There simply is no rigid and dependable formula as yet for rapid economic development. Nowhere, certainly, has the original economic theory of Marx, or the adaptations of it which the Soviet Union has tried to export to underdeveloped nations, met with success.

IV

My third and final point concerns Marxism-Leninism as a Soviet instrument in the conduct of foreign affairs. By Marxian tenets, Communism should serve as an international beacon, around which the working classes of all nations would unite in a dedicated movement regardless of political boundaries. Thus Lenin had expected the Soviet revolution to bring an internationally minded proletariat to power in a succession of key countries in Western Europe; and he was bitterly disappointed that it did not happen.

When Stalin shifted his emphasis from world revolution to the doctrine of "socialism in one country," he was embarking on a primarily defensive gambit, designed to give the Soviet Union the time and means to prepare for whatever next step to world domination might prove practicable.

The time arrived following World War II when the Red Armies

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overran Eastern Europe. The means had been developed by expanding the programs of education and industrial growth within the Soviet Union. Almost at once Communist pressure was felt in war-stricken Western Europe. When Soviet plans there were blocked by the rapid economic recovery of the European nations, first buttressed by the Marshall Plan and then shielded by NATO, they were turned toward Asia and Africa.

In 1948, six Communist-led revolutions were launched in Asia —in addition to the unique and long-developing Chinese Communist revolution—under what appeared to be extraordinarily favorable conditions. In newly independent India, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and in the Philippines these revolutions failed; only in Indochina, where the French tried to maintain an impossible colonial position, was there substantial success.

Since then, the difficulties encountered by the Communist drive in Asia and Africa have multiplied. Evidence of this can be seen in the contradictions in Communist propaganda, in the disagreements between Moscow and various native Communist Parties, in the splits within the local Parties, and in the constant shifts and experimentation which mark Moscow's effort to establish satisfactory working relationships.

A striking aspect of this Communist drive is that its propagandists seem reluctant to cite Communism's supposed economic or social merits. Instead, they describe Communism as an ally of the forces of nationalism. The difficulties here are manifold, not only because of the Soviet Union's anti-national practices in its satellites but because in giving lip service to nationalism it is championing a force which not only is basically incompatible with Communist doctrine but also with long-run Soviet objectives. In South Viet Nam today, for example, Communist propaganda finds it more effective to warn against foreign intervention than to call in Marxist terms for an uprising of the "proletariat and the toiling masses."

In certain other nations, propaganda extolling the merits of Communism is apparently judged a positive handicap and has been abandoned in order more effectively to promote traditional Russian objectives. In Afghanistan, for example, no posters, no demonstrations, no slogans, no overt Communist propaganda can be seen or heard. Instead of acting in the Marxist tradition to stir up antagonism among students, workers or peasants against the Afghan royal family, the Soviet line, at least for the present, is to

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persuade both the rulers and the ruled that economic aid and technical guidance from the neighborly U.S.S.R.—entirely free, moreover, from any ideological connotations—provide the best means of bringing Afghanistan rapidly into the twentieth century.

Contradictions between Soviet policy and the interests of Communist ideology are seen in many other places. In Algeria, for instance, Moscow was so anxious to please the de Gaulle government, for reasons strictly in Russia's nationalist interest, that it missed a promising ideological opportunity by not recognizing the Algerian Provisional Government until after the cease-fire. Similarly, the Soviet Union is now aggressively selling its own oil at cut rates anywhere it can find a market, regardless of the adverse impact on the Communist movement in the oil-producing states of the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Communist Parties have been suppressed by either decree or statute in some 45 nations. This does not count the many new nations in Africa where the Communist Party has failed even to get a start. Indeed, it is now operating legally in only two African states: Tunisia, where it is unimportant, and Madagascar, where the Communists call themselves "Titoists." Even where Communists are tolerated in one of their many guises, their effectiveness is often limited. Where they have merged into the local political system they have lost their identity; where they have failed to merge they have often found themselves in jail. Guinea illustrates the difficulties which their ideology faces in the relatively classless and intensely nationalistic new African societies. In order to gain status within the one-party Guinean state, the Communists have had to subordinate their interests to the dynamic nationalist aims of the government. Last December, when they neglected to do so, the Soviet Ambassador was invited to leave the country.

In India, the Communist Party remains legal, but the disarray within the organization reflects the same sort of dilemma that besets the Communists in several other developing nations. In order to maintain their voting strength the Indian Communists have been forced to play down their doctrinaire appeal and to emphasize their support for such nationalist causes as Goa and Kashmir. And within the Party itself the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions are waging fierce and destructive ideological warfare.

In almost none of the developing countries does one find the

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local Communist leadership acting today as the primary and overt agent of Soviet aims. Where it has not been curbed or where it is not ignored as of no importance, it has been left to play an expendable role of diversion and trouble-making.

An exception is Indonesia, which has the largest Communist Party in any country outside the Soviet bloc. Yet a major explanation of the Communist Party's strength there lies in its identification with nationalist forces on the one remaining "colonialist" issue in Indonesian politics, the question of West New Guinea. If that issue can be resolved peacefully, and an intensified effort is made to achieve economic development, the present strength of Indonesian Communism may be expected to decline.

Since the Soviet Union found that Communist ideology was becoming less appealing in the newly developing nations, it has turned increasingly to two other instruments of political penetration: subversion and foreign aid.

In South Viet Nam and Laos the geographical conditions were ideal for Communist infiltration and subversion. But in situations less exposed to direct Communist pressure the attempts at subversion by both Moscow and Peking have usually aroused popular distaste or hostility and in many cases have led to effective official countermeasures. I found this particularly so on recent trips to Latin America. Either because or in spite of spending large sums and much effort on espionage, propaganda and agitation, Castro has thus far lost diplomatic representation in 14 Latin American nations. And it is significant that, partly at least in an effort to counter his political slippage outside Cuba, he has lately disavowed the more doctrinaire Communist elements in his own house.

In an effort to forward their political aims, the Communist governments have depended increasingly on programs of economic aid. From 1955 to 1961, the Sino-Soviet bloc extended about $4.4 billion in economic grants and credits, mostly the latter, to 28 nations outside the Iron Curtain. The Soviet Union supplied about three-fourths of the total. At the end of 1961, some 8,500 bloc technicians were in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In many cases such assistance has gone to nations which have taken openly anti-Communist positions. Whatever may be the political effect of this effort to offset American and European foreign aid programs, no claim can be made that it bears any ideological relationship to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism.

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On the crucial question of arms control, Communist ideology has come into conflict with the assumed interests of Russian nationalism. According to Marx, the capitalistic economies are sustained either by war or by the threat of war. If the present Soviet leadership really believed its own dogma, it would sponsor a vigorous and realistic program to reduce the armament load, confident that if the United States agreed to lower its defense budget it would face unmanageable unemployment and that if it refused it would face a unanimously indignant world opinion. Yet the traditional Russian obsession with secrecy has made the Kremlin unwilling to accept any practicable version of the principle of inspection which would make arms control a reality, Karl Marx notwithstanding.

The instances I have cited suggest that whether in Communist propaganda, political action, subversion or foreign aid, Communist ideology is often proving either an ineffective servant of Soviet foreign policy or an actual handicap to its operations; and that as Soviet experience has made this or that manœuvre or adjustment to reality, the ideology itself has become increasingly twisted and confused or outright ignored.

Communist ideology has even failed to provide a reliable cement to bind together the nations which profess it. Indeed, one might say that the main importance of Communist doctrine today is found in disputes within the Communist bloc itself—above all, of course, in the ideological controversies between Moscow and Peking. These controversies damage the whole Marxist concept of a single orthodoxy and wreak havoc with Moscow's effort to interpret it to suit the Soviet Union's particular experience and national priorities. Nationalism runs counter to Marxist-Leninist concepts of a world structured by classes, for it switches the basis of change from the supposedly inevitable tides of economics and history to the interpretations and imperatives of a particular man or group of men. This is markedly present, of course, in the disagreements among Moscow, Peking, Belgrade, Tirana and the satellite capitals of Eastern Europe.

The fact that the Communist nations with so much at stake are unable to create and maintain a common front affects not only their political future as the "socialist camp" but the power which the Marxist concept is assumed to wield in the world as a result of its alleged unbreakable unity.

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V

I have suggested that Communist ideology is declining in relevance to the tasks of the modern world and that the Communists themselves are finding it of declining value as a political tool, an economic panacea and an instrument of diplomacy. This tendency may work to our advantage in the long run; but I must point out with the greatest possible emphasis that it in no way lessens the short-range challenge that the Soviet Union poses to the American people and their policy makers. As Soviet leaders are increasingly liberated from their own dogma, they may be encouraged to apply their great powers more constructively. Or the result may be something of a crisis of faith within the Soviet Union itself, a confrontation of the "believers" and the "realists." This in turn might release frustrations and hostilities in the Communist world that could have dangerous results for world peace. We can only pray that the waning of doctrinaire zeal and the replacement of it by nationalist aims among the Communist countries will not have this result, but that on the contrary it may in time offer new grounds for successful negotiation and even peaceful accommodation with us and our friends.

The question remains: What of America itself? Even if it is true that Communism is gradually losing much of its significance as a global ideology, this will not be of great importance to our grandchildren unless the democratic faith as we aim to practice it can be made relevant to the world of the future. If this is to happen, the American people will have to adopt a role which no prosperous and powerful nation has ever undertaken to play in the long history of civilization. It will have to identify itself boldly with the social, economic and political revolution that is now beginning to transform the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings in all parts of the globe. The obstacles to our playing such a role are appallingly large. Yet the possibilities for us and for mankind are very nearly infinite.

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN COMMUNIST STRATEGY

By Raymond L. Garthoff

UNCONVENTIONAL warfare has become all too conventional, even if it is not yet adequately understood. It is paradoxical that the coming of mighty engines of war that literally extend war "out of this world" and threaten violence measured in megadeaths should, in fact, lend strength to the resurgence of a kind of hostilities marked by poisoned bamboo spears, bazooka ambushes and civil war. In a recent article in these pages, the nature and dimensions of the problem have been thoughtfully analyzed.[1] In the present discussion, I should like to focus attention on a series of 12 propositions derived from study of Communist theory and practice regarding the seizure of power by unconventional warfare.

Our starting point should be the fundamental role that internal war and unconventional warfare play in general Communist world strategy. On that foundation, we can examine Communist views on the expediency of waging unconventional warfare under various conditions, and on operational strategies likely to be used in cases where it is deemed feasible and desirable. Finally, it will be useful to take a closer look at guerrilla warfare in particular as a technique, in past and future Communist practice, for waging internal war. Thus we shall move from looking at unconventional war in Communist doctrine to looking at Communist doctrine on unconventional warfare.

II

Very simply, "internal," "unconventional," "irregular"—"class"—war is of the essence of Marxist-Leninist theory, hence at least theoretically at the base of Communist strategy. We became so accustomed to Stalin's reliance on the Red Army and the Soviet intelligence services as the most conspicuous elements of force in international politics that it takes a moment to place in focus the older—and newer—more fundamental Communist reliance on manœuvring and manipulating power on an indigenous political fulcrum. This is my first proposition.

Unconventional warfare—our very use of this expression jars

[1] Franklin Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962, p. 264–274.

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one by its contrast to the Marxist-Leninist conception of the conventional nature of internal warfare—may assume various forms, depending on the concrete situation, its opportunities and constraints. Although in other areas the Communists may resort to rigid design or overcentralized planning, when it comes to the application of force they show an acute awareness of the wide range of kinds of unconventional warfare available to them. This is the second proposition I would raise. To rephrase the point: Communists are flexible in waging varied forms of internal war, and irregular warfare is but one of the means.

Not all activity of Soviet, Chinese or indigenous Communists should be considered a form of internal war—though one can define the term broadly enough to encompass most of it. But the Communist leaders do assign a major role to active civil violence at a certain stage of development of the class conflict. For such countries as the United States, that stage may be seen only very dimly—or perhaps merely assumed—in a vague and distant future. But in volatile and unstable societies emerging from colonial rule or undergoing modernization without adequate tools for the job, internal war is expected to have a future—if it is not already present. Thus my third proposition is that the Communists expect, plan and wage internal war as the final stage of class struggle leading to the seizure of power. Internal unconventional war is above all *revolutionary* war.

III

Bolshevism arose as a revolutionary movement with international pretensions; its fundamental outlook was hostile to the existing international order. None the less, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to wage revolutionary war beyond the borders of the old Russian Empire, in the period from 1918 to 1923, Soviet leaders began to recognize the need to be more selective in choosing the time and place to conduct revolutionary war. Also, as the years went by, they directed their energies increasingly to internal matters. The building of "socialism in one country" marked an indefinite extension of the original compromise by which the Soviet Union proposed to coexist with the outside world. The avowed revolutionary ends have continued unchanged, but means have become increasingly important in themselves. As occasions arose calling for sacrifice either by the Soviet State or by the forces of the Revolution abroad, Moscow's deci-

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sion has invariably been at the expense of the latter. The subordination to Moscow of Communist Parties everywhere meant that the suitability of local internal war was defined in terms of the prevailing foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. And as a consequence, for over two decades Communist "internal war" boasted few campaigns and no victories. Only in China did an active revolutionary war even stay alive, and it did so by liberating itself from Moscow's strategic direction.

World War II brought new opportunities for building undergrounds and waging partisan warfare in many countries occupied by an alien invader. Local Communists (as well as other resistance elements), aided by the Allies, established strong forces in several countries. The Soviets themselves built up sizable guerrilla forces on their own German-occupied territory. At the close of the war, the Jugoslav and Albanian partisans were able to seize power with little opposition. The Chinese Communists were also immeasurably aided by the course and outcome of the war.

In the early postwar period, the sudden shift in the balance of power in areas on the Soviet periphery, and the not accidental projection of the Red Army into many of these areas, led to new opportunities for expansion of Communist rule by various means including internal war. Where Soviet occupation was prolonged, political and subversive techniques were used effectively to establish puppet Communist régimes. But beyond the shadow of the Soviet Army the story was quite different. A wave of attempts at subversion, rebellion and revolution struck in 1948–1949. Success in Czechoslovakia by subversive coup was not matched in Finland, and not even tried in France and Italy. In China, the Communists—against Stalin's advice—pushed on to take all continental China. But the revolutionary guerrilla campaigns in Greece, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia ended in failure; only in Viet Nam did such a campaign drag on to an important partial victory in 1954. Causes of failure varied, but one important general one was that the balance of power in the world had become stabilized anew.

In the current phase, since about 1960, there has been a new wave of Communist guerrilla efforts in Laos and South Viet Nam, a failure in the Congo, and a seizure from within of the successful guerrilla movement in Cuba. Similar efforts to take over other native, non-Communist rebel forces, for example in Angola and Colombia, are at present under way.

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In summing up this brief historical review, we reach a fourth proposition: One of the key conditions for resort to revolutionary war, in Communist eyes, is the general world situation (as well as the local situation). And as a related fifth proposition: While the general strategic balance of terror today increases the dangers to the Communist bloc of resorting to direct aggression and creating Soviet-Western military confrontations, it reduces the risks involved in indirect, unconventional war.

IV

Communist strategies for waging revolutionary warfare place a high premium on the political content and context of a campaign. Some strategies, beyond the purview of this article, involve exclusively political action. Others involve infiltration and subversion, where the political vulnerability of the opponent is of cardinal importance. Subversion (which should be distinguished from agitation, propaganda, trouble-making and other overt or underground Communist activities) can be either a substitute for a revolutionary war or a complementary tactic in it, but in general it has not proven nearly as versatile a Communist tool as many of us tend to think. Subversion is usually directed against existing governments, but it may be directed against indigenous revolutionary movements, as in the Cuban case. Infiltration and subversion, political isolation and manipulation, and economic penetration all ultimately should—in the Communist strategy—lay the groundwork for the seizure of power either by coup d'état or by revolutionary war.

As my sixth proposition, I would advance the hypothesis that the Soviet leaders generally prefer the use of subversion, or other non-violent means, to the use of guerrilla war, because the seizure of power by indigenous revolutionary forces tends to make local Communist rulers too independent of Moscow's control. The only countries other than Russia where local Communist forces fought and won their own victories are China, Jugoslavia, Albania and Viet Nam (with Cuba as a quasi-fifth). All, with the uncertain exception of North Viet Nam, are today serious problems for the Soviet Union.

The Chinese—absorbed by their own internal problems and struggles with the Russians, smarting over the frustration of continuing irredentist claims, and "on the make"—have not developed the qualms or subtle calculations which mark the Soviet

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attitude toward the means of extending Communist power. Maoism as an export item has done well in Indochina; a number of other Communist Parties—especially, but not only, in Asia—are turning to China in the course of the growing division within the Communist movement. The Soviet leaders do not, of course, turn their backs on the theory or even the practice of national-liberation revolutionary war. None the less, my seventh proposition—companion to the sixth—is that the Chinese Communists are likely in the future to be the guiding spirit in most Communist revolutionary guerrilla wars.

In further support of this conclusion, I offer as my eighth proposition that Soviet experience in 1941–44 (and 1918–20) is not really relevant to the current problems of Communist revolutionary war. In Russia, guerrilla warfare was supplementary and distinctly subordinate to the actions of regular armies; it was national rather than class, and defensive rather than offensive in character. Communist revolutionaries today are aware of this inapplicability of the Soviet experience. Che Guevara states, early in his book "La Guerra de Guerrillas," that:

> For the proper analysis of guerrilla warfare, it should be noted that there are two different types: first, the guerrillas supplement the effort of a large regular army as in the case of the Ukrainian guerrillas; second, an armed group is fighting against an established government. We are not interested in the first type. We are interested only in the type where an armed group is carrying on a fight against an established colonial (or other) power.[2]

While Mao in the 1930s paid tribute to the Russian experience and to the theoretical contributions of Lenin and Stalin, he stressed that they could not simply be transferred to the Chinese scene because, as he put it, "there are a great number of conditions special to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army." The "laws of war and military directives in the Soviet Union embody the special characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army of the Soviet Union; if we copy them and apply them mechanically and allow no change whatsoever, it will also be like whittling down our feet to fit the shoes, and we shall be defeated."[3] (A curious figure of speech, by the way, suggesting that the Russians couldn't fill the shoes of the Chinese.) Indeed, Mao had won leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in a bitter contest

[2] Translation in *Army*, March 1961, p. 24.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" (December 1936). Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954, p. 3–4; see also p. 2, 5, 18 and 31.

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over the very issue of independence from Moscow. He therefore insisted that the Chinese experience in revolutionary war included important features and even "laws" of its own. This, it should be noted, also carries implications for the transferability of Mao's thought and Chinese experience to other countries.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has brought to the surface significant differences in the current Chinese and Russian approaches to revolutionary war. The Soviets have explicitly granted priority to the task of prevention of "war," for which the Chinese have attacked them. Under the pressure of polemical controversy with the Chinese Communists, the Soviets have refined their own conceptions and have been led to distinguish three different "categories" of war: world war, limited or local wars, and "national liberation wars and popular uprisings." Recognizing the disastrous consequences of general nuclear war, and the risk of such war in direct Western-Communist confrontation in limited wars, they oppose local as well as world wars. The Chinese are not wholly insensitive to the dangers of nuclear war, but they stress the "inevitability" of local wars in contrast to Soviet emphasis on "averting" them. The Soviets as well as the Chinese of course favor internal "wars of national liberation," so long as they are against the West. The divergence between them arises from the fact that the Soviets are more cautious than the Chinese in evaluating the risks that they believe the Communist bloc should assume in overt support of revolutionary wars.

In the most explicit and authoritative Soviet pronouncement on revolutionary war, Khrushchev declared, in 1961: "Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible, but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, including armed struggle."[4] But it is clear from Soviet discourse and action that, while they surely favor such wars in principle and do support them in some concrete cases, this support is not unqualified or universal.

It would be incorrect to write off Soviet influence, interest and impact on Communist revolutionary war and warfare. Many well-developed techniques of Communist conspiracy are useful in this kind of activity. The Soviets have substantial relevant

[4] N. S. Khrushchev, speech of January 6, 1961, in *Kommunist*, January 1961, p. 19.

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assets, and they have not forsworn all violence. None the less, for guidance on the tactics and operations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, and for direct support, the Soviets do not have the experience, the doctrine, the cadres or the missionary zeal of the Chinese Communists.

V

The leading Communist theoretician of guerrilla warfare is Mao Tse-tung; the other two most influential writers are the Vietnamese General Giap and Che Guevara of Cuba. Without summarizing the development of Mao's doctrine on guerrilla warfare, nor reviewing in detail the Chinese Communist and Vietnamese experience, we should note some of the key political aspects of Communist doctrine for waging guerrilla warfare, and also some of the key related military tactics.

Almost all Mao's writings on military matters date from the period 1936–38. But in 1929, in one of his earliest pieces, he succinctly stated the political purpose of irregular, internal war: "When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence."[5] One of the best known of Mao's dicta is the statement, "Every Communist must grasp the truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'."[6] It is instructive to note the context of this statement, as it is not that usually assumed and ascribed in Western commentary. The gist of Mao's thought was that it was necessary in a revolutionary class war to implant and cultivate in the masses of the people awareness that they could, with gun in hand, seize power. Naturally, the Communist Party would lead them in this effort and harvest the result. But the idea was not simply that with military might one could take power; it was that the very process of revolutionary mass warfare could give invaluable political impetus to the military effort. This, then, is my ninth proposition: the Communists see revolutionary war not only as a means, expedient under some conditions, to *seize* power, but also as a means of building political support which will *sustain* power.

[5] Mao Tse-tung, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party" (December 1929), "Selected Works," v. 1. New York: International Publishers, 1954, p. 106.

[6] Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy" (November 6, 1938), "Selected Works," v. 2, p. 272.

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General Giap, in his recently published "People's War, People's Army," stresses that guerrilla war is waged for people, not for territory.[7] Space is often traded for time, and time used for political advance. The "high ground" of most importance is popular support, or at least popular non-support of the incumbent authority. Mao considered this as cardinal. As he put it, "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people."[8] This is probably true, with the important qualifications that the political objectives must *appear* to coincide with the aspirations of the people—even if they do not—and that the people compare the revolutionaries with the incumbent régime on the basis of both their own experience and the net image that propaganda and information from all sides convey. Finally, apart from "aspirations," the popular reaction is strongly influenced by expectations as to who is winning.

Mao, Giap and Guevara all stress the importance of exemplary conduct in relations with the population. Mao, especially, warned against excessive or indiscriminate repressive measures. Ten years ago Giap repeated this Maoist doctrine, but gave attention also to a minor-key Maoist theme recommending selective terror against local representatives of the incumbent régime in order to destroy its control. In South Viet Nam, the Communist-led Viet Cong have in recent years turned to systematic selective terror against local government officials on a large scale. They seek by this means to intimidate those who could organize opposition to their activities, and to paralyze the existing administration of the countryside at its very base.

Turning now to the military tactics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, my tenth proposition is that the Communists have no "secret" doctrinal formula for success, but they do have considerable experience and a basically sound theoretical expression of their doctrine for waging guerrilla warfare. It is very difficult to summarize usefully the many relevant tactical concepts, especially those in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, but also those of Che Guevara. In 1942, the Soviets prepared a manual on partisan operations, and in 1944 added a chapter on the subject to their regular army "Field Regulations." But except for doctrine on

[7] General Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's Army." Hanoi: Foreign Publishing House, 1961, p. 48 *et passim.*

[8] Mao Tse-tung, "Guerrilla Warfare" (1937), quoted by Brig. Gen. S. B. Griffith, U.S.M.C. (Ret.), in "Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare." New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, p. 43.

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combined and supporting operations for regular war, these are strictly technical and of little relevance to Communist guerrillas in other countries. Incidentally, Mao's chief military writings, and Guevara's, have only recently appeared in Russian translation.

Mao proceeds from the premise that "The principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy is the basis of all military principles."[9] Measures to achieve flexibility and adaptability include dispersion and temporary concentration to achieve local superiority for sharp attacks before shifting to another point of pressure. The enemy is thus forced to disperse and is kept off balance. Guerrilla campaigns must be carefully planned and purposeful in terms of a broad strategic design, and yet susceptible to alteration in order to meet changed conditions. Bases should not be established if it involves pitched battles and position warfare to defend them. Surprise, speed, secrecy, deception, initiative and reliable intelligence are all at high premium. Guerrillas, said Mao, should be "as cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits."[10] Mobility, manœuvrability, ability to melt into inaccessible terrain or into the peaceful population are important qualities in an effective force. I have already discussed morale and rapport with the population. Other necessary characteristics are discipline, ingenuity, Spartan living, ability to live off the land without excessive requisitions, and substantial reliance on captured arms and equipment.

Mao's concept of "protracted war" is now widely, if not always well, known. He advanced the thesis in order to explain the particular situation in China in the 1930s (though on occasion he also did assume a wider applicability), when neither the government forces nor the guerrillas were strong enough to annihilate the other. A protracted period was necessary to shift the balance to the revolutionaries.[11]

The eleventh proposition: Guerrilla warfare, in Communist strategy, is only a stage in the growth of the revolution in a particular country. Usually it must be succeeded by regular civil war before power can be grasped. Mao categorically stated that "guer-

[9] Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" (May 1938). Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954, p. 6.

[10] Quoted by Lt. Col. Robert Rigg in "Red China's Fighting Forces." Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing House, 1952, p. 226.

[11] See, in particular, Mao Tse-tung, "On the Protracted War" (June 1938), in "Selected Works," v. 2, p. 157–243.

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rilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare,"[12] "In the course of the prolonged, ruthless war," he explained, "guerrilla warfare should not remain its old self but must develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: supporting regular warfare and transforming itself into regular warfare."[13] Guevara likewise holds that "guerrilla combat is a phase of warfare that cannot of itself attain complete victory; it is important to remember that guerrilla fighting is only a beginning or preparation for conventional warfare."[14]

In conclusion, I would note as my twelfth and final proposition: The future role of revolutionary guerrilla war in Communist strategy is probably more dependent on local opportunity than on anything else. The politico-military premises of Communist —chiefly Chinese—thought on revolutionary warfare is basically sound, as is their tactical doctrine for such operations. The most vulnerable point, then, is the local societies and polities which may be threatened. This is not a novel idea, but if our analysis of Communist thought and action brings us back to this point, we have at least discovered that there are no short cuts for either side —no basic flaws in the Communist approach, but also no secret weapon in their arsenal.

[12] In Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[13] Mao Tse-tung, "On the Protracted War." "Selected Works," v. 2, p. 224.
[14] Guevara, in *Army*, March 1961, p. 24.

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SOVIET AGRICULTURE MARKS TIME

By Alec Nove

NINE years ago, Khrushchev addressed the first "agricultural" plenum of the Central Committee since Stalin's death. His frank exposure of the poor state of Soviet agriculture was followed by action along a wide front. Prices paid by the state for farm produce were substantially raised, investments in agriculture increased, peasant incomes showed a much needed and rapid rise from very low levels. Tax and other burdens on the private activities of peasants were eased, to the benefit of all concerned; for example, in five years the number of privately owned cows increased 25 percent. In 1958 a major organizational weakness was corrected: Tractors and other machinery formerly owned and operated by the Machine Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) were sold to the collective farms which the M.T.S. had previously "serviced" (and also supervised). In 1958, too, the government dropped its complex multiple-price system, under which farms received a low price for a quota of produce and a higher one for deliveries in excess of their quota; this was replaced by a single price for each product, with zonal variations.

The period 1953–58, then, was one of reform, of higher incomes, of large investments, of new methods. It was also one of higher production. The 1958 grain harvest set an all-time record. Sugar beets and cotton also did very well. Milk yields benefited from the improved diet of the cows. According to the official statistics, the *annual* rate of growth of gross agricultural output in the five years 1953–58 was 8.6 percent. This would be a remarkable achievement, if the statistics were reliable, but there are ample grounds for suspecting some degree of exaggeration. Even so, no serious observer doubts that a substantial advance was recorded in these years.

No doubt inspired by the figures with which they were supplied, Khrushchev and his colleagues projected an even more rapid growth of agricultural output in the Seven Year Plan (1959–65), and onward through 1970. Extremely ambitious plans were envisaged for meat production, in particular, and for other scarce items such as fruit and vegetables. Yet for three consecutive years since 1958 the figures have shown no appreciable change, merely some fluctuations reflecting better or worse weather. In-

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deed, grain harvests have been below the 1958 record (see table on next page). How far performance lags behind plan can be seen from the following table (totals are in millions of tons):

	1961 plan	*1961 performance*
Grain	155.2	137.2
Meat	11.8	8.8
Milk	78.4	62.5

Source: Khrushchev, *Pravda*, March 6, 1962.

Allowance for statistical inflation of output would make the shortfall even greater. There is no doubt that Khrushchev is alarmed, because he has admitted as much at great length, and has proposed a number of remedies.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the reasons for the difficulties in which Soviet agriculture finds itself, and to assess the likely efficacy of the measures proposed to set matters right. But before doing so it is important to repeat that there has been a sizable advance since the death of Stalin, and that the crisis in Soviet agriculture is essentially to be seen as a failure to expand, a failure to measure up to very ambitious plans, rather than as a collapse. Various foods are in short supply in many cities at different times of the year, but there is some truth in Khrushchev's assertion that the shortage has been exacerbated by an increase in personal incomes (with retail prices broadly unchanged).

In considering the problems of Soviet agriculture, it is necessary to distinguish several types of difficulty, and, correspondingly, different kinds of policies or remedial measures. There is, first, the complex of problems related to soil utilization, agricultural techniques, equipment and the like, which may be called problems of production. Secondly, there are questions connected with the peasants, with their private interests, incomes, incentives. Finally, there are the many problems of agricultural planning, administration and control. These are all to some extent interconnected, as when, for instance, an administrative measure designed to improve technique affects the peasants' private activities. None the less, it remains true that these various matters are to some extent distinct and can be separately analyzed.

II. PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION

One of the principal objects—though not the only object—of Soviet farm policy is to increase production. Under any politi-

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cal system, this would involve overcoming serious obstacles, for a large part of Soviet territory is unsuitable for agriculture. Where the soil is fertile there is usually a high risk of drought, and where rainfall is adequate the soil is generally poor. Two of Khrushchev's principal remedies—designed to provide more crops and especially more grain for human and animal consumption—were the virgin-lands and the corn campaigns. The first involved enlarging the area of extensive farming, the second was an attempt to intensify farming. Both have now been running for six years or more, and so some assessment of their effectiveness is possible.

The virgin-lands campaign was a truly formidable undertaking. It added to the farmland of the Soviet Union an area equal to the cultivated land of Canada. Between 1953 and 1956, the total sown area rose from 157 to 194.7 million hectares. So great an expansion in so short a period has no parallel in agricultural history. It was achieved through a major diversion of machinery and with a minimum number of permanent settlers, reinforced at harvest time by migrant labor (volunteers or "volunteers," probably both). The areas brought under cultivation were in the northern half of Kazakhstan, in parts of west and central Siberia and in the territories east of the lower Volga and the southern Urals. The principal crop was grain, largely spring wheat. The following table gives the official production figures (in millions of metric tons) for the total grain harvest in the years 1953–1961, with a breakdown showing that part of the total harvested in the virgin lands, of which Kazakhstan (shown as a further subtotal) is one region.

	1953	*1954*	*1955*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*
TOTAL GRAIN HARVEST	82.5	85.6	106.8	127.6	105.0	141.2	125.9	134.3	137.3
Harvested in virgin lands	27.1	37.6	28.0	63.6	38.5	58.8	55.3	59.1	n.a.
Harvested in Kazakhstan	5.4	7.7	4.8	23.8	10.5	22.0	19.1	18.8	14.8

Sources: for 1953–60, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo* S.S.S.R. v. *1960 godu*, p. 440–1; for 1961, *Pravda*, March 6, 1962.

Clearly, grain production did increase greatly through 1958. In 1954, the first year of the campaign, yields were good but little had yet been ploughed. In 1955, on the other hand, drought ruined the crop; in Kazakhstan, for instance, yields in that year averaged a mere 3.8 quintals per hectare, against a nation-wide

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average of 8.5 quintals in a not very favorable year. In 1956 the harvest was very good—the best to date in the areas with which we are concerned. The 1957 crop was a poor one. Since 1958, a good year, no further progress has been made, and the figures for Kazakhstan, the territory with the highest drought risk, have shown an alarming downward trend.

The difficulties encountered have been of the following kinds:

1. The nature of the campaign itself caused the ploughing up of some land with unsuitable soil, or with excessively sparse rainfall. The causes of such errors will be discussed when we come to analyze administration.

2. A surprisingly high proportion of the machinery is not kept in good repair and cannot be used, owing to lack of spare parts, skilled mechanics and workshops. The situation has been getting steadily worse; thus there were 32,000 combine-harvesters inactive in Kazakhstan in 1959, but 60,000 were in disrepair at the start of the 1961 harvest.[1]

3. The right kind of rapidly ripening seed is seldom available. This, in combination with the shortage of working machinery, delays the harvest, and, in this area of early frosts, heavy losses result.

4. Lack of amenities has driven away some of the permanent labor force, despite repeated criticisms of this state of affairs by Khrushchev and by many lesser officials.

5. The land has been misused. Spring wheat has been sown year after year, although there was no lack of warnings as to the consequences. Weed infestation, soil erosion, reduced natural fertility are all named as causes of falling yields. No acceptable system of cultivation and crop rotation has yet been agreed upon.

Despite these difficulties, the campaign to date has paid good dividends. It was clear from the start that there would be some bad years, and, whatever discount is made for statistical exaggeration, it is surely true that a substantial contribution has been made to Soviet grain supplies, which could not otherwise have been obtained so quickly. Moreover, poor weather conditions in the Ukraine have often coincided with good ones in Kazakhstan, so that one effect of the campaign has been to spread the risks somewhat.

The future, on the other hand, looks much less satisfactory. It is known that some of the newly opened lands are of good quality,

[1] These figures are taken from the remarkable speech by the premier of Kazakhstan, Sharipov, in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1961.

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while others appear to have been ploughed up on orders from above and against the better judgment of local experts, but we do not know how much land may be in each category. Nor have we the means of assessing the extent of damage done by prolonged monoculture, or wind erosion, though these factors have certainly contributed to the steady drop in output and yields in Kazakhstan, where the bulk of the least suitable lands happens to be situated. Probably some of the ploughed-up land will have to be abandoned. Remedial measures at present being discussed may well run into administrative difficulties, because of Khrushchev's strong distaste for fallow and grasses, which presumably should be extended in some areas if the land is to be saved. Increased application of fertilizer is unlikely to provide a solution because of lack of moisture. (Very little is used on the somewhat similar Canadian prairies, though rainfall there is slightly higher.) In all the circumstances, it would be sensible to assume that a bigger contribution will be needed from traditional agricultural areas, and that the Soviet Union will be fortunate if means are found to maintain average yields in these marginal lands at the modest levels of the last few years.

Khrushchev was conscious from the first of the need to increase substantially the output of fodder, particularly fodder grains, in the "old" cultivated areas. This was the primary object of his corn campaign, which was facilitated by the growing of so much wheat in the virgin lands. Corn had been neglected, and its acreage in 1953 was actually somewhat lower than in 1940 and 1950. To enforce a rapid change, Khrushchev had recourse to continuous propaganda and administrative pressures. As a result, the area under corn rose rapidly from 3.5 million hectares in 1953 to 19.7 in 1958 and 28.2 in 1961. With strong pressure to sow corn on good land and to give it a large share of the available fertilizer,[2] yields rose also, as the following table shows:

	1953	*1958*	*1959*	*1961*
Total corn harvest (millions of metric tons)	3.7	16.7	12.0	24.0
Yield (quintals per hectare)	10.6	20.6	13.8	18.2

However, these official averages conceal vast regional variations. Thus in some areas in which corn was sown "by order," yields were exceedingly low; these include the Volga area and the

[2] Perhaps this is why potatoes, which "compete" for scarce fertilizer with the more fashionable corn, have been doing badly of late.

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Urals, where average yields for the period 1957–59 were respectively 5.1 and 4.5 quintals per hectare. This represents utter failure.

None the less, as in the case of the virgin-lands campaign, the underlying idea behind Khrushchev's corn plan was sound, and the substantial increase in silage supplies (from 32 million tons in 1953 to 186 million tons in 1960, largely due to corn) certainly helped in raising milk yields and providing a better diet for an expanded livestock population. The trouble, as in the case of the virgin-lands campaign, has been the "campaigning" methods themselves, which caused rapid expansion under conditions which were often unsuitable. (Khrushchev has repeatedly claimed that corn can grow even as far north as Archangel.) Orders from the center demanded that all corn be sown in "square clusters," although, as several local agronomists sought vainly to point out, it is often more convenient to sow in rows.

Khrushchev has also set unrealistic goals. Thus whole provinces in the Ukraine were expected to achieve a yield of 50 quintals of corn per hectare in 1961, whereas American yields, with more suitable soils and warmer climate, averaged around 32 quintals. Even though the 1961 harvest in the Ukraine was an all-time record, with excellent weather conditions, no province came within 15 quintals of this target. Instead of learning his lesson, Khrushchev has repeated his demand for 50 quintals per hectare in 1962. One is left wondering which would do more harm: failure (with or without simulation of success), or success bought at the cost of neglecting all other farming needs of the Ukraine; presumably the former. It is this chronic tendency to overdo a good idea, to impose it by decree, which ruins its application and does so much harm to Soviet agriculture. More will be said below about the causes of such practices.

Meanwhile we must turn to consider the latest of Khrushchev's campaigns—to plough up meadows and reduce the area of sown grasses. Its motive, like that of the corn campaign, was the need for fodder, more in quantity and more diversified in type. This called for a further intensification of agriculture, which, as Khrushchev rightly saw, was inconsistent with the previously fashionable *travopolye* (rotational grass) crop system, associated with the name of Vilyams (Williams) and imposed under Stalin on all parts of the Soviet Union, regardless of local conditions. While grass could be a valuable source of fodder in the Baltic

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States or the northwest, in central and south Russia it grows poorly and provides little hay. Consequently there was much to criticize in these cropping practices. Khrushchev attacked the indiscriminate enforcement of *travopolye* in 1954, but agronomists had been trained in this way of thinking, officials were used to it, and those experts who had opposed it in Stalin's day had been punished or demoted. Consequently, little change actually occurred.

Khrushchev launched an all-out assault on *travopolye* in 1961 —in speeches in many parts of the country and at the Twenty-second Party Congress. He pointed to the vast areas of sown grasses, of meadows, of low-yield crops such as oats. He ridiculed those provinces, including Leningrad and Moscow, where 50 percent or more of all arable land consisted of grasses and fallow. He demanded that such crops as corn, peas, beans and sugar beets be sown instead, in virtually all parts of the country. Only by intensification of agriculture of this kind, he asserted, would it be possible to produce sufficient fodder. Agricultural experts or officials who did not see this would have to be reëducated or removed. Crop rotation, too, must be drastically altered forthwith.

Again, as in the case of the virgin-lands and corn campaigns, Khrushchev appears right in general principle, but the method of enforcing his ideas almost ensures that very serious errors will be made in some parts of the country. The new system will not be understood. New crops will be grown by order in areas where soil conditions or labor shortage or the lack of necessary machinery or fertilizer will make it impossible to apply the directive effectively. For example, in parts of the Baltic States or in the Leningrad province it may well be rational to grow grass, because, although it would certainly be possible to produce more fodder per hectare by planting, say, beans, it would not be worth the extra labor involved. Incredibly enough, Khrushchev hardly mentioned that additional inputs would be necessary; all he declared himself concerned about was the amount of fodder produced. Of course, Khrushchev was careful to warn against excesses; grass was not to be universally banished, fallow might be necessary here and there, and so on. But the general sense of his instructions was such that they are bound to be followed by orders to plough up grass, to ban fallow and sow beans, corn, etc., regardless of circumstances. Thus the premier of Latvia mentioned that some of his colleagues in the Baltic States were already treating clover as a

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"forbidden crop."[3] Khrushchev must know all this. Yet presumably he can see no other way of breaking up existing irrational farm practices, since his only available weapon is the party machine, and this is the sort of way it works. In his impatience with low yields and general inefficiency, these crude administrative methods must appear to him as irreplaceable.

One cannot envisage a rapid advance of Soviet agriculture by such methods—the more so as the agricultural machinery industry has been undergoing a painful period of readjustment. Production of some vital items has fallen drastically. Khrushchev himself cited with dismay the fact that output of corn silage combines, urgently needed as a result of the expansion of the corn acreage, actually fell from 55,000 in 1957 to 13,000 in 1960.[4] Other sources confirm that the new system of industrial planning has caused much confusion in farm machinery factories.[5] The chronic shortage of spare parts continues, and decrees about expanding their output and making them available to farms on free purchase (as distinct from administrative allocation) have remained on paper.[6] Finally, fertilizer production and output of other important agricultural chemicals (sprays, weed-killers, etc.) are far behind schedule. Khrushchev contrasted the Seven Year Plan target for mineral fertilizer—an increase from 12 to 35 million tons—with the "achievement" of an increase of a mere 2.9 million tons in three years. New capacity is being delayed, and the completion plan for the three years is only 44 percent fulfilled.[7] No wonder the Ukrainian party leader, Podgornyi, complained that fertilizer supplies were inadequate: "For instance, deliveries to the Ukraine of fertilizer for sugar beet growing, per unit of land, has actually diminished in the past few years." He also deplored serious difficulties in supplies of timber, vehicles, tires and metal.[8] These are products of obvious importance to agriculture. The adoption of even the best techniques cannot bring results if the required machines are not available, or if they break down and cannot be repaired, or if, as in some areas, farms do not even have

[3] Y. Peive, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,* March 5, 1962, p. 5.

[4] *Pravda,* March 6, 1962. Khrushchev there cites other examples.

[5] See in particular the article by the director of the Tula farm machinery factory, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,* Jan. 15, 1962, p. 8.

[6] A 1961 decree provides for severe punishment for allowing farm machinery to deteriorate, but often enough the cause of the trouble is lack of spare parts, or of materials with which to build shelter and storage space.

[7] *Pravda,* March 8, 1962.

[8] *Pravda,* March 7, 1962.

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carts or trailers to move into the fields the fertilizer which they do have available.

One purpose of the Party's recent declarations may be to restore a high priority to the industrial sectors which serve agriculture, and surely some improvements are both possible and likely. However, these shortages, which hamper agriculture even with existing cropping arrangements, must greatly hinder the application of the anti-*travopolye* policies, which call for much increased utilization of both machinery and fertilizer. If this call cannot be met, the result is likely to be a large additional expenditure of peasant labor without sufficient return.[9] It should be added that, as a consequence of the ploughing up of grasses, private livestock may be deprived of pasturage, to the further detriment of production and peasant morale. (When the corn campaign was launched, the peasants were promised part of the corn for their animals; but no such promises are being made at present.)

III. THE PEASANTS

By the end of 1957, many collectivized peasants must have felt considerable grounds for satisfaction. Cash distributions from the farms had risen almost fourfold in five years. They were about to be freed from all delivery obligations to the state from their private holdings, and their private livestock was expanding at a fairly impressive rate. It is true that work discipline was being tightened. But clearly things were improving.

In the past four years, the peasants have been in a much less satisfactory situation. Space precludes anything like a full analysis of the many factors involved. The following is a summary of unfavorable developments:

1. Attempts, sometimes encouraged by the authorities, to pay collective farmers a guaranteed minimum "wage," instead of in "workday units" of uncertain value, have broken down in many areas[10] because there is still no financial basis for any regular payment for work done, except on the richer farms. For seven years the press has been publishing articles and letters insisting on the necessity of earmarking a fixed share of farm revenue to pay the peasant members. Yet nothing effective has been done.

2. The 1958 reforms had the unintended consequence of increasing disparities in income between rich and poor farms. This

[9] The burdens on the labor force which present policies impose were stressed at the Central Committee plenum by P. Abrosimov (*Pravda*, March 8, 1962).

[10] See evidence in A. Kraeva, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8/1961, p. 74.

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was because, until that year, the more fertile areas were charged a kind of disguised differential rent by having to pay more for work done by the M.T.S. and by being compelled to deliver a bigger quota of produce at low prices. The abolition of the M.T.S. and the unification of delivery prices eliminated these methods. It is true that the unified delivery prices are lower in fertile areas, but the difference is quite small.

3. Peasant income from collective farms appears to have declined since 1957. The evidence for this lies, first, in the fact that there has been statistical silence since 1957, which usually indicates that the figures look bad. Second, two Soviet scholars have used regional and/or sample data to show a fall in distributions to peasants since that date; one of the writers, citing a 15 percent reduction between 1957 and 1960 in the province of Rostov, lists a number of other areas in which "the situation is broadly similar."[11] This happened despite a rise in gross revenues, and appears to have been due to pressure to spend large sums on investment, to exorbitant charges for repairs in state-run workshops, and the need to pay black-market prices to obtain desperately scarce tires, building materials and spare parts.[12]

4. Restrictions have been imposed on private activities of peasants, and the number of privately owned cows has declined sharply since the end of 1957. In consequence, and also because of a decline in free-market sales, peasant incomes in cash and produce from their private plots have fallen too. Thus there is evidence of a significant decline in peasant living standards, which must affect incentives.

Several measures have been taken to ease the financial burdens of the collective farms: prices of some items which farms must purchase were reduced in 1961, credit terms were eased, and payments for produce were made in advance. Also, nearly two million collective-farm peasants have been converted to state-farm status since 1957, making them regular wage earners (though the wages are low). However, possibly because of financial stringency, the government has done little indeed to improve peasant incomes, and must have caused much irritation by its measures against private livestock.

Perhaps the renewed restrictions on private activities of peasants are designed to persuade them to work harder for the collec-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 77, and E. Kapustin, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,* April 9, 1962, p. 8.

[12] *E.g.* see articles in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* by M. Semko and A. Severov, respectively March 5 and March 19, 1962.

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tives. Certainly, it could be shown that millions of man-hours are dissipated on private landholdings and millions more on taking produce to market. The Soviet leaders could well argue that these are not efficient ways of using labor. Yet, in existing circumstances, the private plot and the free market are indispensable, both for the peasants and for urban consumers of foodstuffs. In the first place, the private holdings, though primitively cultivated, are often much more productive, per unit of land, than collective or state farms, due partly to hard work and partly to the concentration of manure on a small area. To take a particularly striking example, in 1959 a hectare of potatoes on private holdings yielded 11.6 tons, as against 6.6 on state and collective farms.[13] Second, particularly in small towns and in rural districts, the state distribution network is utterly incapable of coping with food supplies, except for a narrow range of staple items. In this situation a cut in the number of private cows may create serious shortages.

Why, since milk production on state and collective farms has fully offset the decline in private output, does this situation occur? Some would point to exaggerations in the reporting of milk production, asserting that output has in fact fallen. This may well be so. But there is another and simpler reason. To distribute milk in a "modern" manner is a complex affair. It requires storage, refrigeration, specialized transport, bottles or cartons, and so on. All these are lacking, outside of a few big cities. In these circumstances, even if milk does exist on some farm 30 miles away, it is impracticable to distribute it, and so the local woman and her one private cow are irreplaceable. In villages, except in a very few showplaces, the private plot is almost the sole source of milk and vegetables for peasant families. Given the present structure of Soviet farming and food distribution, measures against the private sector must have unfortunate results, and the quickest way of ensuring an increase in production of many much-needed items is to permit some enlargement of private farming activities. It is extraordinary that Khrushchev, who so strongly criticized the measures taken under Stalin against private plots, should be adopting his present policies—or permitting them, since it is not impossible for the party machine in the villages to take some initiative in these matters. Surely he must know better than anyone that such interference damages not only the supply of food from the private

[13] Calculated from detailed figures given in the statistical compendium, *Selskoe khozyaistvo S.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1960).

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sector but also the morale of the peasants and their work for the collective and state farms. Yet only recently it was proposed that private plots on state farms be done away with and that communal vegetable-growing be substituted.[14] One can imagine the unpopularity of such imposed measures. Here ideology and administrative habit seem to stand directly in the way of increasing production.

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING

The Soviet leaders must surely be fully aware that agriculture does not take kindly to centralized planning, that local initiative is vital. Yet ever since collectivization they have interfered with farming operations. This is to some extent explained by the fact that collectivization itself was imposed by the Party, and it has required constant vigilance to maintain collective farms and to "protect" them from their peasant members. Party watchdogs must also supervise the party-nominated "elected" chairmen who were often peasants themselves and therefore liable to give priority to the farm's needs rather than the state's. Low prices, which helped to finance industrialization but offered no financial incentive, made it necessary that the coercive apparatus of Party and state be mobilized annually to enforce deliveries to the state. For many years the principal task of the local party officials in rural areas, and of the political officers within the M.T.S., was to squeeze out produce for the state from reluctant and potentially backsliding peasants, who had to be restrained from spending their time on their private holdings. Farms could not be allowed to pursue the principle of maximizing revenues, since the price system was (and still is) geared to other objectives. The existence of a free market exercised a particularly distracting influence. Thus collective farms have been accused of marketing vegetables in distant cities at high prices, or growing sunflowers instead of sugar beets because they could sell sunflower seed in the free market at a profit,[15] or even—in the case of a state farm in 1961—growing grass instead of grain because, as a surprisingly honest director told Khrushchev to his face, grass does not need to be delivered to the state and grain does.

Consequently, the habit developed of controlling agriculture

[14] V. Grishin, the "trade union" chief, *Pravda,* March 10, 1962.

[15] I. Bodyul, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,* March 5, 1962, p. 6. Many similar examples could be cited.

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from above, and of so organizing farms and planning as to facilitate this control. To some extent the amalgamation of collective farms, which has more than quadrupled their average size since 1950 (and which is still going on), is explained by the greater convenience in exerting control from above, rather than the convenience of management. From the latter standpoint, most state and collective farms are much too big. This tendency to very large size is also explained in part by the traditional Marxist belief that there are substantial economies of scale in agriculture.

When, in 1953, the appalling state of Soviet farming called for drastic remedial measures, Khrushchev showed himself very conscious of the harm done by inefficient central planning. The Soviet press printed a long series of articles criticizing the stupidity of inflexible production plans passed down the administrative hierarchy to farms for which they were quite unsuitable. Khrushchev and others declared that this must cease. In 1955, a decree was adopted freeing the collective farms from having production plans determined for them; they were to be given delivery quotas, and were to be free to decide their crop and livestock plans, so long as these were consistent with the quotas. It was repeatedly asserted that farm management and agronomists should be free to decide their own methods in the light of the very varied circumstances which always exist in agriculture.

In practice, since prices of neither output nor inputs reflected either needs or scarcities, direction from above had to continue. The period 1955–61 was one of experiment and frequent change in administrative arrangements. The Ministry of Agriculture was gradually shorn of its powers, part of which were transferred to *Gosplan* (the central planning agency) and part to a new body responsible for supply and utilization of farm machinery and fertilizer (*Sel'khoztekhnika*). A number of changes in purchasing arrangements culminated in the setting up, in 1961, of a Procurements Committee with local organs in close touch with farms, whose production programs they were supposed to influence. But production planning was also supposed to be the responsibility of the provincial agricultural department, while state farms came under a provincial trust which took its orders from organs of the individual republics.

The result was confusion. Everyone was to some extent responsible, therefore no one was. In practice, the local party organs at provincial (*oblast*) and district (*rayon*) levels exercised the most

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effective control over collective farms (and to a lesser extent over state farms). They issued orders on a variety of topics, they could and did dismiss the "elected" chairmen of farms and "recommend" others. But the responsibilities of the local parties, and the pressures to which they were subjected, gave rise to an administrative disease which is worth analyzing more closely.

A rural party secretary has always spent the bulk of his time dealing with agricultural problems. His promotion, or dismissal, depends on his success in coping with them. But how is his success or failure to be determined? The answer in practice has been: by his ability to report the fulfillment of plans to his superiors, if possible ahead of time. These plans tend to be very ambitious, and Khrushchev has systematically encouraged party secretaries to "compete" with one another by offering to overfulfill them. The plans in question are of many different kinds: they might concern grain procurement, meat deliveries, milk production, the completion of sowing by a certain date, the quadrupling of the corn acreage, the use of some fashionable method of harvesting, and so on. Almost invariably, the plans are either impossible of fulfillment, or (and this is the cause of much trouble) can be fulfilled only if other agricultural activities, which may be important but not at the moment the subject of a campaign, are neglected. Party secretaries are therefore repeatedly placed in an impossible situation. They are, of course, told to administer their areas efficiently, to take into account all the multifarious needs of agriculture. But they simply cannot do this while they are being cajoled to fulfill plans which, in the circumstances, are inconsistent with a healthy agriculture.

By long training, party officials have tended to adapt their behavior to the need to report success in the current campaign. Therefore cases like these recur repeatedly (all the examples are genuine and could be multiplied): seed grain is delivered to the state to fulfill delivery plans, and later other grain, unsorted and unsuitable, has to be returned for seed; farms are ordered to sow before the ground is fit for it, and/or to harvest by a fashionable but, in the given circumstances, unsuitable method; meat quotas are met at the cost of slaughtering livestock needed in the following year; to fulfill the procurement plan the local party boss orders the state elevators to receive what Khrushchev (in his speech at Novosibirsk) described as "mud, ice, snow and unthreshed stalks," which damaged the elevator's equipment. Party officials

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have repeatedly broken up established crop rotations to compel the adoption of whatever was the subject of the current campaign; if they understood the long-term damage which this might do to the soil, they would, in any case, probably be in charge of some other area by then. Other party secretaries inspired or condoned large-scale falsification of plan fulfillment, by such methods as instructing farms to buy butter in retail stores for delivery as their own produce (note that the cost of this operation falls on the peasants), or more simply by "writing in" non-existent figures (*pripiski*). They did not do these things because they enjoyed cheating or damaging the farms of their area, but as a response to pressures to achieve the impossible.

It is interesting to speculate why agricultural plans are so much less realistic than industrial ones. The uncertainties of the weather constitute one reason, but another is surely the habit of "campaigning," which is of such long standing, has done so much damage to sound farming and which still continues. A campaign must have clearly defined objectives, priorities and dates on which achievements are to be measured; it must involve strain and effort to achieve success, and must lead, therefore, to neglect of other considerations. But in agriculture this does great harm.

Given these administrative habits, it followed logically that the planning autonomy granted to collective farms in 1955 could never be a reality. It is also easy to understand why all decentralization measures were doomed to failure. Devolution of authority in the existing setting meant in practice devolution to party secretaries, who alone were in a position to enforce decisions, and this led to the systematic neglect of anything for which there was no pressure from the center. In a genuine effort to encourage local initiative, Khrushchev announced in 1958 that only grain-surplus regions were to be given grain delivery quotas. The idea was to encourage other regions to meet their own needs from their own resources, and in particular to concentrate on fodder grains for their livestock. What happened was that both grain acreage and production fell sharply in the areas freed from delivery quotas. In returning to centralized procurement planning in 1961, Khrushchev himself explained the reason: party secretaries, finding themselves no longer under pressure to deliver grain, instructed "their" farms to pursue other objectives in which the center seemed more interested; consequently, the fodder shortage was accentuated.

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It is in the light of all this that one must assess Khrushchev's latest administrative reforms. There were two possible ways out: either to grant much more autonomy to farm management, or, on the contrary, to attempt to organize a more streamlined and flexible machine of central control. He chose the latter. Given his own background and the traditions of the Party, he could hardly have done otherwise.

A completely new hierarchical pyramid of control has been created in 1962. A new All-Union Committee on Agriculture is to be headed by a deputy premier, and is to include the head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the Party, and the heads of other relevant organizations, which retain their identity within, or alongside, the new structure: the Procurements Committee, *Setl'khoztekhnika,* the Ministry of Agriculture (reduced to purely research and advisory functions), plus representatives of the planning agencies. This new committee will apparently not be a policy-making body (Khrushchev would have headed it if it were); it is merely to ensure that party and state directives for agriculture are carried out. But below the all-union level the situation is different in one all-important respect: the heads of the agricultural committees in republics and provinces are to be the first secretaries of the republican and provincial parties. At provincial level and below, the tasks of procurement as well as production planning, for collective farms and state farms, will be unified under the new committee within a provincial agricultural department. The basic unit of agricultural planning, operating on the instructions of the provincial committee, will now be a new "territorial state and collective farm administration," which, as a rule, will group together several districts (*rayony*). In each of these territorial administrations there will be a "party organizer" deputed by the republican or provincial party organization.

This new hierarchy is to have authority to plan production, to issue directives as to methods, crop rotations, procurements, and in general to be in charge of both state farms and collective farm operations. "Inspector-organizers" employed by the territorial administrations will work within the farms and "will decide on the spot questions of production and procurement." The large number of workshops and other minor enterprises carried on jointly by two or more collective farms will be placed directly under the territorial administrations. An end is finally made of the doctrine,

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so often disregarded in practice, that collective farms are autonomous coöperatives governed by their members.

The reorganization marks a drastic alteration in, and a tightening of, the entire system of administration. Within it, the role of territorial party officials has undergone an important change. Hitherto, however frequently these officials interfered with plans and operations, they were not directly in charge of them. Their job was supposed to be to ensure that the relevant state organs did their job, to act as political commissars and not as army commanders, so to speak. It is true that they did in fact frequently issue commands, but—and this point was made several times—they could and often did dodge responsibility by putting the blame on one or more of the state officials whose formal duty it was to plan this or that aspect of agriculture. Now, the most senior party secretaries at the republic and provincial level have been put in direct command over farming in their areas, have been given full powers to issue orders to ensure that the agricultural plans are fulfilled. The state organs at their level, and beneath them, are at their command. The most powerful man in the new basic territorial controlling organs will be the "party organizer" whom they will appoint, and even the nominal chiefs of these organs will clearly be party officials for the most part, certainly not professional agricultural managers; both Khrushchev and Voronov warned against appointing farm managers to these posts.[16] One category of party official loses—the district (*rayon*) secretaries—and protests from them were mentioned by Khrushchev. (They will sit on a council which will be attached to the territorial administrations, but so will farm managers and other lesser lights.) Apparently their behavior vis-à-vis the farms is regarded as having contributed to past distortion, which is true enough. Khrushchev appears to believe that the past failures of party control were due to the fact that it was unsystematic, spasmodic, with many overlaps with various state organs which in turn confused one another and, as he put it, left the farms "undirected." Presumably he imagines that, if a party secretary knows he is personally responsible for all agriculture in "his" province, he will no longer concentrate only on the immediately current campaign, and the many defects of party activities in rural areas will thereby be corrected.

[16] Voronov in *Pravda*, March 28, 1962. The big role played by Voronov in carrying out this reform is surely a significant pointer to his rapidly increasing position of power in the U.S.S.R.

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But will they? If our analysis is correct, then the essential weakness arises not from irregularity of their interference but from the overambitious nature of the plans which, willy-nilly, they have to force down the throats of their subordinates, and from the contradiction between these plans and the self-interest of farms and peasants. Party officials will surely continue to try to please their superiors and to organize matters so as to be able to report what these superiors wish to hear. While it is true that a more logical administrative structure has been achieved, it lessens the effective powers of farm managements and farm agronomists. It is on the farms that crops are grown, and it cannot be right to diminish the range of choice open to those who can actually see the crops growing, who bear formal responsibility for farm operations and, in the case of collective farms, for the incomes of the labor force.

V. CONCLUSION

Soviet agriculture is indeed marking time. The liberal post-Stalin policies did produce quick results, but since 1958 the growth rate has been negligible, for a number of interconnected reasons which I have endeavored to analyze here. It clearly does not follow that growth cannot be resumed. If more investment funds can be made available for the fertilizer and farm-machinery industries, for instance, then the very low crop yields in the naturally unfertile lands of the center, north and west of European Russia can be increased. Success in agriculture tends to reinforce itself (higher yields of fodder grains, more livestock, more manure, higher yields, higher productivity, increased incomes, more incentives, therefore still higher productivity, etc., etc.). None of this is impossible, despite the adverse natural conditions under which Soviet agriculture operates. The trouble is that policies toward the peasant and the organizational arrangements of the régime seem inconsistent with the great advance in food production which Khrushchev desires with evident sincerity. And paradoxically, his impatient urgings, and their organizational and "campaigning" consequences, are among the principal obstacles to soundly based progress. Although we should expect to see some increases in production, there can be no question of fulfilling—or anything like it—the plans for 1965 and 1970, to which so much publicity has been given in the Soviet Union.

Finally, it is only right and fair to emphasize that there is no

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easy solution to the problems with which the Soviet leadership is wrestling. It is easy to criticize the price system, but it ill behooves us to lecture Khrushchev about the virtues of a free price mechanism when not a single major Western country permits it to operate in the agricultural sector. Difficulties arise in ensuring even modest efficiency in traditional peasant farming in many non-Communist countries, and agricultural plans have a regrettable habit of going awry in places well to the west of the Soviet border. Thus at the moment of writing there is an acute potato shortage in England, due largely to the fact that the Potato Board restricted plantings in the incorrect expectation of favorable growing weather; if there were a 1962 sheep plan in Scotland it would be a failure, since so many sheep have been killed by the severe winter. It is also not to be forgotten that, seen historically, Soviet agriculture has served as a means of financing and sustaining industrialization and has suffered in consequence. This is a disadvantage unknown to farmers in developed Western countries.

Yet it remains true that the huge farms of the Soviet Union have been inefficient in the use of resources and have shown a deplorable lack of flexibility and a failure to mobilize necessary human ingenuity. It is also significant that the only country in the Communist bloc which fulfills its agricultural plans is Poland, where most farms are privately owned and privately run. One reason for this is that Polish plans are reasonable: had Gomulka been so foolish as to promise to treble meat production in five years, he too would have "failed." Polish farming has its own weaknesses, and it is surely impossible on practical as well as ideological grounds to apply the "Polish model" to the Soviet Union. Yet, Polish experience underlines a fact too often overlooked: that with all the familiar inadequacies of small-peasant agriculture, it possesses advantages which Marxist theory has failed to recognize and Soviet practice has yet to find a way of emulating. Khrushchev is making an all-out effort to seek efficiency within the basic institutional and political framework of the Soviet system, and has mobilized the Communist Party machine for this purpose. The next few years will show whether a breakthrough can be achieved under these conditions. Much depends on the outcome—perhaps Khrushchev's political standing, probably also the influence of the Soviet Union on other peasant countries, within and outside the Communist bloc.

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JAPAN'S POPULATION: MIRACLE, MODEL OR CASE STUDY?

By Irene B. Taeuber

THE spectacular story of the decline in Japan's population growth continues with that regularity in the extraordinary which has characterized the country over the past hundred years. Death rates are low, but so are the birth rates. Growth continues slowly, but only because the age structure is inherited from a period when birth rates were higher. Official views remain pessimistic—no longer because of excessive growth, however, but because growth itself may cease late in the century and might then be replaced by a decline that eventually could reach 10 percent a generation. Quiet inquiries are already being made concerning the pursuit and the timing of policies to increase birth rates.

Feelings of wonder merge into awe as one watches this transformation in an Asian country. The Japan whose industrial potential was presumably destroyed only 17 years ago has rates of economic growth that exceed 10 percent a year. Present economic targets involve a doubling of national income within a decade, together with a shift of two million people away from agricultural occupations. Already the limited land provides most of the rice needed for 95 million people, and hybrid varieties, improved fertilizers and mechanization threaten to add food surpluses to Japan's many problems of foreign markets. There is no problem of surplus population here, though, for the movement off the land is so massive that in 26 of Japan's 46 prefectures the population declined between 1955 and 1960. The Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area contains 15.8 million people, that of Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe 10.2 million.

There are, of course, unanswered questions about this fabulous tale. In itself that is not surprising; periods of pessimism and grandiose delusion have succeeded each other in Japan's history. Projections of Japan's future now are probably as hazardous as they were in the past; and we see today just how hazardous the earlier ones were, for it may be stated categorically that no students in or outside Japan predicted either the sharp drop in the birth rate or the high rate of economic growth. We study the Japanese phenomena, though, not because we know the answers but because Japan demonstrates the fact of Asian modernization

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and raises questions about the relevance of her experience for the billion or so people in Asia today who are approximately at the stage where 35 million Japanese were a century or so ago. It is in this context that it becomes particularly worthwhile to look briefly at what has happened in Japan's modern century and to raise questions that have not yet received, in Japan or elsewhere, the attention they deserve.

II

In the years from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to the late 1930s, Japan seemed to be a perfect illustration of the classic assumptions about the interaction of demographic and economic factors—that is, birth and death rates declined as industrialization and urbanization proceeded. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, population growth, if it occurred at all, was slow and irregular. Then early economic growth was followed by a population increase. The concentration on the land remained unchanged as peasant sons and daughters beyond those needed for replacement moved from agricultural jobs to non-agricultural jobs in the cities. Death rates declined slowly, for incomes were low, nutrition was inadequate and sanitation deficient. Birth rates also declined, initially in the urban areas and among the upper occupational and the educated groups, eventually throughout the nation. In the years from 1920 to 1940, fertility declined steadily in practically all prefectures, rural as well as urban.

The rate of the population increase was low: from 1872 to 1940 it never exceeded 1.5 percent a year. Yet over the decades this slow growth produced a massive total increase. Population became a national concern. In 1872 the total was 35 million; by 1940 it had more than doubled to 71 million. It seemed probable that the population would continue to increase throughout the twentieth century, and that population problems would become more rather than less serious.

The pattern which emerges is a decline in birth and death rates in association with advances in industrialization, urbanization and education. The resulting population growth was never high; the social and economic problems produced were not major hazards to modernization.

Is this, then, the pattern that can be expected or imitated in other Asian nations? The answer is definitely in the negative, whether we base our conclusions on demographic, economic or

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social factors. Japan's early modernization occurred prior to the availability of D.D.T. and the antibiotics, and consequently her death rates were high. To have reduced them substantially would have required major investments in public health and sanitation, in improving working conditions and in raising nutritional levels. If she had made these investments, it is doubtful whether economic growth could have occurred as rapidly as it did, since on the one hand the rates of savings would have been curtailed sharply, while on the other the more rapid population growth resulting from reduced death rates would have required a major expansion of employment opportunities. If larger proportions of sons and daughters had survived in the rural areas, the exodus to the cities would have had to be much greater in order to prevent pile-ups of people on the land. Furthermore, increased consumption would have reduced the rural savings that contributed so substantially to urban development.

The conditions under which Japan achieved her economic and social development do not correspond to the situation today in the underdeveloped nations, where the "revolution of rising expectations" is a paramount fact. There was universal education in Japan, but it included indoctrination to accept one's role in life and one's duties to the state. Economic modernization took place in compartments: hand labor and traditional ways persisted in agriculture and small industries, while advanced technology was limited to those sectors related to international markets and military power. The state concentrated its resources on industrialization, expansion and power; it assumed no responsibilities for individual and family welfare.

A more serious question as to the relevance of Japan's experience lies in the fact that the population increase and the industrialization occurred in company with a drive for geographic expansion and political power. The advances of empire and the wars that led from easy victory in 1895 to costly defeat in 1945 need not be summarized or evaluated here. What does need to be asked is whether economic and military expansion is an inevitable concomitant of modernization in a country where land is limited and people are many. Whatever the answer, it involves both the economic realities associated with population increase and the interpretation of those realities by makers of national policy. In Japan, the pressure of an increasing population was the major argument for expansion. Was it a genuine factor in forming the beliefs and

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decisions that led to militarism, imperialism and, finally, war? Or was it simply used to support policies and actions that could not be properly defended on other grounds? One need not elaborate on the relevance of these questions in any assessment of the future of Japan's colossal neighbor on the mainland.

The last great period of Japanese expansion began with the movement into Manchuria in 1931. The military losses were slight, the presumed achievements substantial. Once they had conquered North China and achieved the goal of an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese saw their population problem in a quite different light—now it was one of insufficient numbers. Japan's net human losses as a result of the Pacific War were limited by the fact that intensive efforts had been made to increase birth rates and reduce death rates.

Losses were nevertheless severe, for Japanese forces were often isolated in the islands of the Pacific and on the Asian mainland with little food and no medical supplies; and many civilians also died, particularly in the incendiary raids on cities. Total defeat and total surrender meant the liquidation of the colonial empire and the imperial structure. Some seven million Japanese were returned to a country where cities had been devastated, industrial plants destroyed and transportation disrupted.

The Japanese people and economy were so seriously injured that demographers forecast high death rates and a declining population. In fact, however, a rapid restoration took place, for the Japanese are an educated and disciplined people and the military occupation was both humanitarian and constructive. So while pessimism reigned and the ghost of Malthus hovered near, families were reunited, new families were formed and a baby boom developed. And death rates dropped rapidly.

In 1947, the birth rate was 34.3 for each 1,000 of population, the death rate 14.6. In 1948 and 1949, birth rates were about 33, death rates below 12. The rate of growth rose above 2 percent a year for the first time in Japan's history. In numerical terms, births remained about 2.7 million a year while deaths declined from more than 1.1 million to less than 950,000. The natural increase was 1.5 million in 1947, 1.8 million in 1948 and 1949. Both the Occupation authorities and the Japanese Government foresaw a soaring population. General MacArthur barred Mrs. Sanger and suppressed an American report on the natural resources of the country; the Japanese newspapers joined in the excitement;

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and birth control became a topic of conversation throughout Japan.

The most influential factors affecting population growth were not demographic. Revolutionary changes came in ways which were in some cases expected, in others rather weird. The Emperor became a man, like other men. Women became the equals of men —in the Constitution—and the family system lost legal sanction. There was land reform. Many owned land, but few owned enough to live from its products. Primogeniture was abolished, and with the vanishing security of the eldest son went that of the family in perpetuity. A Commission of the Diet recommended both contraception and emigration as government policies to help solve the population problem, but the Diet, which is democratically elected, ignored the report.

In this chaotic situation, the racially conscious Japanese worried that the unfit were multiplying and that the country's biological stock was deteriorating. Prohibitions adopted during the war barred sterilization as well as induced abortion. But in September 1949, the Diet revised the Eugenics Protection Law so as to legalize sterilization and abortion for specific reasons, and it permitted contraceptive services in health centers. Proponents of contraception within and outside Japan were jubilant. They looked forward to a limited use of sterilization and abortion for eugenic reasons along with an extensive use of contraception for family planning.

Japanese ethics did not condemn abortion; the country's medical personnel were numerous and its technology was quite adequate for adapting scientific advances to the field of fertility control. Selected physicians received instructions and the public was informed as to when abortions should be performed. Operations were conducted under aseptic conditions, and the use of penicillin was routine. Since they were performed under medical insurance plans, the cost to patients was not a problem. The number of abortions reported moved swiftly upward, then more or less stabilized at something over a million a year. The government health services, alarmed at the threat to health presumably posed by such widespread resort to induced abortion, began actively training doctors, nurses and midwives to give contraceptive advice.

These actions of the Japanese Government and people are still topics of controversy on many grounds, but the facts of the de-

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cline in fertility are demonstrable. The birth rate tumbled from 28.3 per 1,000 population in 1950 to 17.2 in 1957, and then remained approximately at this level. The death rate declined from 10.9 per 1,000 population in 1950 to 8.3 in 1957 and 7.6 in 1960. The population continues to increase, but at a slowing rate and with declining annual increments. If the birth and death rates of the last several years continue, the population will eventually decline.

Are we to assume that this rapid decline in Japanese vital rates in the last decade and a half will now serve as a model for the rest of Asia? Again the answer is negative. The Japanese who have achieved the low death rate and birth rate of a modern people are themselves modern. Their economy is industrial, their residence metropolitan. Education has been compulsory for more than three-quarters of a century; school attendance at the elementary level has been almost universal for more than half a century. Families have strong motives to limit the numbers of their children, and they do so.

No, Japan's experience is not directly transferable, for the conditions that were associated there with slow natural transitions of industrialization no longer exist in Asia. In Japan, industrialization and urbanization were aspects of a single process of economic growth; industries expanded and cities grew; the migration to the city was movement to a job—or, for a girl, to marriage. In contemporary Asia, great cities have grown without an adequate economic base. Some are products of economic failure; surplus people from the rural areas move to cities where jobs are insufficient, housing and amenities improvised, and schools are inadequate. The stimulation for mobility upward, the motivation for limiting the size of families, the aspiration for one's children—all are lacking. What is to be expected now in a Saigon, a Djakarta or a Seoul cannot be equated with what occurred earlier in a Tokyo or an Osaka.

III

The great significance of Japan to Asia is the fact that Japan exists as it does—industrial, urban, modern, a "have" nation with a "have-not" background. Asian pride in the sprawling neon-lit expanses of Tokyo seems to begin in Istanbul and increases in depth across the continent. Among the sophisticated and the unsophisticated alike in many if not all the Asian countries, there

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is a deep interest in how Japan achieved the demographic breakthrough to completed modernization within a decade. Group after group visits the Institute of Public Health to study Japan's government-sponsored activities in the field of contraception. In Tokyo, throughout Japan and at scientific meetings elsewhere, private conversation turns to that topic which no government, either in Japan or in other Asian countries, will mention approvingly in public—induced abortion.

The only direct Asian imitation has occurred in the Peoples Republic of China, where visiting consultants on a Friendship Tour were queried unofficially, and where the law announced soon thereafter was almost a replica of that in Japan—although this is acknowledged neither in Tokyo nor Peking. Other Asian countries are interested in Japan's pool of medical personnel as a possible source for technical assistance in their own family-planning programs. But there are limitations, since the Japanese Government obviously could not send abroad physicians who are specialists in induced abortion, nor could other countries accept them if offered. Neither would Japan admit officially that approval of contraception and the establishment of major public health facilities to spread its practice came only after the birth rate had been reduced dramatically by a nationwide resort to induced abortion.

Analysis of the steps in Japan's early development could nevertheless be helpful to planners in other Asian countries. Japan long ago made education through six grades compulsory for boys and girls alike, in rural areas and in cities. Did the resulting universal literacy and widespread elementary education lead to declining birth rates among village people? There were extensive household industries in Japan and small factories increased in number in rural areas. Was this a factor in reducing birth rates, or did it result only from industrialization in the large cities? Or, again, what were the levels and the changes in birth rates in those urban areas where families worked in their own homes under conditions of stability as great as those in the peasant village? Were these families "urbanized"? Were education, upward mobility and the small family characteristic among the migrants themselves or only among the children of migrants? For a time at least, Japan has achieved solutions to problems of poverty and population which presumably are inherent in the ancient cultures of the rice lands of monsoon Asia. The quantitative record is long and diverse, and descriptive materials are plentiful; analysis of them

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might yield clues as to how to induce social change and declining birth rates among other crowded peoples.

Japan's experience in recent years contradicts the prevalent assumption that the lethargy of traditional societies of the East prevents rapid social change. Japanese culture has been persistent but ever changing. The values and institutions of the village society were aspects of this culture, and they sanctioned early marriage, large families and a veneration for the lineage and property rights of elder sons. Yet the values and the institutions of the great cities and the modernizing villages of today are also aspects of this culture, and they sanction delayed marriage, small families and an emphasis on personal responsibility and achievement. At different times the values of the Japanese culture approved families of quite different sizes, and changes often came swiftly. There were alternatives, in Japanese culture, to demographic doom, and it may be presumed that there are such alternatives in other cultures. The projection of Japan's past into the future has never yielded a description of that future. The Japanese transformation occurred in a period of continuing advances in science and technology, and the changes which they brought were unforeseen. The importance of this fact to the rest of Asia is apparent.

IV

Today the problems created by rapid population growth are widely realized and even more widely discussed. Many people in many sectors of our diverse culture, with its differing traditions and customs, believe that something should be done. There is no consensus, however, for others believe that the doing would be unethical, unwise or simply ineffective. Given a consensus as to the desirability of taking some action, there still would have to be a selection among many possible lines of activity, and this would involve intricate considerations of international propriety. But, even assuming that we overcome our scruples on this score, is effective action in this field feasible? Would our policy be viewed favorably in other countries? Would any policies that we might adopt prove successful in slowing rates of population growth among the peoples of Asia and Africa? The difficulties in these continents seem minimal, moreover, as compared to those of Latin America, especially if family planning were included as an essential aspect of the social modernization that is demanded by the Alliance for Progress.

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Glances backward in history or outward across the world provide few answers concerning policy and action in the population field. The areas that are developing today present problems that are new in their magnitudes and their urgencies. Almost the only relevant experience at our disposal has been in Japan, which had no announced policy to reduce birth rates, but which took measures that profoundly affected them. The fundamental lesson learned there merely corroborated a fact that was obvious: population policies concern or impinge on religious and ethical systems, values and the conflict of values, institutional tensions, political and ideological identifications, aspirations for strategic advantage, rationalizations for power drives, and many things more. Overt encouragement or sponsorship of the policies of other governments in this complicated and delicate field therefore requires the most careful assessment of conditions in each specific case—if, indeed, the occasion should arise when such sponsorship would be other than presumptuous on our part.

The decision as to United States policy is not therefore resolved, for what is in view is not our sponsorship but our coöperation or assistance—in personnel, training, facilities and the provision of means. The basic need is not to find a United States policy for the population problems of other countries but a United States policy for coöperation in population policies that other countries themselves have adopted—or wish to adopt. Our critical foreign-policy decision therefore involves a solution of our own internal difficulties and hesitations with reference to population policies in general and birth control in particular. Our dilemma is posed by the deep, divergent religious beliefs and the disparate cultural and social values of our people. It will not be resolved simply or quickly if it is posed in terms of harsh alternatives.

Among American Negroes, birth rates are substantially higher than they were in prewar Japan. The associated problems of limited education, low incomes, high fertility, disorganization and delinquency are as real for us as for the Japanese. And however we may estimate our international obligations, we cannot deny our responsibilities for the Navajo on the reservations. A positive approach to the world's population problem, then, requires that we view the many related problems within our own society with the same frankness with which we approach those of other countries. We have the responsibility for whatever actions are needed in our own country, just as others bear it in theirs. And we should

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remember what our experience in Japan has taught us: that the fundamental problems and policies in the population field may not be demographic in nature, but social, political and economic.

Finally, we should do well to bear in mind that forecasting in this field has been notably unsatisfactory. Projections of future populations made in the years prior to 1947 involved an implicit assumption that death rates were tied necessarily to ways of living. The numbers expected by the year 2000 were scarcely larger than the numbers that now exist in 1962. Many projections are made today on the implicit assumption that death rates have self-perpetuating downward mechanisms while birth rates retain their inexorable ties with ancient traditions and values. Perhaps so, perhaps not. Projections made prior to the revolutionary technological advances in control over mortality became archaic within a decade. Projections prior to comparable technological advances in control over fertility may become similarly archaic. This is a period of vulnerability and crisis, and we cannot know what the resolution of the conflicting factors will be. It is with an acknowledgment of this uncertainty that we can best proceed to assess the Japanese experience and evolve our own proper policies.

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THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM BEGINS

By Jean Daniel

FROM the statements of M. Georges Pompidou, the new head of the French Government, one would infer that the Algerian conflict is a thing of the past. On the theory that he is now freed from that incubus, he has serenely set about dealing with French social questions and above all with the international problems which, to tell the truth, have always been General de Gaulle's sole, indeed almost obsessive, preoccupation.

But can one really speak of Algeria in the past tense? The secret Army Organization is very far from having been disarmed, despite the spectacular capture of Generals Jouhaud and Salan. The daily bulletins recording assassinations and crimes of all sorts are as regular as ever and the lists of the victims are as numerous. How can one speak, then, of having "got over" the Algerian problem?

It is "got over" by taking a specifically Gaullist attitude. Charles de Gaulle has said more than once that a statesman is a man who can "see beyond," who is farsighted enough to be able to distinguish the hidden essential from the visible nonessential, no matter how serious it momentarily seems. In his view, actions that are urgent at the moment should be carried out by simple executors; statesmen must devote themselves to the future.

This concept would be plausible enough if the executors were always on the watch to see that current actions did not compromise the future and that day-by-day realities did not jeopardize the long-range ideal; and if they had the means to do this effectively. But this is far from being the case. It is certain, for example, that since September 16, 1959,[1] General de Gaulle's closest entourage has not set out seriously to do what needed to be done if the concepts of decolonization which he had formulated in more or less precise terms were to be realized. It is equally certain that the conditions in which de Gaulle himself felt able to carry on the war in Algeria before achieving the Evian agreements were bound to have important consequences for the future of both France and Algeria, and also for the future relations between Algeria on the one hand and Europe and the whole free

[1] This was the date of General de Gaulle's famous speech which raised, for the first time since 1830, the question of self-determination for Algeria.

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world on the other. My purpose in this article is to show that even though there is a good chance that the Algerian war is ending, the Algerian problem has only just begun.

The agreements reached at Evian are reassuring; they constitute a success for de Gaulle's policy in Algeria and still do not compromise in the least the highest ideals of the Algerian revolution. The more one studies them and sees to what an extent they incorporate a common will to coöperate and to respect the International Charter of the Rights of Man, the more one has to recognize both the intelligence and high-mindedness of the French negotiators and the political courage of their Algerian counterparts. Seldom since the beginning of the present century have negotiations led to such a reasonable conclusion.

But agreements, after all, are only agreements. They set up (as a famous French saying has it) a sort of provisional reconciliation between mental reservations. The straightforward ideas appear in the text, the mental reservations do not. We must examine what these latter consist of in the present case. We must see how much the concessions on either side were made regretfully, under force of circumstances, for tactical political reasons, or from the heart.

On the French side, it is a long way from General de Gaulle's early dreams to the Evian agreements. True, when he took over the French presidency he did offer the Algerians "a preferred position in the French Community." But he thought of this Community as a French Commonwealth, whose members would be not so much concerned about obtaining formal and anarchistic independence as about keeping not only economic and cultural ties with France but diplomatic and military ties also. Since many states in French black Africa accepted this kind of relationship the dream did not seem entirely utopian—at any rate on the surface. Thus, de Gaulle felt that the French Community which he gathered about himself had even more solidity and prestige than the British Commonwealth grouped around the Crown.

The most shining example of French-African association in this Community must be Algeria, governed, to be sure, by Algerians but receiving preferred treatment from the metropole, and on that account accepting a particularly close interdependence with it. Admittedly this Community would evolve in the direction of a group of sovereign states; but this would come later, much later, after the French had shaped the local leaderships and adminis-

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trative bodies and after the most fanatical native revolutionaries had been shown that the French sincerely wished to be helpful and that their continued presence was needed. Within this concept developed the Constantine Plan, which was to transform Algeria radically in five years. It was within this concept, also, that the first serious contacts took place between France (represented by M. Pompidou, then merely an adviser at the Elysée) and the Algerians of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). This meeting did not lead to anything.

Since then General de Gaulle has seemed to give up many of his ambitions. Hardly had the Community come into being when it began to crumble. The mystique of complete independence was triumphant throughout Africa and Asia, as well as in Latin America. What is more, a great wave of revolutionary fervor gradually moved Algerians, Cubans, Guineans, Congolese and others in unison in the same direction and with the same slogans. China and the Soviet Union knew better than the West how to channel this fervor to their advantage. Before long the famous trio Nehru-Nasser-Tito came to seem an anachronism of moderation. A revolutionary orthodoxy was born in the Third World of underdeveloped peoples, and anyone who dared accept dependence on the West was branded a heretic—one full of complexes.

General de Gaulle quickly adapted himself to what was happening in the world. When he saw that his dream of the Community seemed unrealizable, at any rate in its original form, he switched, at first ill-humoredly but then quite firmly, to what in France is called "Cartierism," after Raymond Cartier, the journalist, who was the first, if not to formulate the doctrine, at least to systematize it. "Cartierism" is based on the assumption that colonialism and even economic assistance are not "good business." There was a time when colonies paid; that time is gone. If the natives are not mature enough to administer the aid they are given, and, above all, if they are not willing to give anything in exchange for it, then it is much better to invest the capital in the metropole than in Africa—to modernize the Lozère, for instance, the poorest department in France, rather than Upper Volta or Niger. This thesis was considered cynical by perfectionists because it rudely admitted that colonialism had been undertaken only for profit but it was very popular among the French middle classes.

In order to fight the army General de Gaulle ostentatiously

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made use of this shoddy line of argument. How did a man who has always been mistrustful of business influences in political life come to make common cause with the "shopkeepers"? Simply because, tired of the constant demands of the Algerian situation and eager to play a leading role in international developments, he determined to finish with Algeria in one way or another. Since he was not able to convince his countrymen of how vitally important it was that he, de Gaulle, should influence the destiny of the world, he resigned himself to flattering the "shopkeeper spirit" of the French people.

This does not mean that the objectives have changed. In de Gaulle's mind the Community was to enlarge the prestige of France, above all in order to increase her influence in international decisions. From the moment it became apparent that the Algerian war endangered the Community and threatened to destroy the reputation of French diplomacy, there was a complete about-face. Did it come too late? Very late, certainly. For in the meanwhile more than 1,500,000 young Frenchmen had taken part in the Algerian conflict; and more than a million of the French population of Algeria, feeling themselves betrayed and forsaken, supported the O.A.S. The war in Algeria has inflicted a trauma on the French the like of which they have not experienced since 1870; on close inspection, they are all but unrecognizable.

Certainly, the French are prosperous in 1962. They depart on vacation in droves and even the most modest homes are being equipped with automobiles, refrigerators and television. But if one starts rummaging a bit in the soul of present-day France one finds it bruised and wounded, split between the revolt of the individual and the indifference of the group. In this sense, sad to say, the Gaullism of the French people seems more like resignation—putting their fate into the hands of the Man of Destiny—than like active, positive and dynamic partnership. Is this state of affairs the inevitable consequence of decolonization? If so, de Gaulle would be the unpopular but respected hero who cut the umbilical cord tying Algeria to France and who would be repudiated as soon as the necessary operation had been completed. Or is he, on the contrary, the man who thought it clever to break the army by not giving it a clear mission, who was willing to be brought to power by the very clans that he felt he must betray, who introduced the coup d'état into French political life? My feeling is that we must take the sum of the explanations rather

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than choose one of them. But very few people are willing to do this, which is the reason why France today is secretly so divided.

The O.A.S. correctly estimates that this division is very deep, and has been gambling on it. Supposing that the O.A.S. now collapses without having achieved its aim of making the Evian agreements inapplicable and provoking civil war both in Algeria and in metropolitan France, its failure will even so leave important results. One wonders whether within a few months France will not experience a sort of chauvinistic crisis, suddenly seeing herself deprived of her overseas possessions, humiliated as her army will have been, and mistrustful of her own public opinion. This onset of chauvinism can make relations with the new Algeria very difficult. The hypothesis is a pessimistic one, but not unlikely. The manner in which the Algerian drama has unrolled has not laid a promising basis for Franco-Algerian coöperation. And de Gaulle would have needed the very best conditions if he were to be able to return to his mental reservations, namely to use the Evian agreements to remake the Community in another form.

France is not, of course, the only obstacle standing in the way of a return to the earlier Gaullist concept. Above all there are the internal problems of Algeria, and this is the moment to examine the mental reservations of the Algerian negotiators. Everybody knows that the peace agreed upon at Evian was not celebrated exactly joyously by the militant elements and soldiers of the F.L.N. Somebody called it a sad peace.[2] This may seem strange considering that the F.L.N. has obtained sovereignty over the whole Algerian territory including the Sahara; has refused a federal constitution of the Lebanese type under which the Europeans would be represented as a group in the government; and demanded and obtained the total evacuation within three years of all French military forces except those in the base at Mers-el-Kebir, etc. Compare this situation with that of Ho Chi Minh in North Viet Nam, who commanded a real army (which had inflicted the disastrous defeat on the French at Dien Bien Phu) but who secured only half of the territory of Indochina—the part, moreover, which he already occupied, whereas the Algerian army has not occupied any substantial part of the Algerian territory. One may well ask, then, what these militants and soldiers of the F.L.N. find so sad about their peace.

In order to understand their attitude we must remember that

[2] The expression was used by the editor of the Tunisian weekly, *Jeune Afrique*.

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the upshot of the many transformations which the F.L.N. has gone through in the last eight years was an organism which pretended to be a provisional government—the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic—and was recognized as such by some 60 nations. This government has behaved as if independence had already been obtained, or as if it was going to be won by force and not by negotiation. It has entered into real foreign alliances which were useful for the war though they would be hampering in the future. It became a moving force in the Casablanca Group which joined Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Morocco in what they claimed symbolized "revolutionary Africa." It took definite positions on Western colonialism, European racism, American economic domination, atomic tests in the Sahara and military bases.

The more time France allowed to pass, the more intense Algerian radicalism became. Here I must come back to the revolutionary élan mentioned above, which in the orthodox view has justified the Algerian war and has identified the desperate fight against the colonial powers and the West with salvation and human dignity. Actually, in the eyes of the hardened and politically minded Algerian fighters the struggle is not at all desperate, for they have the support of the immense majority of underdeveloped and exploited nations. At one time they proclaimed that they were fighting for the liberation not only of Algeria but of all Africa, a line of argument which led them finally to consider all the allies of France, Belgium and Portugal as enemies—that is to say, all the members of the Atlantic Pact.

Thus, little by little the cold war entered into the colonial struggle; and Soviet and Chinese propaganda, making the most of the American errors in Cuba and South Viet Nam, the anarchy in the Congo and the Portuguese oppression in Angola, has succeeded in building up a mystical belief that anti-colonialism is pro-Soviet or at any rate anti-Western. That is to say, many young Algerians ended up thinking of themselves as really being fighters in a permanent Afro-Asian revolution, adherents of a kind of neo-Trotskyism which gives the Third World two commandments: 1) liberation must take place everywhere or it is not real anywhere; 2) this liberation must be won by violence. Although they are a minority, these young Algerians represent none the less a glorious *avant garde;* and if O.A.S. activities should render the Evian agreements inapplicable, that would be enough to make them the majority.

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It is obvious, in any case, that the "Algerian Revolution" has been forced to backtrack—very far, in fact. It has had to be realistic enough to agree to proceed by stages; it has had to agree to military bases, to a privileged status for non-Moslem communities, to a long negotiation to obtain very gradual independence and to putting the Provisional Government itself in doubt by accepting a referendum. This comedown has caused the Algerians another sort of trauma. The young ones mentioned above do not conceal their hostility for the Evian agreements; and naturally all the mental reservations remain and operate in favor of making the old dreams in some way or other come true.

No, the Algerian problem evidently is not solved. Another phase is opening, one which we have a right to hope will be less bloody but which politically will be much more important. This phase does not concern France only, since it represents a wager which certain Frenchmen and certain Algerians are going to make in the name of the whole Western world. What is at stake in this wager is the possibility of coöperation between a former colony and its former colonizer; between an underdeveloped country and a rich one; between a state committed to planning and a capitalist state. It will be said that the problem exists everywhere, but the fact is that it has never presented itself under conditions like those in Algeria. The ferment of the Algerian revolution, kneaded vigorously now for eight years, will stir up the Mediterranean, the Arab world and Africa. Thus what is at stake is both new and crucial.

The first need is for the Evian agreements to be applied. But the essential remains that France, Gaullist or not, and the West, Kennedyist or not, shall recognize exactly the elements which compose the revolutions of underdeveloped and colonized peoples. It must be shown that coöperation is give-and-take and not domination. We must reinvest the profits of investments on the spot; we must approve and support the agrarian collectivism necessary in given situations; we must accept African solidarity and neutralism. Then, for the first time, an exciting enterprise can be brought to success. The only advantage enjoyed by Soviet and Chinese propaganda in all the countries of the Third World rests on the extent to which it has been able to identify European and Atlantic capitalism with colonial exploitation. Here, now, is Algeria, a new country, a virgin experience, where everything is possible. What are we going to do with it?

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THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IN INDONESIA

By Guy J. Pauker

THE course of Indonesian policy today must cause doubt and deep concern regarding the future of the world's fifth largest nation. Since Premier Khrushchev's ten-day visit in February 1960, Indonesia has become a major target of Soviet aid and influence, and only massive Western efforts can now prevent its gradual incorporation into the Communist bloc. All the instrumentalities available to the Kremlin—overt and covert, domestic and international—are concentrated on the elimination of Western influences from Indonesia, its isolation from the new nations of Asia and Africa, erosion of the will of domestic anti-Communist political forces to resist capture of the government by the Communist Party, and eventual alignment with the Soviet Union. What the West faces in Indonesia is not simply harassment from a group of conspirators, in usual cold-war fashion, but an all-out challenge from a great power. Indonesia has become a testing ground for the new techniques of power politics, with the local Communist Party only one of various instruments used by the Soviet state to supplant Western influence.

Soviet advances in Indonesia are truly amazing. In the hectic years of Indonesia's struggle for independence, from 1945 to 1949, Moscow attacked nationalist leaders such as President Sukarno as bourgeois lackeys of imperialism, even though the Soviet delegation in the United Nations supported Indonesia as a matter of anti-imperialist principle. In June of 1961 Sukarno chose to celebrate his birthday in Moscow, where the top civilian and military leaders of the Soviet Union presented their felicitations to him. In September 1948, the Indonesian Communist Party engaged in armed rebellion against Sukarno's nationalist government and in a historic radio address he was forced to ask the people to choose between himself and Musso, the Communist leader who had just returned from long years of exile in Moscow. Today President Sukarno's most powerful political support comes from the Communist Party, which he protects against an anti-Communist but submissive officer corps. Until 1954 the Soviet Union was unable to establish diplomatic representation in Djakarta, although it had offered recognition to the nationalist government before independence was secured in 1949.

Today the Soviet presence in Indonesia is a force to be reckoned

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with in every respect. An initial line of credit of $100 million was agreed to by Sukarno during the first of his visits to Moscow, in September 1956. The Indonesian Parliament delayed ratification of this offer until February 1958, but at present Indonesia is the foremost recipient of Communist-bloc aid in the world. Credits for economic and military purposes from all the Communist-bloc countries to Indonesia now exceed $1.5 billion, which is more than the credits received by Communist China from the Soviet Union before the estrangement—a figure estimated at $1.3 billion from 1949 to 1957.

The deeper meaning of all this was perhaps best expressed in a speech made by President Sukarno on March 21, 1962, when he laid the cornerstone of a 300-bed hospital which the Soviet Union is building as a gift to Djakarta. Using a concept which he had already developed in his address to the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations in September of 1961, he stated that there are two great forces in the world today, the "newly emerging forces" represented by the new nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America together with all socialist states (meaning the Communist bloc), and the "old established forces" committed to the status quo and to imperialist domination, which are found in Western Europe and in "other countries" (which to an Indonesian audience could mean only the United States). The "newly emerging forces" favored freedom and sought only to help, "without splitting hairs as to terms of credit," whereas the "old forces" would "haggle for days, weeks, months, even years." Lest there be misunderstanding, the President made it clear that he was referring to the Soviet Union which, unlike "others," wanted Indonesia to be strong, free from imperialist influences, and in control of West New Guinea.

It is noteworthy that this speech was made on the second of the three days of preliminary Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on West New Guinea, held near Washington, D.C. It is also an open secret in Djakarta that a few days earlier Soviet Ambassador Mikhailov had expressed to Foreign Minister Subandrio his displeasure at Indonesia's efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea dispute after receiving massive Soviet military aid and political encouragement to take West New Guinea by force. However, it does not seem plausible that President Sukarno's important statement was only meant to whip Washington into action on his behalf or to pacify an irate Moscow.

Hard facts would tend to substantiate Sukarno's statement

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that the Soviet Union wants Indonesia to be strong and, by implication, that the "old forces" may have different views on the matter. Indonesia had been anxious to obtain military equipment from the United States and other Western sources in 1956–57. The likelihood that these arms would be used against the Dutch in West New Guinea, and other considerations, delayed the extension of credits for such purchases till 1958. The United States program was never a very large one, although it was known that the Indonesians wanted to modernize and standardize their armed forces with Western equipment. Indonesian officers today express freely their disappointment about the halfhearted character of our military deliveries.

In 1957 President Sukarno stated publicly that Mao Tse-tung, whom he had visited in Peking in October 1956, had offered him unlimited amounts of military equipment, and in the spring of 1957 an Indonesian military mission headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant-General Gatot Subroto, visited Communist China. No arms offers from the Soviet Union were publicized at that time. During the following year, however, the first arms from the Communist bloc began arriving. On Armed Forces Day in October 1958, the Indonesian public was electrified by the appearance over Djakarta of the first MIG-15 fighters piloted by Indonesians, who had apparently been trained in Czechoslovakia and Egypt. Some IL-28 bombers were received by the Indonesian Air Force during the same period.

Communist-bloc military aid was already about one-quarter of a billion dollars, but few military items had come directly from the Soviet Union up to the time of Premier Khrushchev's visit in February 1960. During the preceding five years (1955–59) the Middle East seems to have been the major Soviet target, with substantial amounts of aid going to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Then Premier Khrushchev presumably decided to exploit the opportunities Indonesia offered, and to embark on a program of direct Soviet military aid.

In a speech last March, President Sukarno stated that in February 1960 Premier Khrushchev had granted him $700 to $800 million, of which $250 million in economic credits were specifically publicized. After subtracting the economic credits, it appears that the visit resulted in military credits of from $450 to $550 million, bringing the Communist bloc's military assistance program in Indonesia to well over three-quarters of a billion dollars. The rate

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of implementation of this program is less easy to ascertain, but it seems to be much more rapid than that of Communist non-military programs in neutralist countries.

In January 1961 in Moscow, General A. H. Nasution, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Army, signed agreements implementing the program proposed by Mr. Khrushchev. At first the Indonesian services showed some reluctance to take advantage of the Soviet offer and delayed formal commitments until ordered to do so by President Sukarno. Additional agreements were signed by General Nasution in Moscow in June 1961.

Responsible Indonesians say privately that the total Communist military assistance program will eventually reach one billion dollars, that it already represents one-third of the total of Communist military aid to non-aligned nations, and that it may include, in certain circumstances, tactical nuclear weapons. Besides stressing that Soviet military deliveries have been much more rapid than the West's, they point out that, contrary to Western allegations that Soviet generosity consists primarily in selling them obsolete equipment for hard currency (payable at 2.5 percent annual interest over a period of 12 years), the program includes MIG-21 fighters armed with air-to-air missiles and TU-16 medium bombers carrying air-to-surface missiles, both of which are still operational in the Soviet Union. Apparently the army and the navy are also receiving missiles—surface-to-air and surface-to-surface. Furthermore, the army has obtained amphibious tanks and artillery, both novelties in Indonesia. The navy, which a few years ago had only one old British destroyer, now boasts six submarines, six destroyers and will soon have one Sverdlov-class cruiser, besides many smaller ships. While the air force claims to be able to fly all the planes they acquire from the Soviets, it is believed that ships and submarines for the navy arrive from Vladivostok with mixed Soviet-Indonesian crews.

Only a few years ago Indonesian military personnel received their training primarily in the United States, Western Europe and India. None went to bloc countries and no Communist military missions were active on Indonesian soil. Today Soviet military instructors are attached to all three services. Once President Sukarno had broken their initial resistance, the Indonesian armed forces have seemed increasingly eager to speed the Soviet aid programs, which vest them with important power status in Southeast Asia. Demand for training in the Soviet Union and by Soviet in-

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structors in Indonesia is high. In February 1962 the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Vice Air Marshal Umar Dani, went to Moscow to expedite training programs and by April air force officers and non-coms were flying to Moscow for four months of intensive training. Altogether, several thousand Indonesian military personnel are being trained in Communist-bloc countries. The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Indonesia is believed to be the largest outside the Communist bloc, numbering about 400 instructors, under the command of Admiral Chernobay.

In the short run, the Soviet Union would probably derive the highest return from this massive investment if the dispute over West New Guinea led to overt Indonesian military operations against the Dutch. Indonesia's isolation from the West would be increased, making it fully dependent on the Communist bloc for military supplies. Foreign Minister Subandrio told Parliament in closed session on February 3, 1962, that Indonesia would not be ready to invade West New Guinea before the end of 1962. If the Indonesians should attack prematurely, without first eliminating Dutch air and sea power based on Biak, they are likely to suffer serious casualties, thus becoming even more dependent on Soviet military aid. Maybe it is for precisely this reason that the Soviet Union is prodding Indonesia to attack West New Guinea without further delay.

II

Militarization is bound to have the most severe impact on the Indonesian economy. In 1960 Indonesian military expenditures amounted to at least one-third of the total regular budget of about rupiah 46 billion ($1.0 billion).[1] In 1961 military expenditures increased to almost one-half of the regular budget of about rupiah 53 billion ($1.2 billion). In 1962 the burden of military expenses is likely to be even higher. Besides the inflationary pressures created as budgetary deficits cumulate, the military program further drains the country's foreign exchange supply, which has to be diverted from the civilian sectors of the economy to service foreign debts. Indonesia's exports, including the best earners of foreign exchange such as rubber, copra and tin, are being increasingly pledged to the Soviet Union under long-term agreements. Moscow firmly insists on payments according to schedule and recently turned down requests for deferment.

[1] One rupiah equals 2¼ cents, or about 44 rupiah to the dollar.

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One must distinguish temporary crises such as the skyrocketing price of rice in urban markets at the end of 1961 from the long-range prospects of a country whose population is growing at a faster rate than food production. The rice crisis was due in part to the severe drought of that year, which deprived Indonesia of 400,000 tons of rice and increased the normal deficit covered by imports. What is more important is that, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the provisional results of the 1961 census indicate a total population of 95,889,000 and an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent. This would give Indonesia 100 million people by 1963 and an average population density of 475 inhabitants per square kilometer for Java and Madura (as against an average for the country as a whole of 50 inhabitants per square kilometer).

Similarly, the foreign exchange crisis which threatened Indonesia with international insolvency at the end of 1961 is less disturbing than the long-run decline in the production of rubber, palm oil, tobacco, tea and other products earning foreign exchange. How this situation will affect economic development was revealed last December by Finance Minister Notohamiprodjo, who informed the cabinet that the enterprises on which the National Planning Council relied for the financing of the eight-year plan initiated the preceding January had yielded no revenue during 1961.

Other economic portents are equally distressing. Money in circulation increased from rupiah 33.5 billion in 1959 to 46.2 billion in 1960, to 60 billion in 1961 and nearly 70 billion in April 1962. The cost of living in Djakarta, already very high in January 1961, had doubled by the end of the year. The extent of the inflationary pressures may be judged by the fact that deficits in the national budget rose from rupiah 1.56 billion in 1956 to rupiah 16.65 billion in 1961, and the figure is expected to reach rupiah 37 billion this year. This does not include the costs of acquiring Soviet arms, nor could it cover the expenditures of a military campaign against the Dutch in West New Guinea. Whatever the real total, the impact on the cost of living may be catastrophic.

At this point the Soviet master plan for Indonesia should be clear. Once the Soviet military assistance program has been completed it will have destroyed the fabric of Indonesian society by fomenting runaway inflation comparable to that of Germany in the 1920s. The chaos and despair thus created may well bring the Communist Party to power even if the West New Guinea dispute

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is solved peacefully. But this success will be facilitated in a variety of ways if the Indonesian Government is inveigled into major military operations against the Dutch.

III

So far, there is no evidence that Communist efforts to infiltrate the armed forces have been very successful. A massive conversion of the senior officers to Communism seems unlikely unless other factors, such as total loss of faith in the viability of the present system and in Western support, create an atmosphere of despair. However, the mentality of junior officers, whose nationalism was not hardened in the struggle for independence of 20 years ago, is not easy to fathom; they may prove more susceptible than their elders to the appeals of Communism. High-ranking officers and their civilian advisers must begin to wonder whether some figure comparable to the Laotian major, Kong Le, will appear in their midst. The lesson of the May 1961 coup in Korea also has not escaped their attention; but the early detection of such political activities is very difficult. The wiser among them surely recognize the wide gap in status and benefits between themselves and, say, the new graduates of the military academy in Magelang, whose dissatisfaction may lead them to try extremist solutions.

Among the rank and file of the armed forces, Communist penetration may be faster, especially as Communist youth groups have been instructed to volunteer for military service in response to the campaign for the liberation of West New Guinea. However sensitive the commanders of the armed forces may be to this problem, they will find it difficult to bar young Communists who profess nationalist enthusiasm from military service, especially as the rejuvenation of the army and the expansion of the air force and navy will make new recruitments unavoidable.

Changes in the political composition of the armed forces are bound to have a profound impact on the political dynamics of Indonesia. Before 1959 Indonesian political life was complex and unpredictable, reflecting the turbulence of free competition among small groups in the nationalist élites. The masses were largely passive and their interests ignored. The collapse of the parliamentary system permitted President Sukarno to govern with the support of the army and of the Communist Party, the country's two principal political forces. The residual or latent political power of other groups is difficult to ascertain under present repressive

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conditions. Certain parties such as the Moslem Masjumi Party and the Socialists (P.S.I.) were banned in August 1960, and seem at present too demoralized to maintain even covert strength. Others, such as the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.) or the Moslem Nahdatul Ulama, have become stage-props of the Sukarno régime, which needs their names and those of a sufficient number of public figures, irrespective of their real political power, to give credence to the claim that Indonesia is a "guided democracy."

The President has been officially proclaimed "great leader of the revolution" by the Provisional People's Consultative Congress. Stripped of all verbiage, his present role in Indonesian society, whether by chance or design, has become much more that of absolute monarch than that of a modern dictator. Although he remains a father-figure to the masses, who listen respectfully to his many speeches, he does not rely on control of a strong political organization but on the favors which he dispenses to groups whose primary loyalties rest elsewhere. The Indonesian masses do not blame him for misgovernment but assume that his aides are bad, an attitude strikingly similar to that of the Russian peasants toward the Tsar. In point of fact Sukarno does not govern; he rules. Uninterested in the details of governmental administration, he issues "commands" to be implemented by others. His will nevertheless becomes the law of the land, as if projected into a vacuum where it does not clash with the wills of various interest groups—a peculiar phenomenon observed in countries at a stage of development where the political infrastructure is still weak.

President Sukarno's lifetime tenure seems no longer open to question. Private political discussions in Indonesia today center on the more distant future, the so-called "post-Sukarno period." They are not directly related to recurrent rumors concerning the President's health. He is only 61 years old and all those in contact with him are aware of his extraordinary vitality. This is why there is much less speculation in Djakarta about who is likely to become the next president than about which group will eventually be in control—the army or the Communists. Most articulate people believe that if a succession crisis were to develop in the near future, the officer corps would take over full responsibility and would appoint as head of state either General Nasution or a civilian political figure associated with the struggle for independence.

There seems to be no leader in control of a popular political

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force, ready to take over. Since Dr. Mohammad Hatta resigned from the vice-presidency of the Republic in December 1956, the constitutional line of succession has remained vacant. In the absence of an elected representative body, democratic legitimacy could be conferred only by a plebiscite. Close friends of General Nasution claim that being essentially "a modest man" he does not wish to be the next president. Whether this be true or not, General Nasution's political power within the army is based not so much on the loyalty of the officer corps to him personally as on the delicate equipoise of various factions unwilling to force a clash similar to the one which led to the rebellion of commanders in Sumatra and Celebes in 1957–1958. In this respect his position in the army is strikingly similar to that of Sukarno in the country as a whole. Nasution is likely to remain in command as long as the antagonistic forces which he manipulates are unwilling to face a showdown. In Machiavelli's terms, he is a fox, not a lion.

General Nasution's staying power was tested again at a conference of territorial commanders and general staff officers held late last winter in response to President Sukarno's suggestion that the positions of Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff (both of which Nasution holds) be entrusted to different individuals. General Nasution did not attempt to demonstrate that the commanding officers stood firmly behind him. On the contrary Sukarno's suggestion was seriously considered. The suitability of various candidates for the position of Chief of Staff of the Army was weighed and the decision that General Nasution should remain Chief of Staff actually resulted from the officers' inability to agree on another candidate. It is by no means certain, then, that General Nasution would make a strong chief of state. Nor is it clear that a military régime would tackle the country's basic problems more vigorously than has been done in the past, unless a rededication to their mission should call forth within the officer corps a release of latent energies.

Many responsible elements in Indonesia are convinced that if the officer corps appreciated its historic role, it could be the nation's salvation. The revolutionary guerrilla leaders of 1945–1949 have been transformed into a professional group. Their emergence as a key element in the new élite is partially the result of good professional training at the staff and command school in Bandung as well as abroad, and partially the result of a process of natural selection, whereby the army has attracted individuals

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of intelligence, energy and dedication. In the last five years an impressive national military academy patterned on West Point has been drawing several hundred of Indonesia's most promising young men each year. These are hopeful factors, but there are others less encouraging.

The military have penetrated deeply in recent years into the economic sector and the civilian administration of the country. Their performance has, by and large, been as disappointing as that of the civilian politicians, administrators and entrepreneurs whom they displaced.[2] Charges of inefficiency and corruption have tarnished some of the most prominent senior officers. The key question is whether this state of affairs will eventually alienate the junior officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men from their commanders, making them vulnerable to extremist appeals. In the absence of a vigorous political life—elections have been postponed at the insistence of the commanding officers who fear a Communist victory—the military will not withdraw from essentially civilian pursuits.

Under these circumstances, there would seem to be three possible developments: Indonesia may languish indefinitely in a situation very much like the present; a group of field-grade officers, identity unknown, may organize covertly and take over from their less dynamic seniors; or a rapid conversion of the rank and file may destroy the balance between the military and the Communists and give power to the latter.

The Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.) is powerful. The Seventh (extraordinary) Congress of the P.K.I. held in Djakarta in April 1962 was officially informed that the Party now has over two million members. For tactical reasons, the figure may even be understated; but in any case the Indonesian Party is quite certainly the largest outside the Communist bloc. Unlike all other political parties in Indonesia, it has disciplined professional cadres. While its labor organizations, which claim over three million members, may have lost striking power somewhat in recent years (they were forced into the role of "company unions" following the nationalization of the economy), this has probably been offset by the increased strength of the peasant front organization, Barisan Tani Indonesia (B.T.I.), which claims four million members. If economic deterioration and sharpened social conflict are the fuel

[2] On the role of the military in Indonesia see my chapter in "The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries," edited by J. J. Johnson (Princeton University Press, 1962).

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of revolutions, then both peasants and workers may have greater revolutionary potential than is commonly assumed, and they are unlikely to be drawn to parties other than the P.K.I. Historically the Party has been strongest in east and central Java, where population densities are greatest and poverty is intense. Today the P.K.I. is also making gains in the sparsely settled outer islands, and especially in Sumatra. This has occurred despite the repressive means which the army possesses (and employs) by virtue of the continuation of the state of emergency.

It has often been argued that the P.K.I. benefits greatly from the fact that it has no overt party members in the cabinet and hence does not share responsibility for the misgovernment of Indonesia. The Communists themselves do not seem to share this view. As recently as last February, in an interview given to an Associated Press correspondent, party chairman D. N. Aidit asked for inclusion of P.K.I. members in the cabinet as "the only way to solve the country's important and basic problems." Nevertheless, the reorganized cabinet announced by President Sukarno on March 6 did not include Communists. Aidit and the Party's number-two man, M. H. Lukman, merely received ministerial status, as did all the other vice-chairmen of the Provisional People's Consultative Congress and the appointed Parliament—all this in conformity with President Sukarno's efforts to surround himself with symbols of national unity.

The real reason for Communist strength is that the Party is the only political group that understands the importance of organizing at the grassroots, and how to go about it. The exiled Socialist leader, Dr. Sumitro Djojhadikusumo, former Dean of the School of Economics in Djakarta, ex-Minister of Finance and a committed anti-Communist, claimed recently that the P.K.I. impresses the people as being the only group possessing courage, ability and willingness to stand up to the military, and that the P.K.I. knows how to pick as issues legitimate popular grievances. According to Dr. Sumitro, the Communists are, for the first time, making advances among university students and faculties. He could have added that the Communists enjoy a reputation for being honest and disinterested, in a society in which almost everybody else is accused of some form of corruption, and that they present the image of a unified nationalist party in a country deeply rent by factionalism and regionalism.

In actuality, unknown to the general public, a doctrinal battle

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may be raging within the top echelons of the Party. It reflects the Sino-Soviet rift on revolutionary tactics but also raises questions highly relevant to the present situation in Indonesia. Party chairman Aidit, whose tactics parallel but possibly preceded those adopted by Moscow, apparently favors continued support of the Sukarno régime and patient reliance on the legal means thereby available to the Party to secure participation in the cabinet. Aidit's soft line seems dictated by the logic of the situation. It is not obvious what a hard line would accomplish under present conditions, since the P.K.I. can resort neither to general strikes nor to violence without risking immediate repression and probable destruction by the army.

In December of 1961 Aidit made statements on the Albanian question and on de-Stalinization which political analysts, eager to trace all ramifications of the Sino-Soviet rift, interpreted as signs of a drift toward the Chinese position. Seen from Djakarta, these statements do not offer sufficient evidence that Aidit or a majority of the Central Committee of the P.K.I. have accepted that position. Other statements made by Aidit since the Twenty-second Party Congress in Moscow recognized the leadership of the Soviet Union, but stressed heavily the concept of freedom of national Parties to formulate their own positions, as proclaimed at earlier party congresses in 1957 and 1960.

It is possible to interpret Aidit's statements on the Albanian question from the point of view of internal political necessities. Political parties in Indonesia can have no foreign ties not expressly approved by the government. The P.K.I. is, of course, particularly vulnerable in this respect. Aidit may have felt that if he had accepted Khrushchev's position on Albania it could have been used as proof that the P.K.I. is controlled from Moscow.

As for the alleged split within the P.K.I. along the lines of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the positions publicly expressed are not clearly enough defined to permit conclusions. In Communist Parties the struggle for power usually takes the form of doctrinal debate. However, it is not necessary to be privy to P.K.I. secrets in order to be aware of the intense ambition of a man like Sudisman, who as chairman of the secretariat has excelled in manipulating the Party's affairs to serve his private ends.

According to Aidit and the party theoretician, Njoto, Indonesia today is not a "national-democratic state" as defined in the statement of November 1960 by Communist leaders of 81 coun-

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tries, but a bourgeois state, albeit anti-imperialist. If President Sukarno's repeated attempts to include Communists in the cabinet cease to be opposed by the other parties and especially by the army, it can become a "national-democratic state" (in current Communist doctrine a stage preceding a People's Democracy); translated, this means a coalition government controlled by Communists. Even before November 1960, President Sukarno had coined the word NASAKOM, meaning a coalition of nationalist, religious and Communist political forces, but so far he has not been able to form a NASAKOM cabinet.

In the elections of September 1955 the P.K.I. received the fourth largest number of votes. On the basis of the local and provincial elections in the summer of 1957, it appeared to be moving into second place. Some observers claim that today it would win a general election. In consequence, the army commanders oppose the holding of elections for the time being, thus denying the P.K.I. the parliamentary road to power. As long as the leaders of the armed forces remain strong and united in their opposition to Communism—as the three Chiefs of Staff, General Nasution, Admiral Martadinata and Vice Air Marshal Dani seem to be—the road to power by violent means is also barred. This leaves the P.K.I. with one other avenue—namely, to create so compelling an image of strength, purposefulness and dedication to the national cause, under the protection of President Sukarno, that eventually all other political forces will be discredited and the P.K.I., standing as a tower of strength in the midst of chaos, will be brought to power by popular acclamation. Naturally, the more that Soviet military assistance weakens the military's will to resist Communism, the easier would be the takeover.

IV

The Soviet challenge to the West in Indonesia is obvious. What can the West do about it? It is clear that the Netherlands Government is prepared to withdraw from West New Guinea, but it is far from established that the 16 vocal Papuan members of the West New Guinea Council, created by the Dutch in 1961, can make a valid case for the right of self-determination of 700,000 people, who are among the most primitive in the world. However chaotic conditions in Indonesia may be at present, in the long run it may be possible for the people of West New Guinea to move into the modern world under Indonesian auspices. The security of

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the Western Pacific has much to gain from a peaceful solution—acceptable to both Indonesia and the Netherlands—of the sort the United States seeks to facilitate. Indeed the problem should have been solved long ago, before it gave President Sukarno a reason to bring the Soviets into his country.

Once the problem of West New Guinea is settled, one may hope that the Indonesian Government will review its rearmament program, which it now claims is the direct result of the conflict with the Dutch. It is, of course, a matter of record that as early as 1945 some ultranationalists, such as Professor M. Yamin, Deputy First Minister in charge of information and chairman of the National Planning Council, had formulated visions of a Greater Indonesia which would eventually include Malaysia and perhaps more. It is also an open secret in Singapore that Foreign Minister Subandrio has warned the leaders of that city against joining a Malaysian Federation contrary to the wishes of the neighboring "great power," Indonesia. But most Indonesians, engaged in a daily struggle for survival, do not seem to share such grandiose visions. President Sukarno, who is a student of history, may be aware of the fact that Kemal Ataturk, in deciding against reviving Turkey's imperial ambitions and instead concentrating his efforts on the consolidation of a strong nation-state, achieved recognition as one of the great statesmen of the twentieth century.

Needless to say, the armed forces will want to continue to modernize and standardize their equipment. With the internal security problem approaching a solution, and once the West New Guinea issue is settled, it should be possible to do this without mortgaging Indonesia's future economic development. The Soviet Union may hope to create a Communist Indonesia, militarized under its auspices, which will act as a countervailing force against an increasingly intractable and expansionist Communist China. But Indonesia's best security will depend in the future, as it does today, on our interest in maintaining stability in the Western Pacific; a peace-loving Indonesia is not in danger of attack as long as the Seventh Fleet is present in the area.

Indonesians may want to reflect on the end results of President Sukarno's increasingly strident anti-Western statements, and on the consequences of the policies on which his régime has embarked. It is understandable that the political élites in Djakarta, by now accustomed to a heavily controlled press, are hurt by the indifference and hostility shown by part of the American press. It

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evidently does not occur to them to relate these to President Sukarno's statements at the Belgrade Conference of last autumn or to Indonesia's voting record in the United Nations.

The developments related above cannot fail to influence American public opinion and through it the Congress, which is being called upon to approve an aid program for Indonesia. Thus far the United States and the Communist bloc have each contributed (or pledged) between $600 and $700 million in economic assistance to Indonesia; but it urgently requires much larger amounts of aid before it can become capable of self-sustaining growth. Economic aid, to be sure, will not solve all of Indonesia's problems, but if competition between the United States and the Communist bloc takes the form of aid which assists in promoting the organic growth of a viable independent nation, much can be gained. President Sukarno wants his people to believe that the enormous Communist-bloc investment in Indonesia testifies to the benevolent concern which "newly emerging nations" feel toward each other. This analysis of Communist motivation cannot possibly bear up under serious scrutiny. In Indonesia, the Soviet Union has thrown down the gauntlet. Will the West take up the challenge?

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THE CHANGING OIL INDUSTRY

By James Terry Duce

MOST of us think of the oil industry as a modern development, but actually its roots lie far back in history. Noah, the tourist from Ur, pitched his Ark inside and out with tar from the seepages near his native city, and Herodotus reports that Alexander was astounded in Kirkuk by natives who wet down the streets with naphtha and then set fire to them. Bricks from Ur tell us that the ratio between the price of wheat and of asphalt was much the same three thousand years ago as it is today.

But the modern industry really began with the invention by Colonel Edwin L. Drake of a steam-driven rig for drilling for oil, though in principle he had probably been antedated many centuries by the Chinese drillers for brine near Chungking. The impetus for Drake's venture was the pursuit of a source of light. Whales were getting scarce and the distillation of oil from shale in Scotland and New Brunswick was costly. Benjamin Stilleman, the Yale chemist, when asked to report on some samples of seepage from Pennsylvania, drew a glowing picture of the future of "rock oil"; and so in 1859 the search for it began and we were on the road to the oil industry as we now know it.

The commodity was new and different. It was liquid, inflammable, poisonous, explosive—in fact, it had most unpleasant characteristics, so that in its first years the industry spent a great amount of ingenuity in devising its own special means of refining and transporting its product. The tank car, the pipeline, the tank wagon, the tank ship were all gradually developed and there resulted that peculiar vertical integration of the industry by which the raw product was refined and then handled right through from the well to the ultimate consumer. This very integration has often been regarded by anti-trust lawyers as a sinister attempt at monopoly while really it was a natural response to the strange nature of the product and the immediate pressing problems of the market place.

One of the early characteristics of the industry was its trend to standardization. The codes of almost all our states are filled with inspection laws relating to the flash point of kerosene, and it was not without reason that the largest unit in the industry adopted the name "Standard" oil company. By the close of the century a

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new element, the internal combustion engine, developed a voracious appetite both for those oil fractions so dangerous in lighting oil and the heavier oils needed for lubrication. Hence the opening years of the century were spent in the struggle over cracking patents—the secrets of processes that enabled one to modify the refined yield of crude oil to the ratios required by the market.

In the meantime the burgeoning demand for petroleum had raised grave doubts as to its future. The experts were at odds as to the size of the possible supply, and the political situation was complicated by boasts of irresponsible Englishmen that they had a corner on foreign supply. The First World War emphasized the military importance of oil. "The Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil," said Lord Curzon. But the British corner proved illusory as did the judgment of the experts. New methods of deciphering the structure of the earth, the torsion balance and seismograph, were applied to the search for oil fields in the United States, while the discovery of new oil pools in Venezuela, Iran and Iraq provided assurance that the supply problem would be solved. The development of the automotive industry on a world-wide basis made oil fuels a necessity. Oil was everyone's need. It perhaps supplied some primitive desire latent in all men to be "somewhere else." At the same time the substitution of oil and gas for coal as a source of power further increased the demand.

The prophet of this age was the British Admiral, Lord Fisher, who was charged with being an oil maniac because he insisted upon converting the British fleet from coal to oil. Today, practically all shipping is oil fired. Oil consumption in the United States has increased over a hundred times between 1900 and 1962, while automotive vehicles operating on roads increased from 1,000 to 90,000,000. This transformation did not happen quite as rapidly abroad, but it is happening. The automotive vehicle, first built for pleasure, has by modification and adaptation become the workhorse of the world. Areas formerly inaccessible are now in direct communication with all the arteries of trade, and no longer is there the excuse for famine at one spot and abundance at another. Markets little known and isolated are now easily tied into the circles of world commerce. This process, already highly developed in the United States, is gradually penetrating the world. Only in the Communist sphere do we see it delayed by intent.

In the United States, government policy has protected the domestic industry both by tariffs and the restriction of imports

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from certain areas. This policy originated in the desire to make the country self-sufficient in case of national crisis. This has led to endless debate in Congress and to production restrictions by the states. It has also led to higher prices for oil products. However, it has promoted the development of an oil-tool industry which continually experiments in methods and instruments; this increases the recovery of petroleum from its geologic reservoirs—and the technology then becomes available throughout the world. At present, too, the oil industry is pushing its prospecting out to sea, and the probability that deposits will be found and exploited beyond the 100-fathom line will raise some interesting international problems which may lead to modification of the Truman proclamation on the title to oil on the continental shelf.

All this has led to the growth of industrial and economic problems that we have only begun to appreciate. In the first place, the deposits of oil are restricted in area and many of the most massive occur in countries with little else in the way of resources and often with scanty population. Some examples are Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Algeria and Libya. As a result of oil production, a stream of foreign exchange is now pouring into these countries and is only beginning to show its effects. The Persian Gulf countries today receive in taxes and royalties something over an equivalent of $1.5 billion per annum while other expenditures by the oil producers, such as payments for services and purchases of native products, bring the total well above $2 billion per year. Venezuela receives annually in royalties the equivalent of $700 million.

Everywhere in these areas new schools, roads and ports are being built and the ceaseless mill of trade is stimulated. Real estate is pyramiding in value. Some of the most desperately poor countries have by this turn of fortune become wealthy. The uneducated are being educated. In the Middle East illiteracy will become a thing of the past in less than a generation. One can only guess at yearly incomes per capita received by the major oil-producing states, but perhaps in Kuwait it now exceeds $2,000, in Saudi Arabia $1,000, in Venezuela $1,500 and in Qatar $3,000. Such countries are becoming welfare states.

It must be remembered, too, that this is only the beginning of a long train of events. As yet the inevitable multipliers of income have not appeared in full force—the specialized financial institutions so important in a modern society, such as insurance com-

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panies, building and loan associations and all the other modern specialized devices for handling funds. At present much of this money is being invested abroad. For instance, Kuwait's investments in the London market exceed the equivalent of $750 million. It is said that this is necessary to protect a wasting asset, but the reserves of Kuwait are so great that at the present rate of production the Sheikhdom would have well over a hundred years' supply. Provision for such a remote event as the exhaustion of these reserves seems an extraordinary precaution, especially as political events which might take place over that period can hardly be foreseen.

The last published figures indicate the proven reserves of the Middle East to be about 187 billion barrels. Experts who know the area believe that in time total recoverable reserves of liquid hydrocarbons may well reach 500 billion barrels (providing prospecting is allowed to continue). For each barrel produced, about $1.00 in foreign exchange has so far flowed into the economies of these countries in the form of taxes, royalties and expenditures in local markets for goods and services. The future would look bright indeed if there were no political problems to obstruct development, and if the golden flow were invariably harnessed to constructive purposes.

One of the unsettled problems of the area is that of boundaries. In the desert, the "dirah"—the shifting territories of the Bedouin tribes—did not lend themselves to the fixed limits we like in the modern world. In the past, one square mile of desert looked much like the next. But a square mile of desert underlaid by an oil field may yield 60 million barrels—which makes it very different from one which is not. There are few fixed boundaries in the Persian Gulf, whether on the land or at sea. In terms of oil prospects, the floor of the Persian Gulf itself is one of the most interesting areas in the world.[1]

The boundaries in this area must therefore be determined, for ultimately we shall come across several promising structures which cross international boundary lines at sea and which will become the source of international disputes. One is already known between the island of Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, but agreement

[1] Five important fields are already developed in the seaway: the new discovery by Panam International off the coast of Iran; Safaniya off the coast of Saudi Arabia, with its extensions into the Neutral Zone, now being developed by the Japanese; the Shell discoveries off the coast of Qatar; the British Petroleum and Compagnie Français discovery off the Island of Das in Abu Dhabi.

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has been reached regarding its development. At present, however, we do not know what the boundary is between Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait Neutral Zone at the north end of Safaniya. It has been estimated that between the various possible interpretations of this boundary at sea there is a difference of several million barrels of oil reserves. The legal basis for these various boundary lines has to be explored. The Gulf must be carefully mapped and countries concerned must agree as to their actual interest.

Land boundaries are equally controversial. For instance, the positions of very few Saudi Arabian boundaries have been settled. Fortunately, the question has not so far arisen with respect to any particular producing field, but that such questions will arise shortly is not to be doubted. The only fixed land boundaries of Saudi Arabia on which there is complete agreement at present are those with the Neutral Zone to the south; with the Yemen, for a relatively short distance; and with Bahrein in the Gulf itself. The boundaries to the east and south of the country have been subject to perennial dispute between Saudi Arabia and the British, representing the various sheikhdoms and the Sultan of Muscat. The Murban field now being developed in Abu Dhabi will probably cover areas to which the Saudis lay claim. The Burami dispute is now under arbitration among Saudi Arabia and the British protected states of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat. Ancillary questions involve rights-of-way and the use of ports.

All of these matters will be the subject of political discussion between the governments and will affect the interests of the various concessionaires involved. Boundary questions and disputes over pipelines have already arisen between Tunis, Libya and Algeria, and the projected pipelines are going to raise others. In any event, the oil industry finds itself in the background of international disputes which will grow in importance.

The influx of vast wealth into these countries may further disturb inter-governmental relations. Rich sheikhdoms will exist, side by side with some of the most poverty-stricken areas in the world. For example, I believe that very shortly the small community of Abu Dhabi will be receiving royalties and rentals in the neighborhood of $50 million per year, which is $10,000 per person for its present population, while its neighbor Dubai, which so far has no oil at all and almost no resources, cannot be expected to have an average individual income above $100 per year. These contrasts are bound to create serious political problems.

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Another series of problems affecting the political situation involves concession terms, the most important provision of which has been the 50-50 split in profits which predominates in the industry today. Any serious change in the terms of any of the great concessions is almost certain to prompt a similar change in the terms of all other agreements. For instance, should the terms of the concession in Indonesia be altered to 60-40 in favor of the producing country, this will undoubtedly spread to Venezuela, the Middle East and to concessions on the African continent. Similarly, the demands of the Iraqi Government on the Iraq Petroleum Corporation for the surrender of all concession acreage not so far developed have already been reflected in Kuwait, where the same sort of demand has been made.

One of the most pervasive effects of the oil industry has been the social change induced in the producing countries. This has extended from the development of education to alterations in the social and governmental structure. The increase in wages caused by the oil business disrupts the established social forms, and this in turn creates problems of both a political and social nature. The encouragement of education, the liberalization of governments, the impact of tremendous public works, are associated directly with the industry. Even such matters as the status of women and children are affected by the operation of the companies.

As the largest item in international trade, oil has a profound effect on the balance of payments of importing countries. Because petroleum products are desperately needed in the modern world, governments without petroleum resources take every possible step to reduce the consequent drain on their foreign exchange. The usual process is to erect local refineries and transport the crude oil in locally owned tankers, or on a ship which will accept local currency for its services. Then the only burden on foreign exchange is to pay for crude at its port of embarkation; refining and transport costs are in the currency of the consuming country.

The balance-of-payments problem of the major oil consumers is further complicated by the fact that the producing countries are not great consumers of their manufactured goods. On top of this, oil imports may hurt local fuel and power industries. For instance, cheaper petroleum products affect the coal production of the Saar and Ruhr Basins, and the mines of Pas de Calais and southern Belgium. To protect these industries, heavy taxes are often levied on oil. The production and transportation of gas, the

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inevitable partner of oil production and itself an industry still in its infancy, will further complicate this tenuous balance of international trade.

The reason gas has not been more important in Europe is that political tensions in the surrounding areas discourage investment in fixed installations. Pipelines are immovable while ships can be transferred to other scenes; transportation therefore tends to be by ship. It is to be hoped that some time a general pipeline treaty may be arrived at which will permit gas and oil to flow freely across international boundaries into areas where they are needed; no such world-wide arrangement seems probable at present.

The result of all this has been a growth in basic competition in the industry. Gone are the days when one could speak of "the Big Five." Competition has sprung from every corner. Because of the importance of liquid fuels, even governments have entered the race: the Yaciementos Petroliferos Fiscales of Argentina and Bolivia; Petrobras in Brazil; the semi-governmental companies such as Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli in Italy, Compagnie Français de Petrol; and indeed, we might add the British Petroleum Corporation. In the meantime innumerable smaller groups have entered the race for reserves, such as American Independent, Panam International, Getty Oil Company, Oasis Petroleum, Iracom and Japan's Arabian oil company. This list does not even touch upon the numerous independents on the South American scene, from the Argentine to Venezuela.

One of the most important developments affecting the market for crude petroleum is the Russian invasion of European and other markets. This may be caused in part by the Soviet need for foreign exchange, but the Russians clearly are not averse to using oil as a political weapon, whether in Europe or the Far East or Cuba. In response, the great oil-trading corporations may start to sell oil in the Iron Curtain countries, where the Russians are now demanding a high price. Perhaps as a result of all this the Russians will, as they did in the 1920s, arrive at some kind of arrangement with the big oil traders in which the Soviets settle for a percentage of certain markets. This reflects the fact that state trading in oil has all the vices which are alleged to be a part of cartel organizations, compounded by the use of political power.

The construction of large pipelines from the Perm Basin at the foot of the Urals to both Black Sea and Baltic ports makes it clear that the Soviet Union intends to increase its exports. This, of

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course, is being done at present at the expense of its internal market. The Russian planners have preferred to put their investment capital in steel for munitions instead of into roads and automobiles. The result is that in the Soviet Union per capita consumption of oil products is about one-quarter of that in the United States.

We know that Russian reserves must be very great, and that for a long time to come Russia will continue to be an exporting country, using its oil resources in support of Communist penetration and therefore as a political weapon. In Cuba, it is doubtful if Castro could have maintained himself in power without the support of Russian oil; probably the same can be said of Red China. The Russians also, we know, have long had ambitions to press southward into the Persian Gulf countries—a fact that was emphasized in some of the discussions between the Russians and the Germans at the opening of World War II.

Parallel with the invasion of the European markets by the Russians has come the development of an intergovernmental body which is devoted to maintaining the prices and increasing the market for oil products. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is already discussing the mutual interests of its members, particularly regarding the price and distribution of petroleum products, and concession terms. Should the combination of petroleum-producing states, through OPEC, be able to dictate the price at which oil is sold, it would mean, in effect, that oil prices would be set in the political councils of government. This would present grave obstacles, for international producers often produce under one sovereignty, refine under another and sell under a third. The interests of the various countries are not parallel. The companies exist in the area between these sovereignties and serve as a highly useful connection and mediating force among them. In his "Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution," Adolf Berle points out that the great corporations engaged in international trade perform a function analogous to that which St. Augustine of Hippo proposed for the Papacy after the fall of Rome. Whatever the force of this parallel may be, it is true that the major oil companies perform a most necessary type of international public service. The further growth of this responsibility will be a complicated process, depending in large measure on what obligations the trading companies may wish to assume in order to assure their own survival.

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NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN POLAND

By Adam Bromke

IT is an old truth that in the long run the foreign policy of any country is determined less by ideological forces than by the facts of geography and history. And so it is in postwar Poland. The striking feature of the political scene in Poland today is that, while Communist ideology has failed to take any firm roots among the Polish people, the government's foreign policy is endorsed by an increasing number of Poles. The explanation of this apparent paradox is that since 1945 the gap between Communist goals in the international sphere and Polish national interests has considerably narrowed.

Poland's foreign policy always has been exceptionally sensitive to the facts of her geographic position. Squeezed between Germany and Russia, with no natural borders to protect her, she has been repeatedly threatened by powerful neighbors ready to deprive her of her very existence. Had it been otherwise, Poland might have achieved the status of a middle power, to which her human and material resources entitle her. Power in international politics being relative, by virtue of her location Poland has been reduced to the status of a small country.

Yet the Poles themselves are to a great extent responsible for the vulnerability which has so consistently plagued them. When opportunities existed to gain advantage in relation to the Germans or the Russians, the Poles failed to exploit them. At times they won brilliant military victories, but neglected to translate them into lasting political successes. As a result, at the turn of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries Poland's power dwindled to the point where she was no longer a match for either Russia or the German states. At that stage of European history, Poland was not the only great power on the decline. Her case was, nevertheless, unique. While the countries located on the periphery of the European continent, such as Sweden, Spain or Turkey, all suffered loss of territory, they retained their independence; but Poland, because of her central geographic position, was totally dismembered by her neighbors. Having lost their state, the Poles strove to save at least their existence as a nation. Against successive waves of Germanization and Russification

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since the end of the eighteenth century, the Poles have waged a desperate battle to preserve their national identity.

It is their unhappy history which has made the Poles intensely, at times boisterously, nationalistic. With their state dismembered, the Poles' last line of defense became nationalism, the sine qua non of their survival as a people. It inspired them in their repeated efforts to cast off foreign bondage and to restore a viable Polish state. The founder of modern Polish nationalism, Roman Dmowski, taught his compatriots that in Poland's geographic position there is no room for a small, weak nation.

The preoccupation with external matters was reflected in the character of Polish politics. Political groupings in Poland traditionally formed or broke apart over issues not of social reform but of foreign policy. This did not mean, of course, that the Poles were indifferent to domestic matters. But in their scale of values, national independence took precedence over social reforms. Indeed, social reform was often advocated less as an end in itself than as a means of strengthening Poland against external enemies.

The early Marxists were by no means immune to these traditions in Polish politics. The socialist movement in Poland was repeatedly torn into two wings: one primarily interested in promoting the struggle for national independence, the other more concerned with advancing social revolution. It was the former wing which, through its patriotic appeal, commanded the support of a majority of the Polish working class. And it was from this faction that there emerged the group led by Jozef Pilsudski which governed Poland through most of the inter-war years—although by that time it had shed completely its socialist character. Meanwhile, the minority wing maintained close ties with the Bolshevik Party in Russia, and from its ranks came most of the leaders of postwar Poland.

Between the two World Wars Communism had little appeal in Poland. This was not because the Poles were opposed to social revolution, but primarily because Communism was viewed as a disguised form of Russian domination. The Poles not only feared a party which was subordinate to the Comintern,[1] hence a tool of

[1] The Polish Communists now admit their subordination to the Russian Communists prior to 1956. A recent article published in the theoretical journal of the Polish Communist Party acknowledged that the relationship between the foreign Communist Parties and the Soviet Communist Party meant in practice "the imposition upon all the parties of the views and opinions of one party, or to be more precise the opinions and views of its leadership." (*Nowe Drogi*, December 1961, p. 48.)

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the Soviet Government; they also bitterly resented the territorial concessions which the Polish Communists, acting under instructions from the Russians, were willing to make at Poland's expense. They were ready to cede to the Soviet Union the eastern provinces, representing almost half of Poland's territory, although populated largely by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. In order to strengthen the position of the German Communists, who in the eyes of the Comintern were more important, the Polish Communist Party was prepared to yield Upper Silesia and Pomerania to Germany.[2] Most Poles looked upon these concessions as treasonable.

II

During World War II the program expounded by the Polish Communists was drastically altered. In place of the old Communist Party, the Polish Workers' Party was created, combining in its appeal the goals of social revolution and national liberation. The new party emphasized its independence from Soviet Communism, although it still upheld the cession of Poland's prewar eastern provinces to the U.S.S.R. But understandably it reversed completely its stand in the territorial dispute with Germany. The Communists now championed recovery of the ancient Polish lands which before the war had been a part of Germany. Despite such concessions to Polish nationalism and despite the pronounced swing of Polish society to the left under the equalitarian impact of the war, the new Communist program failed to produce any substantial response among the people. The Communist régime in Poland was established only after a prolonged and, at times, fierce struggle between the Polish Workers' Party, backed by Soviet military might, and the anti-Communist political forces supported by the overwhelming majority of the people.

The bitter resistance to the imposition of a Communist régime in Poland was essentially nationalistic and not social in character. The Poles distrusted the Communists' assurances that they no longer took orders from Moscow. The whole tradition of the Polish Communist movement belied this, and the Party's ready as-

[2] The readiness of the Polish Communists to make territorial concessions to Germany in the inter-war period is rarely mentioned in Poland today. Nevertheless, since 1956 some indirect references to it have appeared. "While writing these words," one writer stated in digressing from his theme, "I recall an old comrade from the Communist Party of Poland, who did not agree with the concessions to the Communist Party of Germany concerning Upper Silesia." (Wladyslaw Machejek, *Zycie literackie*, October 28, 1956.)

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sent to the annexation of Poland's eastern territories by the Soviet Union impugned their credibility even further. These doubts were fully vindicated when in 1948–49, after expelling from its ranks a group led by Wladyslaw Gomulka on charges of "nationalist deviation," the Party reverted to open espousal of its ties to Moscow.

In the immediate postwar years the anti-Communist posture of the Poles was fully in harmony with their national interests. The effort to avoid Soviet subjugation did not weaken in any way Poland's position vis-à-vis Germany; occupied Germany posed no threat to Poland in the west. Moreover, in view of the consent of the Western powers to the removal of the German population from the prewar German territories acquired by Poland, it appeared that the border along the Oder-Neisse rivers was looked upon as final. Soviet support of Poland's right to this frontier, therefore, did not seem to the Poles exceptionally significant.

There is no evidence that since the late 1940s the Poles have revised in any fundamental way their opposition to Communism as a vehicle of Russian domination. The so-called October revolt of 1956 clearly indicated that Communist ideology had not taken root. Not only had the Polish Communists failed to win the people to their side, but they themselves proved vulnerable to popular pressure. In the face of ferment throughout the country, the Communist Party revealed itself to be weak and divided. An influential wing of the Party, by defying the Russians, however unwillingly, demonstrated that many were ready to place the interests of the nation before those of international Communism. In 1956, as before in Polish history, the issue of social reform was of secondary importance. The generally socialist direction of Communist policies was not seriously questioned by the Polish people. What they resented was that in the name of ideological uniformity the economic and social reforms had been made to follow blindly the Soviet pattern, instead of being based on Poland's needs. Above all, they objected to the adoption of a political system which was copied after that in the Soviet Union.

Since 1956 the attitude of the Poles toward Communism has not changed in any apparent way. If anything, Communist ideology has been undermined even more. During the period of relative freedom after the October revolt, sharp attacks were publicly leveled at various aspects of Marxism-Leninism. Such open criticism subsequently has been curbed but by no means ex-

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tinguished. The lively debate on freedom among Polish scholars following the new de-Stalinization campaign indicates that the intellectuals in Poland remain restive. Likewise there has been little evidence that Communism has any increasing influence among the masses. The advancement of industrialization has not only failed to produce the new socialist type of society envisaged by the Marxists, but in several respects has brought the Poles closer to the West. The acceptance of Western mass culture in Poland has been markedly accelerated. Under its essentially agnostic impact the Polish people have become less susceptible to any ideology, least of all Communism. Finally, there are no signs of any revival of ideological zeal among the Communists themselves. The pattern followed by the Polish Party is a patchwork of political realism, pragmatic radicalism and sheer opportunism, but not Marxism-Leninism.[3] Communist ideology in Poland has become diluted to a degree unprecedented in any Communist-bloc country.

III

The fact remains, however, that since the mid-fifties a considerable measure of accommodation has been achieved between the people and the Communist régime. Again, the explanation lies in the international sphere. In the last decade several changes have taken place in international politics which have greatly affected the position of Poland. First of all, the relative liberalization in the Soviet bloc following the demise of Stalin made the Russian overlordship less onerous. Since Gomulka's return to power in 1956, Poland has secured a measure of internal autonomy which, though still restricted, is nevertheless genuine. Second, West Germany reëmerged as an independent state, assuming a prominent role in the anti-Communist alliance. The revival of German military force, coupled with the persistent refusal on the part of the Bonn government to accept the western border of Poland along the Oder and Neisse Rivers, made the Poles once again fearful of their western neighbor. Furthermore, the indefinite postponement of recognition of this frontier by the Western powers made support of the boundary by the Soviet Union of

[3] The lack of ideological zeal among the Polish Communists is at times conceded in Poland. In an article expressing concern over this development, the opinion of an "earnest Communist" was quoted: "The period of intense ideological activities, discussions and creative thought belongs to the past, and all attempts to stimulate an interest of a large number of party members in those problems are at present doomed to failure." (Romana Granas, *Polityka*, November 26, 1959.)

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crucial importance for Poland.[4] The problem of retaining these prewar German provinces overshadowed the Polish-Soviet territorial dispute, which gradually faded into the background.

These developments in the international sphere had, in turn, a profound impact on the Poles' conception of their own national interests. What in the late forties seemed a straightforward choice between submission to or independence from Russia became blurred a decade later. The Poles are now faced with a dilemma: if they demonstrate an uncompromising opposition to Communism, they run the risk of losing their western territories. There seems to be little doubt that in the past few years Polish opinion has shifted in favor of putting up with modified, but none the less unmistakable, dependence on Russia in exchange for security against Germany. It was the beginnings of this shift which gave the upheaval of 1956 its moderate outcome. Significantly, during the October revolt the necessity of Poland's alignment with the Soviet Union was not seriously questioned. Since 1956, after the easing of Russian oppression, the process of accommodation with the Soviet Union has been carried further as a result of Poland's changing appreciation of her position vis-à-vis Germany and Russia.

It is Germany which in the eyes of the Poles represents the arch-enemy. A millennium-long territorial dispute with Germany has concerned the lands which had been the cradle of the Polish nation. It was largely under the impact of the *Drang nach Osten* that the Poles were driven to seek outlets in the east which brought them into conflict with the Russians. Also, because of the superiority of German technology and organization, Germanization usually presented a far greater threat than Russification. Consequently, at least since Bismarck launched the systematic suppression of Polishdom in the Prussian provinces, the Poles inclined to seek coöperation with Russia against Germany rather than vice versa. The memory of the German occupation of Poland during World War II, when the Poles were literally threatened with national extermination at the hands of the Nazis, only in-

[4] There exists a widespread view in the West that the Soviet Union intentionally let Poland push her territory to the Oder in order to make her dependent on Soviet support for the defense of this border, and thus virtually to chain her to Russia. What this argument ignores is that in 1945 neither the Russians nor the Poles could anticipate that, after agreeing to the removal of the German population from this territory, the West would refuse to recognize its acquisition by Poland as final. And it was only in the light of this inconsistent position that the Soviet Union emerged as the sole champion of Poland's right to the frontier along the Oder-Neisse line.

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tensifies this inclination. It makes the Poles skeptical of the changes which have taken place in West Germany and causes them to overestimate the strength of elements there which stand for revision of the Polish-German border.

The reasons why the Poles are so determined to preserve their postwar gains in the west should not, however, be attributed solely to their anti-German sentiments. Most of them are convinced that the western provinces are essential for continued resistance to Russia as well. They feel that Poland's present boundaries make her far more viable politically, economically and even strategically than before the war, and give her a better chance to withstand pressure from the east. Indeed, many Poles believe that it was their relative strength which enabled them to extract a substantial degree of internal autonomy from the Soviet Union in 1956. Conversely, they claim that Poland, crippled by the loss of her western provinces, would have become an easy prey to Russia, and thus to Communism. In short, the Poles consider the preservation of their present western border as literally a matter of national survival. We are back to the centuries-old focal point of Polish politics.

It is clearly not Communism but nationalism which is today, as much as ever, the major political force in Poland. Because Soviet policy vis-à-vis West Germany meets with the approval of virtually all Poles, and because the Soviet Union has permitted the Polish régime to move one step nearer to the wishes of the people, some degree of reconciliation between the Communist government and Polish society has occurred. On the other hand, friction between the government and the people continues as a result of the régime's adherence to the international Communist ideology, which requires Poland, under the guise of preserving the unity of the "socialist camp," to follow the course of domestic policies prescribed by Moscow. The traditional interlocking of Poland's external position and her internal politics has reappeared in a new form.

IV

Poland's centuries-old objective—namely, to protect its interests from both Germany and Russia—is unlikely to undergo any essential change in the near future. Thus, the Poles in the years to come will strive to widen the scope of their independence from Russia without simultaneously acceding to German claims to the

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Polish western territories. Although these two goals are in some degree incompatible, it is not impossible that Poland may improve her position in relation to both her principal neighbors. The Poles foresee at least two developments that might provide them with a satisfactory way out of their dilemma.

First, the Poles place their hopes in further transformation of the Soviet bloc in the direction of "polycentrism," thereby giving them greater freedom in domestic policies. They hope that their country may become less a semi-satellite and more a genuine ally of Russia. The alliance would be based not on an artificial affinity between the Soviet and Polish political and socio-economic systems, but on their mutual interests and common policies toward Germany. The Poles feel that the chances of such a trend in Polish-Soviet relations are enhanced by the widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. It is not only that Chinese defiance of Soviet supreme authority has the general effect of promoting polycentrism in the Communist bloc. As the third largest country in the bloc, Poland is likely to profit most from the dissension between its two giants. In exchange for Polish support in its dispute with China, the Soviet Union might be amenable to a greater diversity in Poland's domestic policies.

Since the shift toward polycentrism in the Soviet bloc would not bring about any swift changes in the Polish political system, this development would be welcomed primarily by the Polish Communists, but it would not be objectionable to a great many non-Communists. The latter, of course, would like this trend to go so far as to allow some form of "national Communism" providing for complete independence from Moscow and a considerably widened scope of freedom at home.

Second, the Poles have not abandoned all hope that some settlement in Central Europe along the broad lines of "disengagement" may eventually be reached between the West and the East. Such a solution would fulfill their national aspirations in high degree. On the one hand, by leaving the Communist bloc and assuming the position of a neutral country, along the lines of Finland, Poland would regain genuine internal independence.[5] On the other, with Germany neutralized, the pressure on Poland's

[5] The comparison of Poland's possible neutrality with that of Finland requires a qualification. Poland, located at the center and not at the periphery of Europe and flanked by Germany rather than Sweden, would tend to be more pro-Russian in her foreign policy than Finland. For a discussion of the possible impact of disengagement on Poland, see my "Disengagement in Eastern Europe," *International Journal,* Summer 1959.

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western border would be lifted. An additional advantage for the Poles would be that by removing this political barrier their traditionally close cultural ties with the West could be restored.

Since the adoption of a policy of disengagement in Central Europe would be likely to result in a drastic transformation of Poland's internal political system, paving the way for a very substantial increase of freedom, it is favored primarily by the non-Communists. However, as their persistent advocacy of the Rapacki Plan indicates, the Polish Communists also seem to be interested in some version of disengagement which would improve their position in the international sphere but not undermine their rule at home.

Whatever the currents of politics in the Soviet bloc and in the world at large, one thing seems to be certain: the Polish question will reappear in one form or another in many conflicts and in many attempts to settle them. This has very little to do with the global ideological struggle, for Poland's aspirations cut across the lines dividing the two blocs. Her importance in the international sphere is a natural consequence of her crucial geographic location between Russia and Germany. It is also a result of the stand taken by the Polish nation, which has proved throughout its history that it is not content to leave its fate to others but seeks to shape its own destiny.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY IN INDIA

By Myron Weiner

THE principle of equality is having a revolutionary effect on life in contemporary India. The impact is more dramatic there than elsewhere because perhaps no other major society in recent history has known inequalities so gross or so long preserved. In the traditional civilizations of Islam and China, the ideal if not always the practice of equality had an honorable and often commanding place in the culture. But in India the notion that men should remain in the same occupation and station of life as their forefathers was enshrined in religious precepts and social custom. While life was not as immobile as theory prescribed, and from time to time revolts against the dominance of particular social classes occurred, the idea of social equality never became as widespread in Hinduism as it did in other great traditions.

Even today, the visitor to India—whether from Europe or the Far East—is struck by the gross inequalities, not merely in material standards, but more profoundly in the attitudes of men toward each other. To be kissed on the foot by a beggar or by a supplicant for a job is, for one sensitive to the dignity of man, among the most degrading human acts imaginable. The stooped back, the outstretched hands of the groveling poor are in contrast with the stern and commanding voice and the fine carriage of the rich, the mighty and the highborn. Yet very recently the principle of equality has flowered in Indian life, and it is the changes that this has brought and its effects on other aspects of India's efforts at modernization that I shall try to describe here.

II

Remote roots of what social equality exists can be found in medieval Islam as it affected the subcontinent, and in the development of *bakti* or devotional tradition in medieval Hinduism, which sought to stress the notion of equality before God. But the concept became really influential with the appearance of anti-caste movements in the nineteenth century. The influence of Christianity and the rise of nationalism both contributed in their own way to its growth, as did the impact of socialist ideas among

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young nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s. But it is not our purpose to enter into any detailed historical examination of how the notion of an equalitarian society came to be accepted by the leaders of the Indian nationalist movement. Suffice it to say here that those who held it took power in 1947 and began to exercise the authority of the state to make it a reality.

With virtually no debate, the principle of political equality was enshrined in the constitution when all adults, literate or illiterate, were given the right to vote. The initial effect was the further extension and intensification of party political organization, especially in rural areas. The governing Congress Party, which enjoyed the legacy of the nationalist movement with its relatively well established mass base, clearly won the race—but not without unexpected results. Congress politicians, like those of other political parties, discovered that voters were moved more readily by appeals to their caste, religion, tribe and language than by appeals based on broad public policy. With a skill that would do credit to a New York or Chicago politician, Indian party leaders shrewdly sought "balanced" tickets. Lower castes, which are large, soon clamored for more seats in municipal bodies, state legislative assemblies and Parliament, as well as for more posts in the party organization. Century-old rivalries among communities burst forth. Local politicians made their own constituents aware of the benefits to be obtained from government and awakened them to the power which they could obtain as a result of universal adult suffrage.

Thus linguistic, caste and tribal organizations have multiplied, and throughout the country particularistic loyalties have been intensified. This was demonstrated in the general elections for Parliament and the state assemblies last February. Except in the much publicized North Bombay constituency, election issues rarely involved ideology or public policy. On the contrary, the electorate tended to vote in accordance with traditional loyalties; issues, such as they were, tended to be parochial.

Another related consequence of universal adult suffrage is that social classes which had hitherto been politically dormant have now come to play an increasingly important role in local politics. In many of the urban areas especially, the respectable, high-caste, prosperous and well educated leaders who guided the party in the past have been replaced by a less educated, status-hungry class of shopkeepers and minor clerks. Their drive for position and

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prestige has often led to bitter struggles for control of the local Congress Party organization, and especially for the position of local party president; for it is he, with the district collector and other high officials and respected citizens, who welcomes visiting ministers from the state and central government to the city. In the eyes of a lower middle-class politician, the post is a coveted one and it is no wonder that the struggle for this office has shattered many urban Congress Party organizations. Though many other factors have contributed, it is not surprising that the Congress Party has lost municipal elections in many cities in recent years, including Madras, Delhi, Madurai and Coimbatore. But regardless of who wins, municipal governments are increasingly falling under the control of men of lower social status.

In the rural areas, however, power is still in the hands of large landowners, prosperous rural businessmen and, in general, men of comparatively high social status, caste and education. But even here it is becoming difficult to generalize, for there is a growing struggle by the more populous lower classes to get control of the Congress Party organization and—particularly during the last few years—the newly constituted village and district councils.

In late 1959 two states, Andhra and Rajasthan, inaugurated what is known in India as *panchayati raj,* or democratic decentralization. Under this program, a three-tiered system of local government was established and is now being extended throughout India. At one level is the village *panchayat,* an elected council with enlarged powers of central government. At a second level is a *samiti* usually constituting the heads of village panchayats from an area of about 60,000 people (the number varies from state to state). At the third level there is a *zilla parishad* or district council made up of the samiti presidents. The area of the samiti coincides with the administrative units of the government-sponsored community development program, which was established during the First Five Year Plan to develop the country's rural areas. And the parishad has as its major responsibility the coördination of all development activities within the entire district, an area encompassing more than a million people. The samiti and the parishad thus constitute units not only of local self-government but also of rural development, with substantial budgets for primary and secondary schools, medical dispensaries, road construction, well digging and agricultural development, including minor irrigation works.

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From the very beginning, these organizations of local government have been largely controlled by the high-caste landowners who dominate the countryside. But gradually, the numerically superior lower castes have become more active and in some areas they have gained control of the village panchayats, and even occasionally the samitis. While the spread of political participation may be desirable, it often means that power is taken by those who have had no experience in managing governmental bodies.

We can illustrate the consequences of this development by describing a village near Baroda in an area from which many of India's nationalist leaders (including Sardar Patel, India's first Home Minister) have come. In this region, the landowning *patidars* are the dominant caste in control of the Congress Party organization, local government bodies, credit institutions and coöperatives. As in most of the villages in this area the *baraiyas,* a caste of landless laborers and tenants, are the largest single caste. In 1951 a popularly elected panchayat was created and the dominant patidars won. But as a result of a controversy within the panchayat, the patidars resigned, leaving a handful of baraiyas in control. Once in power, they developed enough self-confidence to wish to retain control, and in subsequent elections they were successful.

Under baraiya control, the panchayat has been lenient in collecting taxes from the baraiya community while continuing to make collections from the patidars. When a new water works was established in the village, the panchayat at first refused to provide connections to the homes of patidars. The panchayat also meets infrequently, passes resolutions without discussions and is generally badly run. And within the local coöperative a conflict has developed between the landless baraiyas, eager to use the coöperative to purchase and store food grains at low prices, and the landowning patidars who want the coöperative to invest its limited funds in the purchase of cheap manures.

The growing participation of the baraiyas in the political life of this area can be further illustrated by the role they played in the February elections to the state assembly. In order to oppose the patidars effectively, the baraiyas joined the newly formed Swatantra (Freedom) Party. The result was that Swatantra candidates won in a number of constituencies in which the baraiyas are numerically large.

Elsewhere, the rise of lower castes into the panchayats and

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samitis is frequently accompanied by favoritism toward a particular community, a marked rise in the inefficiency of local government and an increase in corruption. These side effects of universal adult suffrage, as well as the intensification of class and caste conflict which we have noted, are widely decried by many educated Indians. The crass struggle for office seems to be far from the ideal of British democracy which the Indian intelligentsia holds dear. As a result, many intellectuals wish that they might call a halt to processes which they helped to set in motion. The cry grows for indirect elections, for outlawing political appeals to caste and religion, and for limiting tenure in a public office to a period of no more than ten years. One measure already taken by some states to reduce local conflicts is to award a bounty to villages which elect members of panchayats unanimously.

III

The application of equalitarian principles to education is also a matter of concern to many Indians. In an effort to improve the economic position of backward communities, state governments have passed legislation reserving a specified proportion of openings in the colleges and universities for particular castes declared by the government to be backward. For these same groups, a percentage—often a large percentage—of government jobs is also set aside. The principle of equality of opportunity, it is held, cannot be applied, because Brahmins and other high castes—by virtue of their head-start in education—would then be in a preferred position in obtaining both admission to college and, thereafter, one of the limited and coveted posts in the Civil Service.

The inevitable consequence of such a quota system, however, has been a marked decrease in standards. Examination marks for college admission and for securing government jobs have been lowered for the backward communities. High-caste leaders now argue, with some force, that the principle of appointment by merit has been almost eliminated. Since so many advantages accrue to a backward caste, there is great pressure on state governments to enlarge the list, and in some states as much as half the population has been declared backward. Many Indians point out that these policies have served to intensify caste loyalties and organization, but not necessarily to equalize the position of individuals, since many high castes have economically backward individuals and many low castes have wealthy families. If the lot

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of backward peoples is to be improved, it is argued, then the test of economic backwardness should be applied to individuals rather than entire communities.

The conflict between the goals of equalizing the position of individuals in society and of improving or at least maintaining educational standards has become most dramatically apparent with the enormous increase in higher education. State ministers of education have had to choose between mass education and high standards, no matter how much they may have hoped for both. Whereas there were 250,000 students in colleges and universities at the time of independence, the number is now rapidly approaching the million mark in less than 15 years. And since the First Five Year Plan was started in 1951, the number of colleges has been increased from 542 to over 1,000. Some of the older colleges such as St. Stephen's in Delhi, St. Xavier's in Bombay and the Presidency Colleges in Calcutta and Madras are still good—though one can start an argument with any educated Indian by asking whether they are as good as they used to be. But clearly the newer colleges and universities are, with a few notable exceptions, inferior.

The centrally sponsored University Grants Commission has cautioned state governments against precipitous mushrooming of colleges, against increasing admissions without a commensurate increase in teachers, and against hastily switching to more easily understood regional languages when adequate teaching materials are not available. But the political pressures at the state level have been enormous, and the number of students demanding entrance into college is probably still increasing more rapidly than new openings are being made available.

IV

The application of the principle of equality has probably slowed the pace of economic growth in some areas, quickened it in others. In the halls of Parliament and at dinner parties in Delhi, the most acrimonious subject for discussion is the matter of locating industries. The issue became dramatic in 1958, when the central government decided to build a refinery in the state of Bihar to refine the newly discovered oil of Assam. The Assamese launched a militant protest and the Indian Government finally agreed to build the refinery in Assam, and a second one later in Bihar. Two principles were involved. On the one hand, it was obviously desirable

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to develop industries in the most economic location. On the other, the Planning Commission has committed itself to the principle of giving special attention to the less developed areas of the country in an effort to equalize standards of living. The poorer areas like Assam have clamored for and received a larger share of public investment than they would have obtained if exclusively economic criteria had been applied. Similarly, the government has recently agreed to build a fertilizer plant in every state in India irrespective of economic costs and benefits.

The Third Five Year Plan explicitly states that "balanced development of different parts of the country, extension of the benefits of economic progress to the less developed regions and widespread diffusion of industry are among the major aims of planned development." But the report goes on to admit that "as resources are limited, frequently advantage lies in concentrating them at those points within the economy at which the returns are likely to be favourable." The planners have taken the position that the primary concern should be to increase national income and that "once a minimum in terms of national income and growth in different sectors is reached . . . it becomes possible to provide in many directions for a larger scale of development in the less developed regions." But in practice, the location of many factories within the public sector has been determined more by the persuasiveness of particular ministers in the central government and of chief ministers in the various states than by economic and technical considerations.

In agriculture, too, the political pressure for equalization in development has often been more effective than the arguments of agricultural economists. At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan a community development program was established as the instrument for rural development. Community development blocks were created and assigned agricultural, educational and social welfare officers who collectively were concerned with the all-around development of the villages within their blocks. Those who initially developed the program argued that the quality of the extension officers would be a critical factor in the success of the program, and that therefore the expansion of the program to encompass all of the country's villages should occur slowly. But this note of caution was effectively dismissed by those who argued that in the shortest possible time all villages should enjoy the advantages of the program. Within a brief nine years the program

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was extended to reach 370,000 villages, and by October 1963 it is expected that all of India's approximately half-million villages will be included in the program. Consequently, the quality of the development officers is understandably not as high as the planners had hoped, nor has the program fulfilled expectations.

In 1960 the Government of India agreed that an alternative method had to be found to increase the country's present rate of agricultural growth. This was estimated to be 17 percent in the first plan, and 16 percent in the second, which meant that over the past decade the growth rate in agriculture amounted to 3.3 percent annually compared to a population rise of about 2.1 percent per year—an increase of some 77,000,000 souls from 1951 to 1961. The Government decided to concentrate its agricultural experts and additional financial and administrative resources in seven selected districts where a combination of soils, availability of water and other resources was likely to bring the maximum increase in productivity. No sooner had the seven districts been selected than intense pressure was applied on the central government by states which had been overlooked. Recently the central government agreed to expand the program to include a district in every state.

While in some respects the application of the concept of equality in the development program has slowed the rate of growth, in other respects it has quickened the country's development. The beneficial effects are seen primarily in the private sector. As a result of the decision by state governments to give priority to the backward classes, many of the best-educated Indians, who used to enter the Civil Service as a matter of course, are now going into private business. Indeed, many social classes have taken to entrepreneurial activities for the first time on a large scale. The general effect of providing special benefits to lower castes has been to increase their self-awareness and arouse their expectations. As these classes increase their local political influence—an inevitable consequence of universal adult suffrage—they have also become more skilled at getting the licenses and permits from the government necessary to open shops, engage in the export-import trade and start small-scale industries. One can point to many communities now in private business which were not previously so engaged, at least at the present scale—the Nadars in Madras, Sikhs in the Punjab, Patidars in Gujarat and Marathas in Maharashtra.

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V

It would be misleading to assume that all policy moves in the direction of greater equality in India. The social, political and economic gulf between those who have land and those who are landless is a vast one. The political equality permitted by "democratic decentralization" has helped to bridge that gap, but the sheer weight of economic inequalities in many areas makes it difficult for the poor to assert their claims. In most states land-reform legislation has been passed, but it is widely agreed that the landlords have evaded much of the legislation imposing ceilings on land by the simple expedient of distributing titles to other members of their family. None the less, two factors are at work which may serve to increase the power of the landless even when they do not obtain land. One is the growth of the powers of local government and the introduction of universal adult suffrage in local elections. And the second is the creation of compulsory primary education which is likely to be nearly universal throughout India by the end of the Third Five Year Plan in 1966.

India is now in the process of changing from a relatively rigid, hierarchical social system to a mass society in which the great psychological, social and economic gulfs between human beings are reduced. To achieve this objective Indians have been forced to make hard choices, for the goal of an equalitarian society often conflicts with other values which Indians cherish. But how committed the leadership is to this goal is indicated by the price which they have often, though uncomfortably, been willing to pay—an increase in particularistic loyalties, a diminution in educational standards and perhaps even a decrease in the rate of economic growth. How hard the doctrine of equality should be pushed and how heavy a price with respect to other values should be paid are obviously issues which each society must weigh for itself.

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN

By Louis Morton

THE role of the Soviet Union in the struggle against Japan has received considerable attention from politicians and publicists as well as scholars, and the subject continues to hold great interest for a wider audience than is ordinarily available to the academician. The reasons for this interest are not hard to find. They stem, in part, from the controversies aroused by the Yalta Agreement and the decision to use the atomic bomb in 1945. But more fundamentally they reflect a concern over the mounting tensions of the cold war and an effort to find in our wartime relations with the Soviet Union some explanation for the failure to achieve a just settlement and a lasting peace after the greatest war in history.

This emphasis on the controversial political aspects of Soviet involvement in the Far Eastern war has blurred somewhat the military and strategic necessities. At the time, whether rightly or not, these were the most important considerations in the minds of the Allied leaders, and perhaps in the long run they may prove to have been the most decisive. At any rate, it is these, the military factors that governed American relations with the Soviet Union, that I wish to examine here.

Russian interest in the Far East long antedated World War II, but in the period following the Revolution the Bolsheviks had been forced to adopt a passive policy in the region while the Japanese took over Manchuria and much of North China and probed Russian defenses along the Siberian border. After 1939, the Japanese shifted their interests to the south, where the crumbling empires of the British, French and Dutch offered tempting opportunities.

The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941 proved a boon for both countries. It encouraged Japan in its plans for southern expansion by assuring Soviet neutrality in case of war with the United States, and it gave Russia similar assurances in the event of a German attack. As George Kennan remarked, the two countries "—one being confronted with great opportunities, the other with great dangers—agreed for the moment on a moratorium in the rivalry over East Asia."[1] Two months after the Pact was signed, Hitler loosed the full fury of the Nazi war machine against his former ally. The Japanese, when the Germans struck, kept their side of the bargain. And when they in turn attacked the United States in December, the Russians kept theirs. Whatever the reasons, at least each made good on his pledge to the other.

Once the United States was in the war, many Americans assumed that the Soviet Union, in common with England and the Associated Powers, would now fight shoulder to shoulder with her Allies against the enemy in Asia as well as in Europe. Notice of this possibility was taken in the press, and on the day after the attack, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull raised the question with Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador. At the same time, General Marshall brought the matter up at a staff conference with

[1] "Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin." Boston: Little Brown, 1961, p. 371.

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Mr. Stimson. And from the Far East came messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General MacArthur, each for his own reasons urging Soviet participation in the war against Japan.[2]

To all these demands, Stalin turned a deaf ear. Politely but firmly he declined to take any step that might involve him with another enemy on another front. He had his hands full with Germany and was in no position to violate the neutrality pact with Japan. The Americans were sympathetic and readily accepted the Soviet refusal, especially since involvement might weaken the primary effort against Germany.

During 1942, the question of Soviet entry was related principally to the possibility that Japan might attack the Soviet maritime provinces and to the American interest in using air bases in that region to strike at Japan. It was essential to have information about Soviet facilities and forces so that plans could be concerted. The Russians finally consented to an American Military Mission and in July Major-General Follett Bradley left for Moscow. But they showed no disposition to be coöperative and Bradley learned little about Soviet resources or intentions in the Far East.

So long as Stalin persisted in his determination to maintain a scrupulous neutrality toward Japan and avoid a two-front war, all overtures for coöperation in the Far East came to naught. In December 1942, when Roosevelt offered him three heavy bombardment groups (105 planes) for use in the Far East if he would permit Bradley to survey installations in eastern Siberia, Stalin replied that he would be delighted to have the planes, but he needed them on the German front, not in Siberia. Nor would he allow Bradley to make his survey. "It would seem obvious," he told the President, "that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by American inspectors. On this matter," he said, "[there] must be no misunderstanding"—all of which has a familiar ring today.[3]

Still, despite these rejections, American long-range plans continued to be based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would enter the war in the Far East, either on its own initiative or as a result of a Japanese attack. There was, in the opinion of both American and British strategists, a basic conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and Japan. Japan could not enjoy complete strategic security without control of eastern Siberia, and the Soviet Union could not feel secure so long as Japan was based on the Asiatic mainland and in Sakhalin. Though both found it in their interests for the moment to avoid war with the other, the Allied strategists felt that the Russians would probably attack Japan sooner or later, but not before the German threat had been removed. "After that," they declared, "she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan

[2] These conversations and messages, and subsequent actions, are described in several works: Cordell Hull, "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," 2 volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Maurice Matloff and E. M. Snell, "Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953); Louis Morton, "The Fall of the Philippines" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953) and "Strategy and Command" (in press); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953). The author has examined the sources cited in each case.

[3] Radio message, Stalin to Roosevelt, January 13, 1943. See also radio messages, Roosevelt to Stalin, January 8, and Stalin to Roosevelt, January 5.

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can be defeated at a small cost to her."[4] Thus, the general strategy agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and Prime Minister stated that after the defeat of Germany, the Allied Powers in the Pacific, with the coöperation, if possible, of Russia, would direct their full resources against Japan to bring about her unconditional surrender.[5] Plans for the final phases of the Far Eastern war, therefore, would have to remain tentative until the Russians made clear their intentions.

Signs of the Soviets' willingness to commit themselves appeared first in the fall of 1943 at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow. Representing the United States was Secretary of State Hull, the newly appointed Ambassador, Averell Harriman, and Major-General John R. Deane, head of the Military Mission. Stalin on this occasion proved extremely coöperative. In an expansive mood, he told Mr. Hull "clearly and unequivocally" that once Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union would join the Allies against Japan. Molotov and Vishinsky, in private conversations, made similar statements, and at a party the Russians entertained their guests with a film depicting Japanese penetration of Siberia in 1921, a subtle way, perhaps, of telling the Americans that Japan was the common enemy.[6]

Though no formal commitment was made at the time, the Americans had every reason to feel confident that they could count on Soviet participation, a feeling that was confirmed by Molotov's assurances to Harriman the following month. Then, at the Tehran Conference at the end of November, Stalin expressed his regret to President Roosevelt that he had not been able to help in the Pacific, but said that after Germany's defeat there would be a "common front" against Japan. The next day, Roosevelt gave Stalin a list of questions which would have to be answered before firm plans for Soviet intervention could be made. And shortly thereafter, at Cairo, the Combined Chiefs approved in principle an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan that included Soviet participation. "We are agreed," they said, "that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event."[7]

The mood of optimism over the Soviet attitude proved premature. General Deane was unable to secure any of the detailed information required for planning, and the prospect for closer military collaboration against Japan remained as remote as ever.[8] But the American staff continued to work on a plan for the final defeat of Japan. As finally approved at Quebec in September

[4] The relevant paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 6, 1943, is contained in the Department of Defense pamphlet, "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945," September 1955. Many of the J.C.S. and Combined Chiefs of Staff documents cited in this article can be found in that source.

[5] Memo by C.C.S., May 25, 1943: "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (Trident Conference)," C.C.S. 242/6.

[6] Hull, "Memoirs," v. 2, p. 1113 and 1309–10. The original messages by Harriman and Deane are quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 21–22.

[7] Memo by J.C.S., December 3, 1943: "Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944," C.C.S. 397.

[8] For an account of the difficulties experienced by General Deane on this occasion and subsequently, see his "Strange Alliance" (New York: Viking Press, 1947) and Harriman's reports and messages in "Entry of the Soviet Union" and in "Military Situation in the Far East" (MacArthur Hearings) Part 5, (Washington: G.P.O., 1951).

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1944, this plan called, first, for sea and air blockades to reduce Japan's ability and will to resist; and second, for the invasion of the home islands by way of Kyushu and then Honshu and the Tokyo Plain.[9] The invasion was expected to be extremely costly, but necessary to secure unconditional surrender.

Hope for coöperation with the Russians revived at the end of September when Stalin inquired of Mr. Harriman and the British Ambassador whether the United States still considered Soviet entry into the war essential. On being assured that it did, Stalin suggested that military conversations begin immediately. Then on October 16, with Churchill and Eden present, he discussed the question of Soviet entry again. On this occasion he spoke freely. The Russians, he said, had 30 divisions and 19 infantry brigades in the Far East, facing Japan's Kwantung Army estimated at 24 divisions and 42 brigades. He would have to move to the Far East, he estimated, about 30 more divisions before he could attack. This move would require 1,000 troop trains, and would take almost three months to complete. Thus, the Allies could expect a Russian declaration of war against Japan about three months after the defeat of Germany. But Stalin promised nothing definitely and noted that "the political aspects have not been fully considered."[10] When an American team arrived in Moscow in December 1944, it found that the Russians had no intention of making firm military plans. They seemed interested only in supplies, and insisted on discussing priorities, not operations.

Although official policy continued to call for invasion and Soviet participation, there were some who doubted the wisdom of such a policy and wished, in any case, to delay invasion for a variety of reasons. One highly placed strategist suggested that the Pacific offensive be slowed down and that the United States seek positions on the China coast and a ring of air bases around Japan before trying to land troops on the home islands. The United States could thus force Russia to enter the war *before* the invasion of Japan, for if the Russians thought the United States would invade in any case, they might wait until the last moment and then move into Manchuria without opposition and at little cost.

This proposal received serious study but was finally rejected.[11] One of the main counts against it was that it would delay the defeat of Japan and would involve the United States in unnecessary operations and loss of lives. And whether it would have the desired effect on Russia was by no means certain. Nevertheless, opposition to the invasion was clearly reflected in the preference of Admirals King and Leahy for a strategy of blockade and bombardment and in the support they gave for operations on the coast of China and elsewhere.[12] Proponents of this strategy argued that it would remove the need for Soviet participation. If there were no invasion, it would no longer be essential to have the Russians pin down Japan's Kwantung Army.

[9] Report to the President and Prime Minister, September 15, 1944, C.C.S. 680/1.

[10] In addition to the sources cited above, see messages and papers contained in "Foreign Relations of the United States" (Yalta Papers) (Washington: G.P.O., 1955), p. 361–400; and Matloff, *op. cit.*

[11] Louis Morton, "National Policy and Military Strategy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter 1960, p. 11.

[12] For Leahy's and King's views, see Leahy, "I Was There" (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 312 *et seq.;* King and Whitehill, "Fleet Admiral King" (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 591–2.

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At the end of 1944, the military planners reviewed Russia's position in the war and found no reason to change their view that Soviet participation would hasten the defeat of Japan and was therefore desirable. But, they went on to say, Russian aid was in no sense an essential condition for Allied victory. They recommended, therefore, that when and if Russia did come in—and they were sure it would—it be given no support that did not contribute directly to the war against Japan.

The timing of Russia's entry, the planners recognized, was all-important. That it could not come until after Germany's defeat was evident. But there was a danger also that the Russians might enter too soon or too late, from the American point of view. Too early an attack might involve the United States in a costly effort to support and supply an ally in danger of defeat; too late an attack might leave the Japanese free to move troops to the home islands at the moment of invasion. For the Americans, the best time for a Russian attack would be about three months before the invasion of Kyushu.

The planners also undertook to review what they thought would be the chief Russian contribution to Japan's defeat. Primarily, Russia's role would be to contain and defeat the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and to prevent reinforcement of the home islands before and during the American invasion. The possibility that the autonomous and supposedly powerful Kwantung Army would continue to fight on even after the defeat of Japanese forces in the home islands could not be ignored either, and Soviet participation would remove that danger. The planners concluded that the United States should seek: first, Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with an ability to engage in offensive operations; secondly, an all-out offensive by Soviet forces against Japanese forces in Manchuria; third, intensive air operations against Japan proper; and, finally, interdiction of the lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia. This statement of principle received the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the President before the Yalta meetings, and provided the basis for plans discussed there.[13]

By this time, the price the Allies would have to pay for Soviet participation was already known. Meeting with Harriman in December 1944, Stalin explained just what he had meant by "political aspects" in his earlier conversations. The Russians, he said, should have the Kuriles and everything they had lost to Japan in 1905: the southern half of Sakhalin, leases to the port of Dairen, the naval base of Port Arthur, and the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian Railroads. In addition, Outer Mongolia was to remain independent and free from Chinese sovereignty.[14]

Thus, when President Roosevelt left for the meetings with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, he had the assurances of his military advisers, based on the most careful study, that invasion of the Japanese home islands would be necessary to secure the unconditional surrender of Japan, and that the heavy costs of such an operation would be considerably lightened if, several months before, the Russians would attack the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Soviet aid, therefore, was an important condition if not an essential element in the defeat of Japan.

[13] J.C.S. 1176/6, January 18, 1945, approved January 24, 1945.

[14] Harriman to Roosevelt, December 15, 1944, p. 378; Harriman Statement, MacArthur Hearings, *op. cit.*, Part 5, p. 3330.

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This was a military judgment—one, incidentally, in which both Nimitz and MacArthur later concurred.[15] And it was on the basis of this judgment that Roosevelt paid Stalin the price he asked when they met at Yalta. The terms were substantially those presented to Harriman in December 1944 and there was little discussion. The military members did not participate, though they knew about Stalin's price. On February 10, Harriman and Molotov drew up a statement of the agreement and next day the heads of state, including Churchill, signed.

On the military side, the Yalta Conference was less decisive and certainly less controversial. The Russians confirmed that they would declare war on Japan about three months after Germany's surrender and agreed to let the Americans base their B-29s on the lower Amur River. In response to a series of questions from the Americans, the Russian Chiefs of Staff provided full and satisfactory answers, and promised closer coöperation in the future.[16]

In April 1945, after the death of President Roosevelt, there was a marked shift in the attitude toward Soviet entry. What had appeared extremely desirable at the beginning of the year, by late spring was appearing less so. Victory in Europe was closer than ever and the prospect of bringing large forces to bear against Japan was bright. The B-29s from the Marianas, with fighter support from Iwo Jima, were proving so effective that the need for bases in Siberia seemed less pressing than before. Our ground forces had just landed on Okinawa, most of the Philippines was in American hands, the Imperial Navy had been virtually driven from the sea, and American carrier-based planes were bombing the coastal areas of Japan itself.

This situation was of the greatest importance in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the last few months of the war. Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted the Red Army to pin down the Kwantung Army, they now had a measure of strategic independence that they had not had before. No longer was there any need to make concessions to the Russians, who were more anxious than they had ever been to coöperate with the Americans. The role of the two Allies had been reversed. "If Russia should slow down or even stop its war effort in Europe and Asia," wrote Admiral Leahy, "no particular harm would be done to our war prospects."[17]

Concern over the agreements made at Yalta was also a factor in the changed relationship with the Soviet Union. This concern is strikingly revealed in an exchange between Joseph Grew, then acting Secretary of State, and Mr. Stimson. Seeking to define the postwar political goals of the United States in the Far East, Grew asked Stimson three questions:

1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?

[15] MacArthur's and Nimitz's views are given in detail in messages sent to Marshall and King, and in "The Forrestal Diaries," edited by Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 31. The messages are quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 50–52.

[16] Memo, Roosevelt to Stalin, February 5, 1945; Leahy to Roosevelt, February 6, 1945; and Draft of Final Report to President and Prime Minister, February 8, 1945.

[17] Leahy, "I Was There," *op. cit.*, p. 351.

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2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political demands in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of the Japanese home islands be granted, or would such occupation adversely affect our long-term policy for the future treatment of Japan?[18]

Stimson's reply is most revealing. "The War Department," he said, "considers that Russian entry . . . will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States. . . . While the U.S.S.R. will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States as a condition to her entry into the war against Japan, such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she will enter the war." But, he said, "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives."

Stimson's second point was that the concessions made at Yalta dealt with matters which were well within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S. military action short of war. "Furthermore," he said, "the Russians can, if they choose, await the time when U.S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date."

"It appears," Stimson concluded, "we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians . . . unless we choose to use force. From the military point of view it would be desirable to have a complete understanding and agreement with the Russians concerning the Far East. If it is believed that the reconsideration of the Yalta Agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time."[19]

Meanwhile, planning for the invasion of Japan had gone forward without interruption. In June, when preparations for the Potsdam Conference were being made, President Truman asked for a review of these plans. As a result of this review, which produced no new information and a reaffirmation of the importance of Soviet assistance, the President ordered preparations for the invasion to continue. Already Harry Hopkins, who had gone to Moscow in May, had learned from Stalin that the Red Army would be ready to attack Manchuria on August 8.[20]

[18] Memo, Grew to Stimson, May 12, 1945, in "Entry of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 69–70. See also notes on Conference with Grew, Harriman, Bohlen, Forrestal, *et al,* on Relations with Russia, May 12, 1945.

[19] Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945 (prepared by General G. A. Lincoln, edited by General Marshall, and reviewed by John J. McCloy), quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 69–70.

[20] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins" (New York: Harper, 1948, p. 887–912) contains extracts from Hopkins' record of his meeting with Stalin. "Foreign Relations of the United States" (Potsdam Papers, 2 volumes. Washington: G.P.O., 1960) contains a full record of the preparations and planning for the meeting at Potsdam as well as of the meeting itself. The memoirs cited above as well as those of Henry L. Stimson, "On Active Service in Peace and War" (New York: Harper, 1948) and Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly" (New York: Harper, 1947) are of value here.

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The fact that the Japanese were virtually defeated was well understood by military and political leaders alike before the Potsdam Conference. But defeat did not mean "unconditional surrender," the announced war aim of the Allies. As the Army planners told Stimson, "The point at which the Japanese will accept defeat and agree to our terms is unpredictable. . . . Probably it will take Russian entry into the war coupled with a landing or imminent threat of landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their position."[21] The Japanese Army was still considered strong and well disciplined, with a strength of about five million men. Two million of these, well supplied with ammunition, would be stationed in the home islands, and judging from past experience, they could be expected to resist fanatically to the very end.[22] Neither blockade nor bombing alone would produce an unconditional surrender before the date already decided for invasion.

Thus, when the American delegation left for Potsdam in July 1945, three things seemed clear: (1) Japan could not be brought to unconditional surrender by blockade and bombardment alone. (2) Invasion of the home islands —Kyushu in November 1945 and Honshu the following March—would be necessary. (3) The entry of Russia would facilitate the invasion and was therefore to be encouraged.

But at the same time, few of the military leaders were eager for Soviet intervention or as willing to make concessions as they had been at an earlier period. And there was a strong feeling that even if Soviet entry was not desired it would be impossible to prevent it. Ambassador Harriman believed "that Russia would come into the war regardless of what we might do, and that, in the end, Moscow would exercise control over whatever government might be established in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia."[23]

The conference at Potsdam, most recently chronicled by Herbert Feis, was the prelude to Allied victory and Japanese disaster. The atom bomb had been tested and the date of Russian entry into the war against Japan had been set. All conditions for Japan's defeat had been met except the terms of "unconditional surrender," and these were laid down in the Potsdam Declaration. The text of the Declaration was approved by the British at Potsdam and by the Chinese, but Russia was not informed, ostensibly because she was still neutral. In view of Soviet agreement to attack Japan and in view of the discussions already held, this was an obvious legalism. The true explanation lies perhaps in the fact that some thought the United States could end the war before the Russians entered. As Byrnes remarked on July 28, he was "anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in."[24] Some may also have felt that Russia might construe the Potsdam Declaration as an unfriendly gesture by an ally who had previously pressed for intervention in Asia and now was seeking a Japanese surrender to avoid the commitments made to secure that intervention.

[21] Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Draft Memo, Chiefs of Staff for Secretary of War, no date: Study by General Lincoln, June 4, 1945, quoted in Ray S. Cline, "Washington Command Post" (Washington: G.P.O., 1951), p. 344.

[22] C.C.S. 643/3, Report by Combined Intelligence Committee, July 8, 1945: Estimate of the Enemy Situation.

[23] Leahy, "I Was There," *op. cit.*, p. 369.

[24] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 205-6, 207; "The Forrestal Diaries," *op. cit.*, p. 55, 78.

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In Japan, the receipt of the Declaration led to frantic meetings to decide what should be done. The Japanese had approached the Russians earlier in an effort to secure Soviet mediation to end the war, and Ambassador Sato was then waiting in Moscow for an answer.[25] The Americans knew of these overtures, having intercepted the messages between Sato and the Japanese Foreign Office.[26] Stalin had mentioned the matter also to Truman and Churchill during the Conference. But the Declaration took no cognizance of these overtures and only repeated the demand for unconditional surrender, with the threat of military destruction if the demand was not met.[27]

The Japanese finally decided to ignore the Declaration until a reply was received from Moscow. But under pressure from the military, the Japanese Government issued a statement to the people that was taken by the Allies to mean a rejection. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Ambassador Sato was seeking vainly to get a response from the Soviet Government. He would have to wait, he was told, until Stalin and Molotov returned from Potsdam—and that would not be until August 6. Finally, at 5:00 p.m. on the 8th, two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Sato had his interview with Molotov. At the appointed hour, the Japanese Ambassador arrived at the Kremlin only to be greeted with the Russian declaration of war, effective the following day.[28] With this act, three months to the day after Germany's surrender, Russia lived up to its promise to the Allies—but violated the pledge it had made to Japan in April 1941 and which still had nine months to run. On the morning of the 9th, Soviet troops went into action on the Manchurian front, and an American B-29 dropped a second atomic bomb on Japan. The Japanese offer of surrender followed almost immediately, and five days later the war against Japan came to an end.

It is always risky to attempt to draw lessons from the past, especially, as in this case, when the past is so imperfectly known and so controversial. The historian is rightly skeptical of all such efforts. Still, with all the qualifications and reservations that must be made, it may be useful to try to draw some relevant conclusions from our wartime relations with the Soviet Union.

First, it seems fair to say that on the basis of this historical record there is little reason to believe that the Soviet Union will accept inspection of a disarmament or test-ban agreement. The Russians would not permit inspection during the war when we were their Allies and when they needed our help desperately; there is even less likelihood that they will agree to it now.

[25] For a full account of these negotiations, see "Potsdam Papers," v. 1, p. 873–902; v. 2, p. 1250–64; Robert J. C. Butow, "Japan's Decision to Surrender" (Stanford University Press, 1954); U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "Japan's Struggle to End the War" (Washington: G.P.O., 1946); Takushiro Hattori, "Complete History of the Greater East Asia War" (Japan: Masu Shobo, 1953), v. 4; Herbert Feis, "Japan Subdued" (Princeton University Press, 1961).

[26] "The Forrestal Diaries," *op. cit.*, p. 74–77.

[27] "Potsdam Papers," *op. cit.*, v. 1, p. 884–902; v. 2, p. 1265–90. The Declaration is on p. 1474–6. See also John Ehrman, "Grand Strategy," v. 6, October 1944–August 1945 (H.M.S.O., 1956), p. 461–4; and Winston Churchill, "Triumph and Tragedy" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 641–2.

[28] Butow, *op. cit.*, p. 142–9, 153–4; Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 469; Hattori, *op. cit.*, v. 4, p. 153; "Potsdam Papers," *op cit.*, v. 2, p. 1474, note 1. The Japanese response to the Declaration can be traced in Kazuo Kawaii, "Mokusatsu," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1950, p. 409–14; William J. Coughlin, "The Great Mokusatsu Mistake," *Harper's*, March 1953, p. 31–40.

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A second point worth noting is that the Russians kept their pledge to the Allies about coming into the Far Eastern war. This in itself is not as significant as the timing of their entry. They could have delayed, though some will argue that the bombing of Hiroshima forced them to come in when they did. We do not know whether this was actually the case; nor are we completely certain whether the atomic bomb or the Soviet declaration of war weighed more heavily with the Japanese. But we do know that, whatever the reasons, Stalin kept the promise he had given at Yalta.

The decision to seek Soviet participation provides one of the clearest examples in recent history of the subordination of the political to the military considerations of policy. No one can study these negotiations and not be struck by the almost complete absence of political representation. Here was a matter involving political considerations of the highest importance, yet it was not until near the very end of the war, after the political questions had been settled, that the State Department was brought in at all. As a matter of fact, when Stettinius offered his services at the time of the Yalta meetings, Roosevelt declined the offer politely.[29] Throughout, he treated Soviet entry primarily as a military matter, and it was apparently on the advice of the Joint Chiefs, who viewed the problem in purely military terms, as they should, that he made his decision to pay the price of Soviet intervention. Perhaps he had no other choice, since Stalin could have taken what he asked for anyhow. Or perhaps Roosevelt wanted to get Stalin's coöperation for the postwar settlement. But these in themselves might not have justified the price Stalin asked. That justification Roosevelt found in the strategy of his military advisers, for it was their plans rather than postwar political aims that established with inexorable logic the requirement for Soviet intervention.

Finally, if Soviet entry was based on military necessity, that necessity sprang from an inflexible and unrealistic political goal—the unconditional surrender of Japan. This was the announced war aim of the Allies, made, so far as is known, without any reference to the military. Yet it had enormous implication for the planners. What it did was impose on them a strategy of invasion and total destruction. In the case of Japan, such a strategy was unnecessary, for Japan was already defeated and seeking a way out of the war. But the unconditional-surrender formula could not be changed at this late date, and so the military went ahead with their plans for the invasion. It was this which made Soviet intervention desirable and played so large a role in the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.[30] Perhaps, then, the greatest lesson we can draw from this experience with the Soviet Union is, first, the importance of maintaining a proper balance between the political and military elements of policy, one of the most difficult tasks of a democracy; and, secondly, the danger of complex and inflexible war plans that may themselves commit the nation to a course from which there is no return. In an age of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear warheads, no nation can afford to overlook these lessons.

[29] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Roosevelt and the Russians." Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, p. 95.

[30] Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1957, p. 334–353.

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A scholarly diplomatic-military study of the development of the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council in 1917–1918 and of the American participation therein.

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The author, professor of government at the University of Texas, examines in considerable detail and within the historical framework the position of the United States in the Organization of American States, and discusses the implications of the enormous U.S. influence and power upon the functioning of an inter-American system.

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A careful examination of the juridical personality and policies of the U.N.

LE DROIT DE PÉTITION DANS LES TERRITOIRES SOUS TUTELLE. By Jean Beauté. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1962, 265 p. NF. 30.

A study of the right of petition of dependent territories, with particular reference to the operation of Article 87b of the U.N. Charter.

COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. By R. P. Anand. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian School of International Studies), 1962, 342 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.95.)

An Indian student of international law discusses the extent to which the principle of "compulsory jurisdiction" has been conferred on the International Court.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR. By Quincy Wright. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1962, 119 p. $4.00.

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A comparative study of the setting of public administration in the United States, Thailand and the Philippines. The author is Professor of Government at Indiana University.

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SIX CRISES. By Richard M. Nixon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 460 p. $5.95.

In this personal work the former Vice President discusses six "crisis situations" he has encountered in the course of his political career: the Hiss case, the "fund" speech in the 1952 campaign, President Eisenhower's heart attack, the riot in Caracas, his "kitchen clash" with Khrushchev and the 1960 campaign.

WHY NOT VICTORY? By Barry M. Goldwater. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 201 p. $3.95.

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DIXON-YATES: A STUDY IN POWER POLITICS. By Aaron Wildavsky. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 351 p. $6.75.

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CONSCIENCE IN POLITICS: ADLAI E. STEVENSON IN THE 1950's. By Stuart Gerry Brown. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961, 313 p. $4.50.

A well-written and sympathetic essay on Adlai Stevenson's significant political role throughout the 1950s, despite his defeats in 1952 and 1956.

SECRET SERVICE CHIEF. By U. E. Baughman with Leonard Wallace Robinson. New York: Harper, 1962, 266 p. $4.95.

Highly interesting President-guarding memoirs of the former chief, for 13 years, of the United States Secret Service. Replete with anecdotes, from the pursuit of counterfeiters to the wisp of smoke at President Kennedy's inauguration.

THE ILLUSION OF NEUTRALITY. By Robert A. Divine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 370 p. $6.50.

In this work a historian at the University of Texas reviews the U.S. neutrality legislation of the 1930s and the debate between "isolationists and internationalists," down to the fall of 1939.

THE COMMITTEE AND ITS CRITICS. By William F. Buckley, Jr. and the Editors of *National Review*. New York: Putnam, 1962, 352 p. $4.95.

An appraisal, on the whole friendly and favorable, of the purposes and activities of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Contributors include James Burnham, Willmoore Kendall, Ralph de Toledano, M. Stanton Evans, C. Dickerman Williams and Irving Ferman.

WHEN GOVERNORS CONVENE. By Glenn E. Brooks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961, 186 p. $4.50.

A study of the Governors' Conference and its role in national politics.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS. By Thomas Aitken, Jr. New York: Harper, 1962, 159 p. $4.00.

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The vice president of McCann-Erickson International discusses in this essay the implications of America's vast foreign business operations upon our foreign policy and relations with other peoples.

Western Europe

THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMMON MARKET. By U. W. Kitzinger. Oxford: Blackwell, 1961, 152 p. 10/6.

This is a first-rate summary of the state of continental European integration and the issues facing Britain as it applies for entry. The author, who is in favor of British membership, is an Oxford don who spent six years at the Council of Europe. He has a larger work on the same subject in train.

LE BENELUX COMMENTÉ: TEXTES OFFICIELS. By Jacques Karelle and Fritz de Kemmeter. Brussels: Bruylant, 1961, 364 p. Belgian Fr. 580.

A useful volume of documents relating to the Benelux treaty.

THE CONSEIL D'ETAT IN MODERN FRANCE. By Charles E. Freedeman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 205 p. $5.00.

A monograph on the development, structure and function of the Conseil d'État.

CATHOLICISM AND CRISIS IN MODERN FRANCE. By William Bosworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 407 p. $8.50.

An able study of the various facets and shadings of French Catholicism and their role in contemporary French society and politics.

DÉBAT SUR LA FRANCE DE DEMAIN. By Jacques Rigaud. Paris: Julliard, 1961, 250 p. NF. 10.80.

A report on an extensive exchange of views concerning France's national objectives and future.

LE QUAI D'ORSAY SOUS TROIS RÉPUBLIQUES, 1870–1961. By Georges Bonnet. Paris: Fayard, 1961, 519 p. NF. 19.50.

The former French Ambassador and Minister of Foreign Affairs here reviews and interprets the course of French diplomacy and foreign policy since 1918. A melancholy narrative.

EKONOMIKA I POLITIKA GOLLANDII POSLE VTOROI MIROVOI VOINY. By V. A. Val'kov. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1961, 220 p. Kop. 89.

A Soviet appraisal and critique of the Dutch economy and of domestic and foreign policy since the Second World War.

THE NEW GERMANY AND THE OLD NAZIS. By T. H. Tetens. New York: Random House, 1961, 286 p. $4.95.

As the title suggests, Mr. Tetens argues with considerable animus that "many Nazis are again in key positions of power" and that Germany is hardly a reliable democratic ally.

PLÄDOYER FÜR DIE ZUKUNFT. By Willy Brandt. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1961, 133 p. DM. 4.80.

Twelve pieces by the Mayor of Berlin on various questions of German domestic and foreign policy.

DER HITLERPUTSCH. By Hanns Hubert Hofmann. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1961, 335 p. DM. 19.80.

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A detailed study of the background to Hitler's abortive *putsch* in Bavaria of November 9, 1923.

SOLDATENTUM UND REBELLION. By Gert Buchheit. Rastatt: Grote, 1961, 509 p. DM. 24.80.

A substantial history, by the author of "Hitler der Feldherr," of the fortunes of the German Army under Hitler, 1933–1945.

SPIEGELBILD EINER VERSCHWÖRUNG. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961, 586 p. DM. 38.

A documentary volume comprising Kaltenbrunner's reports to Bormann and Hitler concerning the attempted *coup* of July 20, 1944.

KRIEG IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Walther E. Schmitt. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961, 392 p. DM. 19.80.

A study of the evolution of Soviet policies on Germany, particularly in the postwar period but with some background on Lenin's revolutionary teachings.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DER SOWJETKOMMUNISMUS. By Ernest J. Salter. Munich: Piper, 1961, 305 p. DM. 8.80.

A quite interesting essay on Soviet Communism, its challenge to the habits and practices of the rest of the world, and particularly of Germany.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRIAN SOCIALISM. By Kurt L. Shell. Albany: State University of New York, 1962, 305 p. (New York: University Publishers, distributor, $10.00.)

A scholarly study of the change in goals, ideology and style of the Austrian Social Democratic Party since 1945.

PRELUDE TO INFAMY: THE STORY OF CHANCELLOR DOLLFUSS OF AUSTRIA. By Gordon Brook-Shepherd. New York: Obolensky, 1962, 295 p. $5.00.

A serious, well-researched study of Engelbert Dollfuss, the Austrian Premier who was assassinated in the abortive Nazi *coup* of July 25, 1934.

ITALIENS WEG IN DEN ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Ferdinand Siebert. Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum, 1962, 460 p. DM. 36.

A solid and scholarly study, by a German diplomatic historian, of Italy's foreign policy in the Mussolini era, up to the Duce's intervention in the Second World War.

LIVING PETER. By Glorney Bolton. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 208 p. 25/.

An appreciative account of the career of Pope John XXIII by an English Anglican, resident in Rome.

FRONT POPULAIRE 1936. By Louis Bodin and Jean Touchard. Paris: Colin, 1961, 293 p. NF. 7.50.

A brief review of the Popular Front in France with particular attention to the ideological conflict.

IMAGE OF SPAIN. By James Cleugh. New York: Pitman, 1961, 264 p. $5.95.

A knowledgeable introduction to contemporary Spain, quite optimistic in its political sections.

GRUNDLAGEN UND IDEEN DES SPANISCHEN STAATES DER GEGENWART. By Walter Wefers. Bonn: Bouvier, 1961, 130 p. DM. 15.

An effort to relate the present Spanish state to the national history and character.

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L'ALTRA SPAGNA. By Angelo del Boca. Milan: Bompiani, 1961, 235 p. L. 1200.
A critical Italian report on contemporary Spain.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S.S.R. By Nicholas DeWitt. Washington: National Science Foundation, 1962, 856 p. $5.50.

In this massive and important work, which will serve as an indispensable reference, Professor DeWitt, author of "Soviet Professional Manpower," analyzes the Soviet educational system at all levels, and the utilization of professional and specialized manpower. The author finds the system successful in developing "applied professional skills enabling the individual to perform specialized, functional tasks."

IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN SOVIET POLITICS. By Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. New York: Praeger, 1962, 180 p. $4.50. (Paper, $1.75.)

Five essays by a leading student of contemporary Soviet affairs on totalitarianism, the Soviet system, Communist ideology and changes in the Soviet bloc.

RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. Edited by Abraham Brumberg. New York: Praeger, 1962, 660 p. $8.75. (Paper, $2.50.)

A useful selection of articles taken from the journal *Problems of Communism,* published by the United States Information Agency.

NO THIRD PATH. By Joseph Novak. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 359 p. $4.50.

A young scholar from Eastern Europe, and author of "The Future Is Ours, Comrade," presents, on the basis of interviews, Russia and the world as seen by the Soviet citizen. The sections on "collective life" are particularly good.

SOVIET MAN AND HIS WORLD. By Klaus Mehnert. New York: Praeger, 1962, 310 p. $5.95.

A translation of "Der Sowjetmensch" (noted here in April 1959)—a valuable report on contemporary Russia by an experienced German student of that country.

GESPRÄCHE IN MOSKAU. By Gerd Ruge. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1961, 357 p. DM. 16.80.

A well-known German journalist reports on a visit to the Soviet Union. Of particular interest are his observations on intellectual and cultural developments and on a trip to Siberia.

EIN AFRIKANER IN MOSKAU. By Michel Ayih. Cologne: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1961, 196 p. DM. 14.80.

A young Togolese describes his experiences as a student in Moscow and tells why he left after discovering that there was less freedom under Communism than under a colonial régime.

THE NEW IMPERIALISM. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Chester Springs (Pa.): Dufour, 1962, 136 p. $2.95.

A concise but revealing history of Russian and Soviet imperialism.

DIE SOWJETISCHE GESCHICHTE DES GROSSEN VATERLÄNDISCHEN KRIEGES 1941–1945. By Boris Semjonowitsch Telpuchowski. Frankfurt/Main: Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1961, 576 p. DM. 29.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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A critical translation with analysis and commentary of a work by a leading Soviet historian. Of considerable interest in illustrating the functions and limitations of Soviet historiography.

SOVIET COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES. Edited by Jan F. Triska. San Francisco: Chandler, 1962, 196 p. $1.50. (Paper)

The texts of programs and rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1919.

SOVIET SCHOLASTICISM. By Thomas J. Blakeley. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1961, 176 p. Gldrs. 19.75.

A study of the methods and procedures of contemporary Soviet philosophy.

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT. Edited by J. M. Bocheński and T. J. Blakeley. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1961, 141 p. Gldrs. 17.50.

These studies in the series "Sovietica," put out by the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg, contain a number of valuable, if quite technical, studies of Soviet thought and philosophy.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Ivo J. Lederer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 620 p. $10.00.

A symposium of essays on various aspects of Russian foreign policy, its goals, instruments and application, over the last century.

L'INDUSTRIE LOURDE EN UNION SOVIÉTIQUE. By Serge Mawrizki. Geneva: Droz, 1961, 155 p. Swiss Fr. 16.

A study of organization and planning in Soviet heavy industry.

McGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Michael T. Florinsky. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961, 624 p. $23.50.

A very substantial, comprehensive and authoritative work of reference, arranged alphabetically.

COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM. By Bertram D. Wolfe. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961, 328 p. $4.95.

In this revised edition of essays published in 1956 ("Six Keys to the Soviet System"), Mr. Wolfe has added some more recent papers and addresses.

YUGOSLAVIA IN CRISIS, 1934–1941. By J. B. Hoptner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 328 p. $6.50.

An able study of Jugoslavia's foreign policy during the regency of Prince Paul and amidst the mounting international crisis that was to ravage the country in 1941.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By C. E. Carrington. London: Harrap, 1961, 96 p. 8/6.

In these Reid Lectures the Professor of British Commonwealth Relations at the Royal Institute of International Affairs briefly discusses the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, and the new "partition" of Africa with the rise of independent régimes.

BACKBENCH OPINION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1955–59. By S. E. Finer and Others. New York: Pergamon Press, 1961, 219 p. $10.00.

An interesting effort to get at the nature, composition and stability of backbench opinion in the two great Parliamentary parties.

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PRESSURE GROUP. By H. H. Wilson. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 232 p. $4.00.

A study of the political conflict over the introduction of commercial broadcasting in Britain.

THE STORY OF FABIAN SOCIALISM. By Margaret Cole. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 366 p. $6.50.

A valuable account of that remarkable Society centering in the unusual partnership of Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw. By her own participation and that of her late husband, G. D. H. Cole, the author is exceptionally well equipped to write with authority, and personally, on the subject.

THE FASCISTS IN BRITAIN. By Colin Cross. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1961, 212 p. 21/.

A detached and conscientious account of the Fascist currents in Britain, particularly Sir Oswald Mosley's movement, up to 1940.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE. By James Eayrs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, 232 p. $6.95.

Mobilizing a substantial body of historical and recent detail, the author gives a valuable analysis of the formation of Canadian foreign policy and the place in it of various parts of the Canadian government.

CANADIAN ECONOMIC POLICY. By T. N. Brewis and Others. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 365 p. $6.50.

A review, by three economists and a political scientist, of the development of Canadian government economic policy in recent years.

The Middle East

THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: ITS IMPACT ON ASIA. By Ivar Spector. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1962, 180 p. $3.95. (Paper, $1.95.)

In this book Professor Spector deals chiefly with the impact of the 1905 revolution on Asian nationalist movements, especially in Iran, Turkey, China and India.

L'ISLAM FACE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE. By Jacques Austruy. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1961, 140 p. NF. 7.80.

A discussion of the problem of the adaptation of Islamic society to the needs and possibilities of economic development.

LE CONFLIT DE CHYPRE ET LES CYPRIOTES TURCS. By A. Suat Bilge. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaasi, 1961, 267 p. £T. 17.50.

The Cyprus conflict, 1954–1959, from the perspective of Turkey and the Turkish community on the island.

LE CONFLIT JUDÉO-ARABE. By A. Razak Abdel-Kader. Paris: Maspéro, 1961, 433 p. NF. 18.50.

A quite unusual interpretation of the Jewish-Arab conflict from an ultra-leftist, dissident Communist perspective.

South and Southeast Asia

THE LAST DAYS OF THE BRITISH RAJ. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Harcourt, 1962, 263 p. $4.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An indignant book on the last days of British rule in India, the transfer of power and the partition of the subcontinent amid much violence and bloodshed. The author is particularly critical of Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, who in his view moved too fast and too heedlessly.

FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA. By Satyavrata Ramdas Patel. Bombay: Tripathi, 1960, 282 p. Rs. 15. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman, $4.50.)

A sharp critique of India's foreign policy as "partisan and perverse, weak and vacillating, immature and inane."

BLOSSOMS IN THE DUST. By Kusum Nair. New York: Praeger, 1962, 201 p. $4.00.

The author, who spent a year visiting villages throughout India, presents her picture of rural society and its vicissitudes under the growing impact of social and economic change.

CHANGING INDIA. Edited by N. V. Sovani and V. M. Dandekar. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 356 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $7.50.)

Essays in honor of D. R. Gadgil on a variety of economic and sociological themes.

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: INDIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM RANADE TO BHAVE. By D. Mackenzie Brown. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 244 p. $1.50. (Paper)

In this sequel to the author's earlier "The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi," Professor Brown introduces, and selects some writings of, a number of contemporary Indian political figures.

SOME BASIC PLANNING PROBLEMS. By Charles Bettelheim. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 68 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $5.50.)

Papers prepared in India by a leading French economist, and having special reference to Indian problems.

WIRD ASIEN ROT? By Eckhard Budewig. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961, 237 p. DM. 14.80.

A German correspondent's report on the strategic, political and diplomatic situation in Southeast Asia and on the tasks there confronting the United States and Western Europe.

POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND NATION BUILDING: BURMA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY. By Lucian W. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 307 p. $7.50.

A leading student of Southeast Asia looks into the political culture of Burma, a "transitional society." The author's central focus is the problem of change and modernization in the setting of a traditional order.

THAILAND: ASPECTS OF LANDSCAPE AND LIFE. By Robert L. Pendleton and Others. New York: Duell, 1962, 321 p. $10.00.

A very substantial guide to the country, one in the series of American Geographical Society Handbooks.

AMERICANS IN SUMATRA. By James W. Gould. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961, 185 p. Gldrs. 14.25.

A survey of American interest and interests in Sumatra over the last century or more. Chapters cover oil and rubber development, education and religion.

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The Far East and Pacific Ocean

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By R. G. Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1962, 147 p. $4.50.

A concise survey, by an Australian scholar. The author concludes that the West cannot count on any slackening of Communist China's expansionist drive, but rather an increase.

CHINA AND HER SHADOW. By Tibor Mende. New York: Coward-McCann, 1962, 360 p. $5.00.

A substantial report on contemporary Communist China, based in part upon the author's recent visit to the country but backed by his long-standing interest in the problem of Asia and of economic development. The picture that emerges is of a grim and often suffocating existence, but one driven by an inexorable purpose.

THE NATIONAL INCOME OF COMMUNIST CHINA. By Alexander Eckstein and Others. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, 215 p. $6.75.

A careful study of the composition and size of the Chinese Communist economy, using 1952 as the year for a "cross section view."

CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDIES OF MODERN CHINESE HISTORY. By Albert Feuerwerker and S. Cheng. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for East Asian Research Center), 1961, 287 p. $4.00.

An annotated bibliography of some 500 works published in Communist China between 1949 and 1959 and dealing with modern Chinese history.

PARTIES AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN. By Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 190 p. $3.75.

Two political scientists, one American and one Japanese, have collaborated in this study of political organizations and procedures in postwar Japan, with particular attention to the incidents of May–June 1960 as a test case for their hypotheses.

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Douglas H. Mendel, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 269 p. $6.50.

A useful study of Japanese public opinion relating to issues of recent foreign policy, based on the author's surveys and Japanese polls.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA, 1950–1953. By Robert Frank Futrell and Others. New York: Duell, 1961, 774 p. $12.50.

An official history of the Air Force in the "peculiar" and transitional Korean War. Stresses the role of the air arm and criticizes the Army Command for not making better use of its potentialities.

Africa

AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE. By Immanuel Wallerstein. New York: Vintage Books, 1961, 173 p. $1.25. (Paper)

An interpretative essay, with particular attention to changing social structures, on modern political developments in Africa.

THE AFRICAN NATIONS AND WORLD SOLIDARITY. By Mamadou Dia. New York: Praeger, 1961, 145 p. $4.85. (Paper, $1.85.)

A welcome translation of perceptive and thoughtful views on the problems of the emerging African nations, by the Premier of Senegal, a scholar as well as a political

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leader. (French edition, "Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale." Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1960, 150 p. NF. 9.)

AFRICA AND THE WEST. By Arnold Rivkin. New York: Praeger, 1962, 241 p. $5.00. (Paper, $1.95.)

An effort to identify some of the crucial problems of African political and economic development and their implication for American and free-world policy. The author is a member of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T.

THE COLONIAL RECKONING. By Margery Perham. New York: Knopf, 1962, 203 p. $3.95.

Lectures, by a leading British authority, on the end of colonial rule in Africa, African nationalism and the prospects for the future.

AFRICAN FIELD REPORTS: 1952–1961. By Edwin S. Munger. Cape Town: Struik, 1961, 808 p. £9 9s.

A collection of reports on Tropical and South Africa, originally prepared by Professor Munger under the auspices of the American Universities Field Staff.

MARCHÉS ET MARCHANDS D'AFRIQUE NOIRE. By Jean and René Charbonneau. Paris: La Colombe, 1961, 150 p. NF. 8.80.

Writing informally and without statistics, the authors draw on what is obviously an extensive knowledge of former French Africa to provide an interesting commentary on traders and trading conditions. The great merchant houses of Europe, the white traders, more or less expatriated, and the African traders, established and emergent, are all discussed.

THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM. By Edward Behr. New York: Norton, 1962, 260 p. $4.50.

The author, a British journalist, now North African correspondent for *Time* magazine, provides a useful and knowledgeable review of events in Algeria since the beginning of the rebellion.

FRANCE AND ALGERIA: COMPLEMENTARY ENEMIES. By Germaine Tillion. New York: Knopf, 1961, 183 p. $3.00.

In this brief but lucid essay on the two nations, a distinguished ethnologist stresses the "objective interdependence" of France and Algeria.

LA RÉVOLUTION ALGÉRIENNE. By Francis Jeanson. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962, 255 p.

A sympathetic essay on the Algerian revolution by a writer "de gauche" who hopes for the "véritable socialisation de l'Algérie."

THE KENYATTA ELECTION: KENYA 1960–1961. By George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford), 1961, 230 p. $4.80.

A detailed history and analysis, rapidly produced, of the election in the spring of 1961 and the events leading up to it.

AN AFRICAN ECONOMY. By Hugh Fearn. New York: Oxford University Press (for the East African Institute of Social Research), 1961, 284 p. $5.60.

A detailed study of the economic history of the Nyanza Province of Kenya, from 1903 to 1953.

IN THE NGOMBE TRADITION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE CONGO. By Alvin W. Wolfe. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961, 167 p. $6.50.

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An anthropological study, based on field research, of the Ngombe peoples of the northwestern Congo.

PORTUGAL'S STAND IN AFRICA. By Adriano Moreira. New York: University Publishers, 1962, 265 p. $3.95.

A statement of the Portuguese case by Portugal's Minister of Overseas Affairs.

Latin America and the West Indies

PAN AMERICA IN CRISIS. By William Manger. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 104 p. $3.25.

A discussion of inter-American relations by an author associated for four decades with the Pan American Union and the Organization of American States.

THE CHILDREN OF SÁNCHEZ. By Oscar Lewis. New York: Random House, 1961, 499 p. $7.50.

By anthropological rapport and the skillful editing of tape recordings, Professor Lewis has produced a remarkable five-man autobiography of a poor family in Mexico City that will substantially enlarge most readers' acquaintance with life.

BRAZIL: THE INFINITE COUNTRY. By William Lytle Schurz. New York: Dutton, 1961, 346 p. $6.00.

An exceptionally knowledgeable and readable study of the land and its people. The author has spent many years in Brazil and has traveled widely throughout this enormous country.

VENEZUELA. By Edwin Lieuwen. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1961, 193 p. $4.00.

A concise introduction to the country, in the useful series on Latin America prepared under the auspices of Chatham House.

CASTRO'S CUBA. By Nicolas Rivero. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1962, 239 p. $4.50.

The author, formerly associated with Castro and briefly head of the Department of Information of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, presents his views on the meaning of the Castro dictatorship for the island and for the rest of Latin America. He is inclined to favor military intervention, hopefully as a collective enterprise of the American states.

JAMAICA, 1830–1930: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Gisela Eisner. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961, 399 p. 50/.

A study of long-term historical change by means of national income accounting.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: ***United States:*** Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. ***Great Britain:*** British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. ***United Nations:*** United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; ***International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:*** Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. ***Int. Labor Office:*** 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. ***European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom:*** 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 87th Congress, 2d Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

THE ELEMENTS in our Congo policy, by G. W. Ball. Washington, 1961. 22 p. (Dept. of State. African Series, 25.) 15¢.

STUDY mission to Africa: Sept.–Oct., 1961. Report of Senators Gore, Hart, Neuberger. Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 87th. Cong., Ist. Sess., Jan. 14, 1962. Washington, 1962. 17 p. (Com. Print.)

AFRICA calls; development of education, the needs and problems, by Richard Greenough. Paris, UNESCO, 1961. 50 p.

Atomic Energy

AGREEMENTS between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. N. Y., 1961. 113 p. (61.X.1.) $2.00.

MULTILATERAL agreements. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1959. 257 p. (Legal Series, 1.) $2.50.

COMMENTS on some aspects of nuclear power economics, by L. E. Crean, R. A. Laubenstein and L. S. Mims. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1961. 63 p. (Review Series, 9.) $1.00.

FALLOUT protection; what to know and do about nuclear attack. Washington, Dept. of Defense, 1961. 46 p.

Canada

CANADA. Paris, OECD, 1961. 33 p. (Economic Surveys.) 50¢.

CANADA. London, Commonwealth Economic Committee, 1961. 59 p. (Commonwealth Development and its Financing, 1.) 8s.

SPOTLIGHT on oil drilling equipment. Ottawa, Dept. of Trade and Commerce, 1961. 68 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

ABC's of foreign trade. Washington, 1962. 33 p. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series, 183.) 20¢.

FOREIGN economic policy for the 1960's. Report of the Joint Economic Committee, Jan. 17, 1962. Washington, 1962. 50 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

IMPACT of imports and exports on employment. Hearings, Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports and Exports on American Employment, Committee on Education and Labor, House, 87th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. Washington, 1961–62.

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
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

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

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

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Mr. Conant was formerly a member of the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 1960–61 he served on the faculty of the National War College. He is at present Regional Advisor, Far East, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

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